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Preface
Blame as a concept informing domestic and international criminal 
justice has fascinated us for some time. Through our work researching 
and teaching criminology and penology and our individual interests 
in criminal law jurisprudence (GD) and international criminal justice 
(TH) it became evident that a systematic account of the role blame 
plays in the criminal justice process would constitute an important 
contribution to contemporary debates surrounding the use of the 
criminal law and, by implication, of punishment. It is accepted that 
recourse to the criminal law has become increasingly prevalent over 
the past 20 years and that notions of blameworthiness have often been 
employed to justify such intervention. Sometimes criminalisation was 
obviously necessary and overdue. Other developments, however, do 
not stand up to scrutiny and appear to be a blunt response to an illusory 
or over-stated problem. Like many commentators, we are perturbed 
by a trend to criminalise in the absence of compelling justification. 
This work will argue that this development is explained in part by a 
greater willingness to attribute blame for events, to demand that blame 
is imputed onto an individual or other legal actor, and that severe 
consequences should then follow. More will be said about definitions 
in Chapter One, but we employ the modern term blamestorming 
to describe the deliberate process of attribution. That ‘blamestorming’ 
is followed in the book’s title by blamemongers and scapegoats 
emphasises the fact that blamestorming is not a value-neutral exercise 
and that significant disparities in power are often involved.
Blame is used in this work as a prism which affords one way to 
view contemporary criminal justice policy and practice. We readily 
acknowledge that blame is not the only ground on which recent 
policy has been justified. When clear tension exists between blame 
and alternative explanations or claims, this will be explored further 
but dictates of space mean that our analysis of other possible accounts 
could not always be developed as fully as we would have liked.
Another function can be fulfilled by blame: it can be used to explain 
and it can be used to evaluate. Blaming someone for something may 
be a process worthy of examination but, because of the potentially 
adverse consequences of this process, it is imperative to assess whether 
the process is necessary and the finding and consequences warranted. 
Just as politicians and the media invoke blame too readily to justify 
potentially repressive measures, some criminologists are guilty of 
dismissing all instances of criminalisation as further proof of invidious 
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state control. Both accounts dissolve when exposed to the complexity 
of contemporary criminal justice. A meaningful assessment has to be 
more nuanced and context-specific. If this hinders the ability to make 
broad claims, so be it.
Prior to commencing, we were confident that a book about the 
centrality of blame in the criminal justice process would be valuable. 
We were equally aware that writing such a work would be a complex 
undertaking and we would like to record our thanks to those who 
originally reviewed the proposal for their valuable suggestions to our 
initial proposal. Like all projects of this size, the contents and layout 
evolved as the work progressed – new areas cried out for inclusion 
and this inevitably came at the cost of some topics which we had 
planned to cover.
Two key decisions were taken at the start. The first was that the book 
would address both domestic and international criminal justice: any 
study on blame which failed to consider how society apportions blame 
for the very worst crimes imaginable would be seriously deficient. 
Jurisprudence on the topic now exists as does a considerable secondary 
literature and we have been able to draw on both at various points. 
Second, the approach would be inter-disciplinary as blame interests 
those working in a variety of diverse areas of scholarship. One area 
which required fairly detailed analysis was criminal law theory, despite 
the book not being a legal study. It can easily be forgotten how 
dependent the criminal justice process is on the substantive criminal 
law. Deliberate decisions taken by parliament or the courts set the 
parameters of the criminal law and therefore determines what conduct 
can be responded to. Evaluating some crucial legal determinations 
demonstrated how judges also commonly invoke notions of blame 
when deciding whether particular forms of conduct should be viewed 
as criminal. As judicial interpretation influences decisions taken by 
police and prosecutors, one cannot sensibly divorce criminal law from 
criminal justice in this context.
The book is organised as follows. Chapter One expands on the 
terms and concepts adopted in the title, considering ‘blamestorming’, 
‘blamemongers’ and ‘scapegoats’ in turn. Through the use of 
contemporary and historical examples, we document how society 
seems more ready to hold individuals to account for their, and 
sometimes others’, actions. We start the chapter by detailing the tragic 
facts surrounding the death of a 22-year-old man. Justice seemingly 
demanded the punishment of his mother, but a causal analysis shows 
that her actions were but part of a factually and morally complicated 
story. Even if one could agree on how factual blame could be 
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apportioned in such a case, determining the extent to which she should 
be deemed blameworthy is highly problematic. That blame plays a vital 
role in the criminal justice system, that blame is inherently complex, 
and that society is prepared to find blame more easily than in the past 
are themes that emerge at the start of the study and ones to which we 
return throughout.
Chapter Two provides an overview of the role of blame in English 
criminal justice. Although the chapter cautions against viewing the 
criminal trial as the normal response to deviant behaviour (most 
offenders are diverted pre-trial or admit guilt), the trial remains 
paradigmatic and the chapter’s structure follows the process from mode 
of trial to sentence. It is argued that blame informs, though does not 
fully explain, both of these decisions. At this point in the book the 
value of blame both to illuminate and to evaluate becomes apparent. 
Sentencing represents a determination which will adversely affect the 
offender; as harm is being inflicted, it needs moral justification. The 
extent to which the offender is seen to be deserving of blame often 
frames a justification for sentence. Moreover, despite considerable 
residual discretion, sentencers must act within the law: statutes must 
be followed and guidelines generally heeded. To what extent does the 
law rely on notions of blame? Even if there is a gap between the statute 
and implementation, if sentencing law is based on blameworthiness, 
this is a notable finding. Our conclusion is that, despite a myriad of 
rival objectives, the law provides thresholds for different penalties 
(custody, community sentences and so on) based primarily on personal 
culpability. The relevant law is not so much accommodating to blame 
as a determinant of sentence, but usually demands that it is the sole or 
primary consideration.
Situations where individuals are excluded from criminal liability 
even though they are factually responsible are considered in Chapter 
Three, which we entitle ‘blame and the blameless’. Two categories of 
person often incur no criminal liability or are treated differently on 
the basis of a perceived lack of blame: children and those who lack 
mental capacity. The chapter considers both in turn, investigating the 
basis for such claims and assessing whether the law is consistent with 
the findings of other disciplines such as psychology. It is the case that 
arbitrary decisions are made. The reluctance to raise the minimum age 
of criminal responsibility in England and Wales from 10 (which is low 
compared to most jurisdictions), for example, highlights a change in 
attitude towards those exceptional cases when children kill. We are 
not the first to explore the effect of the James Bulger case on public 
sentiment towards juvenile offenders, but by drawing comparisons 
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with earlier cases a hardening of opinion is discernible: there is little 
sympathy for the fact that the perpetrators were severely disadvantaged 
children. A study of insanity and other defences which rest on lack 
of blame throws up legal inconsistencies and situations where the law 
fails to accord with principle. Finally, attention is paid to the concept 
of moral luck, an under-researched topic of great relevance to our 
study. Often the outcome of an individual’s deliberate action cannot 
be foreseen: a blow to the head can bruise, injure or kill. Does this 
arbitrary consequence affect blame? The likely sentence will be highly 
dependent on the result, but is an individual not as blameworthy if she 
shoots and misses than if she hits the intended target?
Chapter Four turns to what we term blameless crime. Offences 
typically stipulate a state of mind that must have been present at the 
time of commission; examples include intention, knowledge and 
recklessness. It can be argued that these states provide some kind 
of moral hierarchy whereby the intentional harm-causer is seen to 
be more blameworthy than the risk taker or the incompetent. Some 
correlation can be found between the seriousness of the offence (and 
the likely severity of the punishment) and the state of mind prescribed. 
The most serious crimes, most notably murder, demand an intention to 
cause the specified harm whereas many comparatively minor offences 
require no fault on the part of the offender. Blameless crimes therefore 
exist in considerable number, although it is also the case that the courts 
have interpreted many key concepts in a way which gives primacy to 
blame. Two examples are recklessness and strict liability. Statute does 
not specify whether recklessness can be found when the unjustified 
risk taken is obvious to the reasonable man or whether subjective 
appreciation is necessary. If the former approach is taken, individuals 
who foresaw no risk and were perhaps incapable of foreseeing any risk 
would be liable. Examples will be provided of the injustice caused when 
patently blameless individuals were convicted in this way. In a landmark 
ruling, the House of Lords held that subjective appreciation was central 
to a finding of recklessness and based this conclusion largely on the 
understanding that blame should help determine criminal liability. This 
perception is also evident in cases dealing with strict liability. Although 
this category of offence ostensibly requires no fault on the part of the 
offender, the courts have created a series of conditions that need to be 
fulfilled if this is to be the case. A blame requirement will effectively 
be read in if the offence is stigmatic and carries significant punishment.
Thus far the book has shown how blame has been used to justify 
the expansion of the criminal law (often after lobbying by politicians 
and the media) and how it has been used (primarily by the courts) to 
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constrain the punishment of the blameless through distinguishing 
certain exceptional offenders or situations (Chapter Three) or through 
the interpretation of key legal concepts (Chapter Four). Blame is thus 
employed to neutralise or mitigate the scope and the effect of the law. 
The next two chapters consider how this can work in reverse.
Chapter Five conceptualises blame amplification. It starts with a 
detailed review of offence-severity and how this can be quantified 
objectively. Calculating a sentence on the grounds that it should be 
commensurate to the seriousness of the offence would be consistent 
with many people’s perceptions of justice. The problem is that 
the assessment of how serious an offence is and the subsequent 
determination of an appropriate sentence appear subjective. How 
serious is theft relative to criminal damage? What is a proportionate 
response to burglary? What is central to this chapter is the relevance 
of particular factors present in a given case which may make it more 
serious than usual. These aggravating factors are seen to amplify the 
offender’s blame. We consider the factors that the public identified 
when determining the seriousness of sexual offences and how these 
correspond to the factors sentencers should consider when passing 
sentence. All of this pre-supposes rational decision-making on the 
part of the offender. Social science research suggests, though, that 
this distorts the process which calls into question whether issues of 
aggravation and mitigation can be calibrated with any accuracy.
Context cannot be ignored. The chapter ends by considering 
‘extraordinary crime’ (that is, genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity). Their exceptionalism does not stem from their rarity. 
Millions of victims have been directly affected and atrocities continue 
to occur daily. There are distinctive features underlying this criminality: 
the brutality is widespread and has few parallels in domestic crime; 
the targeting is deliberate; and swathes of the population are involved 
actively or passively as perpetrators. Research suggests that few would 
resist participating in such events for a variety of reasons. Given this 
insight, how does blame assist us in finding an appropriate response 
to extraordinary crime? 
In Chapter Six we consider scenarios where the individual puts 
herself in a position which heightens the risk of her offending. This 
can take a variety of forms such as joining a criminal gang (where 
subsequent offending is certain) to becoming intoxicated (there is a 
correlation between intoxication and offending). We are not aware of 
any other attempt to synthesise more than one such activity and the 
conclusions that can be drawn are fascinating. The legal issue is whether 
the precursory conduct should have an impact on the defendant’s 
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criminal liability either in the sense that the offence might not be 
made out or that a defence may be available. There may be a sense of 
injustice if someone who was to blame for putting themselves in this 
position subsequently avoided conviction. A number of tensions are 
evident: the desire to maintain the integrity of the criminal law and the 
recognition that a strict application of the law could lead to injustice; 
the need to protect the public from violence and the acceptance that 
the violence may not have been intended; and the question of whether 
blame attaches to the initial act or to the offence that followed. Blame, 
it will be argued, is often used uncritically in an attempt to remedy 
some profoundly problematic legal issues. Comparative material will 
show that other countries do not always arrive at the same conclusions; 
indeed there are examples where blame has been used to justify 
departure from English law in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
Blame may or may not point in different directions but it has led the 
courts to distinct destinations.
One of the central themes of the book is that there has been a growth 
in the culture of blame and an increased need for scapegoats. We try to 
account for this phenomenon in Chapter Seven. Examples are taken 
from cases where children suffered harm or neglect and it is shown 
that ‘justice’ now entails blaming not only those who directly caused 
the harm (all of whom were dealt with fully by the criminal law) but 
those whose alleged inaction or incompetence provided a space for the 
abuse to occur. Lessons should be learnt and the incompetent should 
not be kept in post if their presence risks further abuse taking place 
but allocating personal responsibility beyond the individual abuser risks 
creating scapegoats. Why is it no longer sufficient to punish those who 
actually neglected or abused the child? The chapter also documents 
two parallel trends namely a shift from civil to criminal liability and 
from human rights to the international criminal court. All of the 
developments in this chapter have occurred in a brief timeframe which 
highlights the relevancy of the approach which we adopted.
Chapter Eight concludes the book by expanding on the process of 
blamestorming and the role played by the blamemongers. There are 
many reasons to become dispirited. Too often the allocation of blame 
is simplistic and arbitrary and reflects little more than the ability of the 
powerful to coerce the marginalised or vulnerable. Too often the force 
of the rhetoric drowns out the lack of substance behind the claim. 
Critically, these scenarios are becoming more common as society 
loses the ability to appreciate that individual blame cannot always 
be found when harm occurs. We also document, however, many 
instances where the law has evolved in order to protect the blameless 
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and the courts still display the confidence to justify their decisions on 
this basis. It is on this note that the book ends. Although the blame 
culture is insidious and the criminal law has been allowed to mushroom 
as a consequence, blame can and should inform progressive criminal 
justice reform. Blame may be a contested and a complex concept, but 
it has resonance and power and there would appear to be widespread 
agreement that it should play some role in setting the parameters of 
the criminal law. Rather than challenging this, reformers would be 
best advised to deconstruct the process of attribution and formulate a 
more compelling alternative.
We wish to thank all those who have assisted us directly or indirectly 
while we worked on this book and our colleagues at Policy Press for 
their professionalism and enthusiasm throughout.






Introduction and the  
centrality of blame
The Case of Mrs Inglis
On 21 November 2008 Frances Inglis killed her 22-year-old son, 
Thomas, by injecting him with heroin, having been unsuccessful in 
an earlier attempt. On 20 January 2010 she was convicted of murder 
and attempted murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 
minimum specified term of nine years. The killing of children by their 
parents is almost universally regarded as especially wrong and there is 
usually widespread public condemnation of mothers who kill their own 
children. On the face of it, Frances Inglis could expect considerable 
blame to be attached to her actions. Many might consider that her 
blame would be increased by the fact that she committed the murder 
while on bail for the attempted murder and that a condition of that 
bail was that she had no contact with her son. The Sentencing Council 
guidelines indicate that there is greater culpability when offences are 
committed on bail (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2004). Yet the 
facts surrounding the case outlined in the Court of Appeal judgment 
in Frances Inglis’s appeal (R v Inglis [2010] EWCA Crim 2637) show 
the attribution and assessment of blame to be far more complicated.
On 7 July 2007 Thomas Inglis was involved in a fight in which he 
was struck on the head. Against his wishes an ambulance was called and 
he was taken to hospital. According to the facts disclosed in the Court 
of Appeal judgment, during the journey to the hospital the back doors 
of the ambulance opened three times. On the third occasion Thomas 
fell out of the back and sustained severe head injuries which left him 
in a coma. At the inquest, the Hertfordshire Coroner found that on 
all three occasions the doors had been opened by Thomas himself 
and that on the third occasion he had jumped from the ambulance. 
Thomas required two life-saving operations to relieve pressure on his 
brain and a portion of the front part of his skull was removed. The 
Court of Appeal accepted that the appearance of Thomas following 
the second operation was ‘distressing’ but the view of the consultants 
at that time was that there was every possibility that Thomas could 
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recover sufficiently to lead an independent life. Frances, who was 
separated from her husband, Thomas’s father, had been opposed to the 
operations and took the view that Thomas should have been allowed 
to die naturally. She was considerably distressed by Thomas’s condition 
and believed him to be suffering and in pain. In August 2007 the 
medical team concluded that Thomas was not yet ready to be moved 
to a rehabilitation unit as he was still unable to swallow on his own. 
The medical team also took the view that Thomas would probably 
require long-term dependent care.
On 4 September 2007 Frances Inglis visited her son in hospital and 
following the visit he suffered cardiac arrest and was clinically dead. He 
was resuscitated and subsequent tests showed the cause of the cardiac 
arrest to be street heroin. Frances was arrested and interviewed and 
initially denied all knowledge of the heroin or any idea of ending 
Thomas’s life. The Court of Appeal pointed out that she was ‘content 
to allow suspicion to fall onto Thomas’s father or his brother or those 
responsible for his care at hospital’ (para 17). She was subsequently 
charged with the attempted murder of her son and granted bail 
subject to the condition that she did not visit her son. In May 2008 
her solicitors indicated that Frances Inglis would plead guilty on the 
basis that her action was motivated by a desire to end what she saw as 
Thomas’s suffering. Her only regret was the fact that she had failed in 
her attempt. While there was some doubt about Thomas’s prognosis 
before 4 September 2007, after the cardiac arrest his condition and 
prognosis was extremely poor.
On 21 November 2008 Frances Inglis gained access to the hospital 
which was providing care for Thomas. The hospital was short staffed 
and, although staff were aware that Frances was not permitted to see 
her son, a photograph which would have enabled staff to identify her 
had been removed some time earlier. Frances asked to see Thomas 
and was allowed in without suspicions being raised. She then injected 
Thomas with heroin and, calculating the time needed for it to take 
effect, waited for the staff to leave the room and then superglued the 
lock and barricaded the door.
At her trial Frances Inglis argued that she felt she had had no choice. 
Her actions had been motivated by love for her son who she did 
not wish to continue suffering a living death. She was particularly 
concerned about the possibility that hydration and nutrition would 
be withdrawn from Thomas if his vegetative state persisted beyond a 
12-month period. There was also evidence given at the trial to show 
that Frances had suffered from depressive disorder in the past and 
was suffering from depression at the time of her actions. At the end 
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of the trial she was convicted of murder and attempted murder and 
sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum period of nine years 
specified for the murder. She appealed both against conviction and 
against sentence. The appeal against conviction was dismissed and the 
Court of Appeal focused more on the appeal against sentence. The 
judgment was delivered by the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge.
Having been convicted of murder the only sentence available to 
the court was life imprisonment, but the court could still reflect the 
level of blame to be attached to Mrs Inglis by the minimum period 
specified. The Court of Appeal confirmed the conventional view 
that premeditation increases the quantity of blame as does the abuse 
of a position of trust: both were present in Mrs Inglis’s case. They also 
found, as an aggravating factor, that Mrs Inglis continued to show a 
lack of remorse for what she had done. On the other hand, the Court 
of Appeal accepted that Mrs Inglis was suffering from an impaired 
ability to cope with the situation of her son and that she genuinely 
believed that she was carrying out an act of mercy. By weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating factors together the Court of Appeal came 
to the conclusion that the initial sentence had overvalued the amount 
of culpability and reduced the recommended minimum term to five 
years imprisonment.
Had Thomas Inglis not sustained serious head injuries in November 
2008 it seems unlikely that his mother, Frances, would be currently 
serving a sentence of life imprisonment for his murder. Had Thomas 
not received a blow to the head during a fight in a pub an ambulance 
would not have been called. Evidence at the inquest suggests that 
Thomas had been drinking and that, either as a result of alcohol or the 
blow to his head, his judgement was impaired. In other circumstances 
he would probably not have attempted to leave a moving ambulance by 
the back door. Had the light warning the driver of an open door been 
working properly then the driver might have stopped when the back 
doors opened. Had the photograph of Mrs Inglis not been removed 
from the hospital which was treating Thomas then she might have 
been recognised and escorted from the premises before administering 
the fatal dose of heroin. Had the hospital not been short staffed it may 
have been more difficult for Mrs Inglis to see Thomas unaccompanied. 
Clearly the main person to blame for Thomas’s death is Frances Inglis. 
The questions as to whether any others in the tragic story are deserving 
of blame and the quantity of blame to be attributed to Frances Inglis 
are more complex.
4
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The Case of Baby P
In 2007 in England and Wales 574 children died between the ages 
of one and four (ONS, 2007). Of those, 21 were victims of unlawful 
killing. One of the victims became particularly known to the public. 
Peter Connelly was born on 1 March 2006 and was found dead in 
his cot on 3 August 2007. The death of ‘Baby P’, as he came to be 
known, received considerable media attention, far more than the 
other 20 young children whose lives were unlawfully ended in 2007. 
During his life, concerns had been expressed on a number of occasions 
about the quality of his care. He was repeatedly seen by members of 
Haringey’s Children and Young Persons Service and by NHS healthcare 
professionals. On two occasions his mother was arrested in connection 
with injuries sustained by Peter but both times she was released without 
charge. The post mortem examination of Peter identified 22 separate 
injuries including fractures to his ribs, a broken spinal cord, a broken 
tooth and a removed toenail (R v B, C and Jason Owen (2009)).1 In 
November 2007 Tracey and her partner, Steven Barker, together with 
Barker’s brother, Jason Owen, were convicted of ‘allowing or causing 
the death of a child or vulnerable adult’ under section 5 of the Domestic 
Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. Connelly and Barker were 
given indeterminate sentences of imprisonment for public protection, 
Owen received a sentence of three years imprisonment.
Unlike the case of Thomas Inglis, a successful criminal prosecution 
of those directly responsible for the death did not bring matters to a 
close. Seven years earlier, Haringey Social Services had been heavily 
criticised following the death of eight-year-old Victoria Climbié in 
February 2000. The death of Peter Connelly seemed to be an awful 
repetition of many of the events surrounding Victoria Climbié’s death. 
Following Peter’s death, Haringey Council launched an internal Serious 
Case Review and the Secretary of State for Children, Schools and 
Families ordered Ofsted, the Healthcare Commission and the Chief 
Inspector of Constabulary to carry out an inspection of safeguarding 
in Haringey. The inspection report was delivered to the Secretary of 
State on 1 December 2008 and acting on their findings he ordered 
the immediate removal of the Director of Children’s Services, Sharon 
Shoesmith.2 On 8 December 2008 Sharon Shoesmith was dismissed 
by Haringey Council and in April 2009 the Council announced that 
it had also dismissed the Deputy Director of Children’s Services, two 
managers and a social worker. Two of the healthcare professionals 
involved in the case were also subject to sanctions. One is left to wonder 
whether, had it not occurred within the jurisdiction of Haringey 
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Social Services, the tragedy of Baby P would have received the same 
media attention. Had it not received the media attention it did, one 
also wonders whether Haringey Council would have been so minded 
to dismiss the Director and Deputy Director of Children’s Services, 
the two managers and the social worker.
The case of Baby P raises important issues relating to blame. It also 
provides an example of public scapegoating. Baby P was not the only 
young child to die in 2007 yet his case received considerable media 
attention. Those directly responsible for his death received long terms 
of imprisonment, yet that did not seem sufficient to assuage a public 
(or certainly media-led) desire to allocate blame. What is also striking is 
the fact that the tone of the inquiries into the deaths of Peter Connelly 
and Victoria Climbié was markedly different to that of the first modern 
child abuse inquiry and this difference was reflected in the respective 
reports. In 1973 Maria Colwell was killed by her stepfather following 
systematic abuse. The case received considerable media coverage and 
a Committee of Inquiry was established, chaired by Thomas Fisher. In 
1974 the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the care and supervision 
provided in relation to Maria Colwell (the Fisher Report) was published 
(HMSO, 1974). It was considerably shorter than the two inquiries 
chaired by Lord Lamming into the deaths of Victoria Climbié and 
Peter Connelly. The written style of the later reports is much more 
personalised and there is a greater willingness to identify the guilty 
and the innocent. In 1974 the authors of the Fisher Report could 
conclude: ‘The overall impression created by Maria’s sad history is 
that while individuals made mistakes it was “the system”, using the 
word in the widest sense, which failed her. Because that system is the 
product of society, it is on society as a whole that the ultimate blame 
must rest’ (HMSO, 1974, para 242).
The later reports seem to be keen to protect society as a whole from 
blame by identifying specific individuals and organisations deserving 
of blame. It will be a central tenet of this book that the increasing 
willingness to attach blame to specific individuals and organisations is 
inextricably linked to a desire to exonerate the rest of us.
Blamestorming
Among the new words identified by the Oxford English Dictionary 
in 2003 was ‘blamestorming’ which was defined as ‘The process of 
investigating the reasons for a failure and of apportioning blame, esp. 
by means of discussion or debate’. The first use of the word was traced 
to a section in Wired Magazine by Gareth Branwyn entitled Jargon 
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Watch. On 20 January 1997 Branwyn identified blamestorming: ‘To 
sit around and discuss why a deadline was missed or a project failed 
and who’s responsible. Like brainstorming, from which it is derived, 
blamestorming is done with little regard for the quality of contributions 
to the discussion’ (Branwyn, 1997). The Daily Telegraph reported on 
29 January 2008 that ‘blamestorming’ was among a number of new 
buzzwords to enter office jargon identified by a survey carried out by 
the recruitment firm Office Angels:
When times get tough, when people get stressed, and when 
they are faced with a crisis, it is interesting to observe how 
many people seem to suddenly become skilled in the Art 
of Blamestorming. Loosely defined Blamestorming is a 
meeting of like-minded people who enjoy sitting around 
in meetings, deciding who or what they are going to blame 
for their current plight. How many good Blamestorming 
sessions have you had in your own organization recently? 
You probably know some people who are highly skilled at 
Blamestorming. Some people are so proficient that they do 
not even need an organized meeting in order to practice 
their art. They do it at the water cooler, in the elevator, 
on the phone and some are even skilled enough to record 
it on paper or send out by email. In our current economic 
climate it is not difficult to become a skilled Blamestormer 
as there are so many easy targets to pick from: Wall Street; 
The Government; Over Spending Home Owners; Greedy 
CEOs; Oil Prices and the like. (Meredith, 2009)
Undoubtedly blamestorming has its origins in the workplace and 
particular management styles yet the concept has a relevance in 
wider society. Meredith’s linking of blamestorming and times of 
crisis seems apt. Yet the increased readiness to blamestorm and blame 
seems a particularly modern phenomenon. A review of the British 
press coverage of the urban unrest of August 2011 by PressEurop 
was headlined ‘Blamestorming Britain’3 and the overall tone of the 
press coverage reflected a readiness or even desire to allocate blame 
to specific individuals and organisations. This is in marked contrast 
to the attitude of the press following unrest in the St Paul’s area of 
Bristol in April 1980. Then The Times editorial published on Monday 
7 April 1980 attempted to understand the weekend of disturbances 
and considered the effects of deprivation and unemployment and the 
nature of police–public relations: 
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But whatever the causes of it, and however blame for the 
causes of it is distributed, the fact of this high unemployment 
rate, which can only worsen in the months ahead, is a 
contributory factor in petty crime, dropping out, and 
resentment of authority – and authority means first and 
foremost the police. (p 9)
This shift in public attitudes is perhaps encapsulated by words, often 
misquoted, spoken by the then Prime Minister, John Major, in an 
interview given to the Mail on Sunday: ‘Society needs to condemn a 
little more and understand a little less’ (Mail on Sunday, 21 February 
1993). The condemnation is expressed in blame. Increasingly, in all 
aspects of life there seems to be a desire, almost a need, to allocate 
blame when things appear to go wrong. We live in a society that 
is increasingly preoccupied with allocating blame. Scientific and 
technological developments appear to give humans increasing control 
over their own destiny. An important consequence of this appears to 
be that when things go wrong someone must be to blame. Stan Cohen 
refers to ‘a denaturalization of nature’ (Cohen, 2002, 38). Cohen argues 
that disasters and environmental problems are increasingly treated as 
social events:
These ‘technical’ disasters are ‘the new species of trouble’, 
in contrast to traditional ‘natural’ disasters. They have 
become ‘normal accidents’, catastrophes embedded within 
the familiar: the collapse of a football stand, a rail crash, 
a bridge falling, the sinking of a channel ferry, a botched 
cancer screening programme. The resultant reactions are not 
as homogenous, automatic or simple as they are supposed 
to be in contrast with the complexities of moral discourse. 
Indeed the reactions are similar to the highly contested 
terrain of all moral panics. (Cohen, 2002, 38)
In 1976 Kai T Erikson published his study of the effects of the Buffalo 
Creek flood (Erikson, 1976). The flood occurred on 26 February 
1972 when the Pittston Coal Company’s coal slurry impoundment 
dam collapsed in West Virginia. The resultant flood engulfed the 
small village of Buffalo Creek, killing 125 people and injuring 1,121. 
Of the population of 5,000, 4,000 were left homeless. The Pittston 
Coal Company called the disaster an act of God. The two enquiries 
into the disaster were fairly inconclusive although the Pittston Coal 
Company did agree to pay compensation to the survivors. Erikson was 
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concerned with the effect of the disaster on social integration. Before 
the disaster the community of Buffalo Creek had been a very close-
knit one and social integration was extremely high. That high level 
of social integration was reflected in high levels of social regulation. 
The disaster had a devastating effect on both. Following the disaster, 
the people of Buffalo Creek had far less confidence and Erikson found 
that people suffered from a high level of anomie. 
Some six years before the Buffalo Creek flood soon after 9.00 am 
on 21 October 1966 a colliery spoil tip above the village of Aberfan 
in South Wales collapsed. The rock and shale slurry quickly covered 
the village including the classrooms of Pantglas Junior School; 116 
children and 28 adults were killed as a direct result of the disaster. On 
26 October 1966 the Secretary of State for Wales appointed a tribunal 
of inquiry under the chairmanship of Lord Justice Edmund Davies. 
The Tribunal reported on 3 August 1967 (HMSO, 1967). The Report 
was clear where blame was to be allocated: 
Blame for the disaster rests on the National Coal Board. 
This is shared, though in varying degrees, among the NCB 
headquarters, the South Western Divisional Board, and 
certain individuals…The legal liability of the NCB to pay 
compensation of the personal injuries, fatal or otherwise, 
and damage to property, is incontestable and uncontested. 
(para 74)
The Report also commented:
[T]he Aberfan Disaster is a terrifying tale of bungling 
ineptitude by many men charged with tasks for which they 
were totally unfitted, of failure to heed clear warnings, 
and of total lack of direction from above. Not villains, but 
decent men, led astray by foolishness or by ignorance or by 
both in combination, are responsible for what happened at 
Aberfan. (Para 73)
Nine individual NCB employees and officials were identified and 
singled for particular criticism. The report made clear, however, that 
it was a tale ‘not of wickedness but of ignorance, ineptitude and a 
failure of communications’. There were no criminal proceedings 
following the disaster. On the day of the disaster itself the chairman 
of the National Coal Board, Lord Robbens of Woldingham chose to 
attend his investiture as Chancellor of the University of Surrey rather 
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than going to the scene of the disaster. He did not arrive at Aberfan 
until the evening of 22 October. It is hard to believe that a comparable 
disaster today would not result in a massive ‘blamestorm’ leading to 
resignations, dismissals or criminal prosecutions.
Both Aberfan and Buffalo Creek had high levels of social integration 
at the time of the disasters and perhaps this provides a clue to the 
puzzle of blame and blamestorming. Although potential targets for 
blame were clearly visible in both disasters the ‘blamestorm’ never 
developed. Socially cohesive societies are unused to looking to the 
outside for either praise or blame and so when disaster strikes there 
is greater introspection and a fracturing of belief systems. Increasing 
blame and blamestorming may itself be a reflection of lower levels of 
social cohesion. Another possibility is raised by Cohen’s suggestion 
that in sudden unexpected forms of deviance or disaster, blame and 
responsibility can be shifted upward. Cohen’s focus was the series of 
disturbances that occurred in a number of south coast resorts and which 
involved clashes between the rival groups of Mods and Rockers. Cohen 
noted that there was generally widespread support for the police and 
the courts and blame was directed towards the government: ‘Students 
of natural disasters have noted a similar scapegoating process: those 
involved in the disaster are usually exonerated – ‘they only did their 
job’ – and government figures become targets for attack and protest 
in a situation for which they had no conceivable direct responsibility’ 
(Cohen, 2002, 186).
Cohen wrote those words in 1972 and the studies of the natural 
disasters to which he referred were published in 1943 and 1957 (Veltfort 
and Lee, 1943; Bucher, 1957). It is possible that, in the 40 years since 
the publication of Folk devils and moral panics, those in power have 
become more sophisticated in deflecting blame back downwards. In 
Chapter Five we discuss how a refusal to accept superior orders as a 
defence to war crimes and crimes against humanity may have the effect 
of downshifting blame and responsibility.
Blamemongers
We coin the term ‘blamemonger’ to focus attention on those who 
blamestorm and allocate blame in society. In the immediate aftermath 
of the Aberfan disaster there was considerable bitterness. The risks 
posed by the spoil tip above the village had been known about for a 
long time and many in the village had asked for action to be taken to 
prevent the very kind of disaster that ultimately occurred. The Merthyr 
Express reported on public sentiment at the inquest into the deaths: 
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The brave front of the people of Aberfan cracked on Monday 
at an inquest on 30 of the children. There were shouts of 
‘murderers’ as the Coroner of Merthyr, Mr Ben Hamilton, 
began reading out the names of the dead children. As one 
name was read out and the cause of death given as asphyxia 
and multiple injuries, the father of the child said ‘No, sir, 
buried alive by the National Coal Board’. One of the only 
two women among the 60 people at the inquest at Sion 
Primitive English Methodist Chapel at Aberfan, shouted 
out through her tears, ‘They have killed our children.’ Then 
a number of people called out and got to their feet. The 
coroner tried to restore order and said: ‘I know your grief 
is such that you may not be realising what you are saying.’ 
The father repeated: ‘I want it recorded – “Buried alive 
by the National Coal Board.” That is what I want to see 
on the record. That is the feeling of those present. Those 
are the words we want to go on the certificate.’ (Merthyr 
Express, 1966)
Those immediately affected were in no doubt as to who was to blame. 
Yet criminal prosecutions did not occur and media reports were much 
more measured. Contemporary society is more pre-occupied with 
blame, but it is important to have an understanding of who in society 
is in a position effectively to allocate blame. 
There are very great parallels here with the concept of moral 
entrepreneurs first identified by Howard Becker. For Becker, ‘Rules 
are the products of someone’s initiative and we can think of the people 
who exhibit such enterprise as moral entrepreneurs’ (1963, 168). Becker 
considers there to be two types of moral entrepreneur: rule creators 
and rule enforcers. The rule creators he regards as moral crusaders who 
‘typically believe that their mission is a holy one’ (p 168). Successful 
crusaders create new rules and new groups of outsiders. With the 
creation of a new rule there are new problems of enforcement and the 
need for rule enforcers who become part of the crusade.
Deviance – in the sense I have been using it, of publicly 
labelled wrongdoing – is always the result of enterprise. 
Before any act can be viewed as deviant, and before any 
class of people can be labelled and treated as outsiders for 
committing the act, someone must have made the rule 
which defines the act as deviant. Rules are not made 
automatically. Even though a practice may be harmful in an 
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objective sense to the group in which it occurs, the harm 
needs to be discovered and pointed out. People must be 
made to feel that something ought to be done about it. 
Someone must call the public’s attention to these matters, 
supply the push necessary to get things done, and direct 
such energies as are aroused in the proper direction to get 
a rule created…Once a rule has come into existence, it 
must be applied to particular people before the abstract 
class of outsiders created by the rule can be peopled. 
Offenders must be discovered, identified, apprehended 
and convicted (or noted as “different” and stigmatized for 
their nonconformity…). This job ordinarily falls to the 
lot of professional enforcers who, by enforcing already 
existing rules, create the particular deviants society views 
as outsiders. (pp 183–4)
Becker argues that only by focusing attention on both those who 
break the rules and those who enforce and make them will we achieve 
a full understanding of deviant behaviour. In a similar way only by 
exploring how blame is allocated – and by whom – will we achieve a 
full understanding of the behaviour that attracts blame.
To some extent the legitimacy of the allocation of blame is dependent 
on the legitimacy of the blamemongers: ‘Blame is morally appropriate 
only when the blamer has standing’ (Bell, 2013, 262). Bell identifies 
a number of writers, including Antony Duff and TM Scanlon, who 
defend this ‘standard account’ requiring would-be blamers to have 
standing to blame and there are some analogies with the concept of 
locus standii in legal proceedings. For Bell standard accounts of blame 
articulate a number of conditions that must be met for a blamemonger 
to have standing.
The first condition identified by Bell is the business condition: 
we can only legitimately blame when it is ‘our business’ to do so. In its 
narrowest meaning, to satisfy the business condition the blamemonger 
needs to demonstrate that he or she has been directly injured by the 
act or omission being blamed. This condition has the closest parallels 
with legal standing or locus standii and for similar reasons has also been 
the target of criticism. There may be practical reasons for limiting the 
amount of litigation but those practicalities do not seem as relevant to 
the allocation of blame. The ‘business condition’ has also been used 
in the context of discussions of blame and privacy: some behaviour is 
private and therefore should not attract blame. Angela Smith argues 
that this respect for privacy and a reluctance to allocate blame to acts or 
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omissions which are ‘private’ and therefore ‘none of our business’ helps 
the smooth running of society (Smith, 2007). Clearly in recent years 
there has been an increasing blurring of the boundaries between public 
and private, not least as a result of the emergence of widespread use of 
social media and almost instant communication. In the past it might 
have been true to argue, as Smith does, that: ‘The rights of privacy are 
such that it is generally not our business to reproach others for their 
minor moral faults unless we stand in a special relationship to them 
and/or have a relevant stake in the matter. (Smith, 2007, 478, n18)
In the days of Facebook and Twitter it may be that many more people 
feel that they have a ‘special relationship’ or ‘relevant stake’ and thus a 
business standing to blame.
The second condition Bell identifies is the contemporary 
condition:
[T]he blamer must inhabit the same moral community 
as the person blamed. Very roughly, two persons can be 
said to inhabit the same moral community if they see the 
same considerations as reason-giving and employ the same 
moral concepts. If the target is dead or inhabits a moral 
community far removed from the critic’s community, it 
would be impossible for the target to give criticism uptake. 
(Bell, 2013, 271)
Yet a functional view of blame might see considerable value in the 
blaming, even where the target is dead. One only has to consider the 
allegations made in respect of Jimmy Savile to see how blame can 
be allocated to dead targets. Those who defend the contemporary 
condition argue that if the blame cannot be received by the target it is 
pointless and morally inappropriate. A less functional view of blame 
would not raise such an objection.
Bell’s third condition is the nonhypocrisy condition according 
to which ‘one forfeits one’s standing to blame if one manifests the 
same flaw that one attempts to criticise in another’ (Bell, 2013, 272). 
There are echoes here of the techniques of neutralisation identified 
by Sykes and Matza (1957) and the condemnation of the condemner. 
Clearly the blamed may be able to respond to blame by pointing out 
the hypocrisy of the blamer but that in itself is surely not enough to 
negative the blamer’s standing. Those blaming may themselves be 
blameworthy but that does not logically imply that they are incapable of 
blaming. The final condition identified by Bell is the noncomplicity 
condition: one cannot blame in situations where one is complicit in 
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the wrongdoing. This would seem to rule out the possibility of self-
blame which undoubtedly exists and can be criticised on the same 
grounds as the nonhypocrisy condition. 
It is clear, though, that possessing the standing to blame is important: 
whether a person is in a position to blame does intuitively appear to 
depend on the relationship between blamemonger and blamed. The 
arguments for the standard account are underpinned by the same ideas 
which underpin legal standing: if there are not strict rules on standing 
we shall be overrun with blame. Bell argues for a more functional view 
of blame while accepting that relative position is important: ‘Blame 
helps to shield and protect us from the moral damage wrought by 
wrongdoing. Rather than attempting to limit blame by appealing to 
the objectionable notion of standing, we should take seriously our 
special responsibility as critics, targets, and bystanders’ (Bell, 2013, 281).
Subsequent chapters attempt to shed some light on this discussion 
to which we will return in the final chapter.
Scapegoats
The origins of the word ‘scapegoat’ are to be found in the translation 
of the Bible undertaken by William Tyndale in the sixteenth century. 
Tyndale’s translation reached a wider public in the King James Bible 
authorised by King James I and completed in 1611. Chapter 16 of the 
Book of Leviticus includes the following verses: 
 8. And Aaron shall cast lots on the two goats; one lot 
for the LORD, and the other lot for the scapegoat. 
 9. And Aaron shall bring the goat on which the LORD’S 
lot fell, and offer him for a sin offering.
 10. But the goat, on which the lot fell to be the scapegoat, 
shall be presented alive before the LORD, to make an 
atonement with him, and to let him go for a scapegoat 
into the wilderness.
‘Scapegoat’ was invented by Tyndale to express the literal meaning, 
as he saw it, of the Hebrew word ‘azazel’. The verses in Leviticus are 
describing the ritual for the Day of Atonement as laid down by Mosaic 
Law. Two goats are to be brought to the altar of the Tabernacle: one goat 
is sacrificed for the Lord and the other goat is used for the atonement 
of sins. The priest transfers the sins of the people to this other goat, the 
scapegoat, and it is driven or allowed to escape into the wilderness. By 
transferring the sins to the scapegoat, the community was cleansed of 
14
Blamestorming, blamemongers and scapegoats
it sins. Tom Douglas (1995, 29) sees particular significance in the fact 
that in ancient Hebrew society the scapegoat was not killed. It was 
only by leaving the community alive that the goat could carry with it 
the sins of the community: ‘The idea of the scapegoat being allowed 
to live is of particular importance when we consider current practice, 
where victims are pushed to the periphery of a group or a community 
but not driven away completely because their function as a focus of 
blame may need to be repeated’ (Douglas, 1995, 29).
The practice of scapegoating was not confined to ancient Hebrew 
society: ‘All through human history there have been ceremonies, if that 
is the right word, which have been and are described as scapegoating, 
and there have been victims’ (Douglas, 1995, 29). Even though modern 
society bears little resemblance to the communities of biblical times, 
scapegoating continues to occur. 
For Douglas:
[I]n order to state that a person, a group or an organisation 
is being scapegoated it is absolutely essential that there 
should be clear evidence that the allegations of responsibility 
and of causation are untrue, or at least partially so. This, 
in effect, means that any rational and real involvement in 
causing difficulties and problems is sufficient to dismiss any 
accusation of scapegoating. A scapegoat has to be innocent 
of causing the events, behaviour or situations for which he 
or she is being blamed. (Douglas, 1995, 55)
The authors argue that proving innocence is not always an easy 
task and that very often the allocation of blame is done quickly and 
without all necessary care in order to achieve the fundamental purpose 
of scapegoating: relieving the burden on the rest of the community. 
Douglas himself makes reference to the case of Beverley Allitt. In 1993 
Beverley Allitt was convicted of murdering four children, attempting 
to murder three children and causing grievous bodily harm to six other 
children while working as a nurse on the children’s ward of Grantham 
and Kesteven Hospital. She received 13 life sentences. As in the Baby 
P case the conviction of the person directly responsible for the deaths 
of children appeared to be insufficient to assuage the anger of the 
community. Following the trial and conviction of Beverly Allitt, the 
Secretary of State for Health appointed an inquiry chaired by Sir Cecil 
Clothier QC. The Clothier Report made it clear that the tragic events 
at the hospital were the product of a malevolent, deranged criminal 
mind and that a determined and secret criminal may defeat the best 
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regulated organisations. Nevertheless, the Report criticised failures of 
management and communication within the hospital and described 
a ‘general lack in the qualities of leadership, energy and drive in all 
those most closely associated with the management of ward four (the 
children’s ward)’. Before the Report was published in February 1994, 
two consultant paediatricians and one nursing manager at the hospital 
had been made redundant and another nursing manager had taken 
early retirement. Parents of some of the children expressed anger at 
the ‘scapegoating’ of the consultants and managers while the senior 
management criticised in the Report remained in their jobs: 
The Allitt case was clear: cause-and-effect responsibility 
and blame are all too horribly obvious. What is most 
important is how blame was apportioned between those 
who were generally regarded as having failed to prevent such 
a monstrous series of events occurring. Whether or not the 
Health Authority action in making the two consultants and 
two other staff redundant was designed to imply that these 
people were responsible is not relevant. What is relevant is 
that the public, and to some extent the media thought they 
were being offered as sacrifices to enable the matter to be 
closed at the cost of four people’s careers and, in some cases, 
their present and future quality of life. (Douglas, 1995, 59)
Significantly Douglas then continues: ‘There may have been some 
culpability on the part of the four who had been dispensed with’ 
thus casting doubt on whether the four can be considered scapegoats 
according to Douglas’s own narrow definition. It is for this reason 
that the authors suggest that a scapegoat does not need to be entirely 
innocent but merely to be carrying blame for others who might also 
be blamed.
The death of children is always a highly charged and 
emotional affair…No amount of cold fact will obliterate 
the overwhelming need to blame. Allitt was found guilty, 
so she cannot be much of a focus for blame because she is 
so obviously grossly disturbed. Thus the blame must go to 
those who should have prevented her from being able to 
take such lethal actions. (Douglas, 1995, 59)
We shall return to the situations where those clearly directly responsible 
cannot be a focus for blame in Chapter Three. The need to blame might 
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also go some way to explaining the investigations into allegations of 
sexual abuse made against the former BBC disc jockey, Jimmy Savile.4 
Savile’s death means no criminal proceedings can be brought against 
him, but investigation might identify police officers, managers and 
fellow disc jockeys at the BBC who are still alive and who are capable 
of being the focus for blame. It is our hope that this book will go some 
way to explaining the nature of this need to blame. We return to the 
investigation of allegations made against Jimmy Savile in Chapter Seven.
Blame
[Uncontroversial] is the fact that blame is, for better or 
worse, a central part of human relationships. (Coates and 
Tognazzini, 2013, 3)
Blame is as common as water and as transparent to the 
gaze. We all know what it is but we cannot explain what 
we know by describing the experience. Often there is no 
experience to describe. We also cannot explain what we 
know by specifying blame’s purpose, since genuine blame 
is always impotent because always after the effect. Given its 
ubiquity, its elusiveness, and its evident moral importance, 
we might expect philosophers to have scrutinised blame 
carefully. But strikingly, they have not. (Sher, 2006, vii) 
This book is fundamentally concerned with blame. Blame is a central 
part of human relationships, as significant as jealousy and love. Yet, as 
George Sher points out, discussion of blame has been minimal: ‘the 
absence of a significant literature on [blame] is really quite remarkable.’ 
(Sher, 2006, vii). We perhaps should point out that we are not 
saying blame is inevitable. A human society which does not blame is 
theoretically possible yet one cannot find an example: a society without 
blame may well be an oxymoron. 
The anthropologist, Mary Douglas, suggested such a society is not 
possible. She offers three types of blame or ‘blame situation’. Imagine, 
she says, that a woman dies. The mourners will inevitably ask: ‘Why 
did she die?’ Douglas suggests the framing of the question and the 
response will depend on the type of society in which one lives. One 
possible explanation is, ‘moralistic: she died because she has offended 
the ancestors, she had broken a taboo, she had sinned’ (Douglas, 1992, 
4). In such a society blame attaches to the victim. The ‘harm’ is evidence 
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of the ‘blame’. A second explanation is that the woman died because 
she had individual adversaries: 
[The] reason she died can be traced back to her not having 
been quick enough or clever enough in looking after her 
own interests; rival magic was more powerful than hers. 
The rivals who killed her are hardly being blamed when the 
finger of causation points to them, for there is not much 
moral concern: everyone is expected to do the same to 
promote their interests. (Douglas, 1992, 6)
The third possibility is that blame is attached to ‘an outside community’: 
‘In this case the answer is she died because an enemy of the community 
got her, not necessarily one who actually comes from outside but a 
hidden disloyal traitor’ (Douglas, 1992, 6).
Contemporary society relies on the third type of blame. Blame 
is about identifying the outsider, the ‘enemy within’ or the ‘other’ 
just as the concept of the scapegoat relies on the idea of insiders and 
outsiders. The Biblical account of scapegoating was that the goat that 
was not to be sacrificed was cast to the ‘outside’. The work of Tajfel 
and Turner on social identity theory shows how important the need 
‘to belong’ can be and how destructive a focus on the out-group or 
‘other’ may become (1986).
In 1960 PF Strawson delivered a lecture to the British Academy 
entitled ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Strawson himself noted that 
the lecture was ‘one of my very few ventures into moral philosophy’ 
(Strawson, 2008, xxvi). The ‘venture’ received considerable attention 
and is seen by many as ‘the founding document of contemporary work 
on blame’ (Coates and Tognazzini, 2013, 5). In his lecture Strawson 
was attempting to reconcile two opposing views on the implications for 
blame on the truth or otherwise of determinism. Strawson characterised 
the two views as pessimism and optimism, more often referred to 
as incompatibilists and compatibilists. The pessimists argue that if 
determinism is true and human beings do not have free will, then 
blame and punishment and expressions of moral condemnation and 
approval are unjustified. The optimists counter this position by arguing 
that blame remains valid even if determinism is true. Some optimists 
argue that the justification for blame is to be found in its efficacy in 
‘regulating behaviour in socially acceptable ways’ (Strawson, 2008, 92). 
The pessimists reply ‘that just punishment and moral condemnation 
imply moral guilt and guilt implies moral responsibility and moral 
responsibility implies freedom and freedom implies the falsity of 
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determinism’(Strawson, 2008, 93). For Strawson, the optimists accept 
the requirement of freedom but understand freedom to mean merely 
the absence of conditions which would make moral condemnation or 
punishment inappropriate: 
[Conditions] like compulsion by another, or innate 
incapacity, or insanity, or other less extreme forms of 
psychological disorder, or the existence of circumstances 
in which the making of any other choice would be morally 
inadmissible or would be too much to expect of any man. 
To this list they are constrained to add other factors which, 
without exactly being limitations of freedom, may also 
make moral condemnation or punishment inappropriate or 
mitigate their force: as some forms of ignorance, mistake 
or accident. (Strawson, 2008, 93)
Strawson’s reconciliation of the two positions relies on the fact that ‘The 
existence of the general framework of attitudes itself is something we 
are given with the fact of human society. As a whole, it neither calls 
for, nor permits, an external ‘rational’ justification’ (Strawson, 2008, 
145). Both optimist and pessimist ‘over-intellectualise’ the notion of 
blame. For Strawson, human society without blame is an impossibility: 
‘[In] the absence of any form of these attitudes it is doubtful whether 
we should have anything that we could find intelligible as a system of 
human relationships, as human society’ (Strawson, 2008, 148). 
The reconciliation of the two positions comes from a radical 
modification of the optimists’ position. Strawson accepts the important 
role of moral condemnation in regulating behaviour but argues that the 
optimists ‘forget that these practices, and their reception, the reactions 
to them, really are expressions of our moral attitudes and not merely 
devices we calculatingly employ for regulative purposes. Our practices 
do not merely exploit our natures, they express them’ (Strawson, 2008, 
150). For Strawson, therefore, blame and moral responsibility are not 
matters of belief which are capable of being assessed for objective truth 
but, rather, they are attitudes and, as such, neither true nor false.
Strawson’s lecture was an attempt to resolve arguments about 
the relationship between blame and determinism and the extent to 
which blame could exist in the absence of free will. David Hume had 
attempted to answer the question 220 years earlier. According to Hume 
the reason we are justified in blaming wrongdoers is that the badness 
of their acts is traceable to corresponding defects in their characters. 
In The Treatise of Human Nature, Hume wrote:
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Actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing; 
and where they proceed not from some cause in the 
characters and disposition of the person, who performed 
them, they infix not themselves on him, and can neither 
redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if evil. The 
action itself may be blameable; it may be contrary to all 
the rules of morality and religion: But the person is not 
responsible for it; and as it proceeded from nothing in him, 
that is durable or constant, and leaves nothing of that nature 
behind it, ’tis impossible he can, on its account, become the 
object of punishment or vengeance. (Selby-Brigge, 1960, 
Book II part III sec II, 411)
Strawson places blame at the centre of our moral lives but there still 
remains the question of what it actually means to blame somebody. A 
number of writers express a view of blame as a sort of moral ledger 
(for example, Feinberg, 1970; Glover, 1970; Ishtiyaque Haji, 1998; 
Zimmerman, 1988):
Moral responsibility, so conceived, is liability to charges and 
credits on some ideal record, liability to credit or blame (in 
the sense of ‘blame’ that implies no action). Just as it is, as we 
say, ‘forever to the credit’ of a hero or saint that he performed 
some noble act, so a man can forever be ‘to blame’ for his 
fault. This, then, is what it is to be morally responsible for 
something on this conception: it is to be liable not to overt 
responses, but to a charging against one’s record as a man. 
This record in turn can be used for any one of a variety 
of purposes – as a basis for self-punishment, remorse, or 
pride, for example; but a person can avoid putting it to 
those further uses, leaving responsibility simply a matter 
for the record. (Feinberg, 1970, 30)
Blame can be seen thus as the negative counterpart of praise. According 
to JJC Smart:
Praising a person is…an important act in itself – it has 
significant effects. A utilitarian must therefore learn 
to control his acts of praise and dispraise, thus perhaps 
concealing his approval of an action when he thinks that 
the expression of such approval might have bad effects, and 
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perhaps even praising actions of which he does not really 
approve. (Smart, 1973, 49–50)
Such a view is implicit in the practice of considering mitigating factors 
when deciding on sentence following conviction. Someone of previous 
good character might receive a lesser punishment for the same act 
committed by a habitual wrongdoer.
In addition, this view might seem to undermine Strawson’s 
characterisation of blame as ‘attitude’. Yet when we blame another 
we do more than simply record the fact that he or she has fallen 
below some standard. The blamer as moral bookkeeper is to suggest 
an objective attitude and:
To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to 
see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy: as a subject for 
what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; 
as something certainly to be taken account, perhaps 
precautionary account of; to be managed or handled or 
cured or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided, though this 
gerundive is not peculiar to cases of objectivity of attitude. 
The objective attitude may be emotionally toned in many 
ways, but not in all ways; it may include repulsion or fear, 
it may include pity or even love, though not all kinds of 
love. But it cannot include the range of reactive feelings 
and attitudes which belong to involvement or participation 
with others in inter-personal human relationships; it cannot 
include resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger, or the 
sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feel 
reciprocally, for each other. (Strawson, 2008, 109)
The view of blame as some sort of moral account or sanction has 
been criticised by a number of writers. PF Strawson himself argued 
against a view of blame as either an assessment or a form of sanctioning 
activity but saw it instead as a ‘distinctive emotional response we have 
to perceived manifestations of ill will or disregard on the part of others’ 
(Smith, 2013, 28). For Strawson, blame is closely related to attitudes 
such as resentment, indignation, guilt and forgiveness. Blame is not just 
an objective evaluation, it is connected to desire, emotion, expectation 
and disposition: ‘we not only evaluate when we blame, but we also 
respond’ (Coates and Tognazzini, 2013, 10). More recently, alternative 
accounts of blame have been put forward by George Sher (2006) and 
TM Scanlon (2008). 
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For George Sher ‘[Blame] is a stance or attitude that a person takes 
toward himself or another on the basis of a judgment that that person 
has in some way failed to conform to some moral standard’ (Scher, 
2006, 7) and further, ‘To blame someone…is to have certain affective 
and behavioural dispositions, each of which can be traced to the 
combination of a belief that that person has acted badly or has a bad 
character and a desire that this not be the case’ (Sher, 2006, 115). Sher 
sees blame to be about the person rather than the act and the issue of 
whether blame attaches to act or actor is discussed elsewhere in this 
book. Sher also sees a relationship between blame and forgiveness: ‘The 
absence of blame would indeed mean we could not forgive anyone…
because forgiving presupposes blame’ (Sher, 2006, 4). 
Scanlon, like Strawson, views blame as attitudinal in character but is 
less concerned with resentment and indignation. For Scanlon:
To claim that a person is blameworthy for an action is to 
claim that the action shows something about the agent’s 
attitudes toward others that impairs the relations that others 
can have with him or her. To blame a person is to judge 
him or her blameworthy and to take your relationship with 
him or her to be modified in a way that this judgment of 
impaired relations holds to be appropriate. (Scanlon, 2008, 
128–9)
As Sher, Scanlon believes blame can take many forms and it is the 
relationship between the blamemonger and blamed that determines 
the precise form the blame takes. Reactive attitudes might be a possible 
response to impaired relations but other responses are possible: rather 
than resentment and indignation, one might feel sadness or a desire 
to end contact with the target of blame. 
Seeing much merit in Scanlon’s and Sher’s account of blame, Angela 
Smith argues that both fail to identify the important aspect of protest 
inherent in blame and offers an amendment to their accounts:
To blame another is to judge that she is blameworthy (that is, 
to judge that she has attitudes that impair her relations with 
others) and to modify one’s own attitudes, intentions, and 
expectations towards that person as a way of protesting (that 
is, registering and challenging) the moral claim implicit in 
the conduct, where such protest implicitly seeks some kind 
of moral acknowledgement on the part of the blameworthy 
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agent and or on the part of others in the moral community. 
(Smith, 2013, 43)
Smith therefore draws a distinction between being blameworthy and 
being blamed: ‘When I say of someone, “I know he’s blameworthy, 
but I just can’t bring myself to blame him”, I am confessing that I 
find it hard to protest the meaning of his actions’ (Smith, 2013, 43).
Smith’s clear distinction is blurred by the definition of culpable 
offered by the Oxford English Dictionary. Initially ‘culpable’ is defined 
as ‘guilty, criminal: deserving as punishment or condemnation’ or 
to be deserving blame or censure: to be culpable is to be blamed or 
blameworthy. 
Culpability is an important concept for contemporary penology. 
S143(1) Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides: ‘In considering the 
seriousness of any offence, the court must consider the offender’s 
culpability in committing the offence and any harm which the offence 
caused, was intended to cause or might foreseeably have caused.’
Von Hirsh is clear that punishment is inextricably linked to blame: 
‘The penal sanction clearly does convey blame. Punishing someone 
consists of visiting a deprivation (hard treatment) on him, because 
he supposedly has committed a wrong, in a manner that expresses 
disapprobation of the person for his conduct’ (Von Hirsch, 2000, 9).
We are left with a certain circularity here since punishment will 
reflect the seriousness of any offence which in turn reflects the level 
of the offender’s culpability. In this book we will explore the extent 
to which it is possible to assess the amount of blame attributed to 
a wrongdoer independently of any sanction (formal or informal) 
imposed.
Preliminary reflections
The idea for this book first emerged as the authors were engaged in 
researching the punishment of those responsible for crimes against 
humanity. It seemed to us that traditional justifications for punishment 
proved unsatisfactory when guidance on how to punish those 
responsible for extraordinary crimes was needed. The fact that many 
of those responsible for some of the worst atrocities had, until the 
critical moment in their lives, led fundamentally blameless lives raised 
further problems in relation to punishment. Could one really find 
mitigation for someone who had murdered hundreds in the fact that 
they had previously been a caring and compassionate prison officer? 
The idea that it is ordinary people who commit extraordinary crimes 
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is nothing new. The psychological experiments of Stanley Milgram 
and Philip Zimbardo suggest we are all (or at least nearly all of us) 
capable of committing blameworthy acts given the right circumstances 
(Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, 2007). Christopher Browning’s study of 
the behaviour of a German police reserve unit in occupied Poland 
supports those experimental findings (Browning, 2001). Central to 
discussion about these extraordinary crimes seemed to be the allocation 
of blame: to what extent are those who are responsible also culpable? 
This led us to consider blame in a more general, less extraordinary 
context and, like George Sher, we were surprised at the comparative 
lack of relevant literature.
In 1999 Mark Langford launched the Accident Group, a personal 
injury claims management business. It is perhaps best known for its 
advertising slogan ‘Where There’s Blame, There’s a Claim’. The slogan 
lasted longer than the company, which went into liquidation in 2003. 
The slogan seemed to epitomise contemporary, claim driven society. 
It also reflects a modern preoccupation with blame: if blame leads to 
claims it can also be said that claims lead to blame. A claim culture is 
also a blame culture. Our view is that over the last 35 years we have 
moved to a more judgemental, less sympathetic, and more punitive 
society. This change is reflected in a growth in criminalisation. Central 
to the change is blame. We suggest that the flow of blame in society 
increases as levels of uncertainty increase and social cohesiveness 
decreases. 
A recent manifestation of this blame culture can be found in the 
reaction to the Berwick Review into Patient Safety. The Review was 
prompted by a number of allegations relating to the safety of those who 
found themselves under the care of Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust. The immediate response to publication of the Review was the 
announcement by David Cameron of the creation of a new criminal 
offence of wilful neglect for those working within the health service. 
The media coverage of the announcement was exemplified by the 
headline in the Independent: ‘“Neglect is unacceptable”: NHS staff 
face jail if patients are abused’ (Independent, 16 November 2013). In 
fact the Review had been keen to promote a culture of openness and 
transparency within the NHS and the reference to legal sanctions came 
towards the end of the Review:
We believe that legal sanctions in the very rare cases where 
individuals or organisations are unequivocally guilty of 
wilful or reckless neglect or mistreatment of patients 
would provide deterrence while not impeding a vital 
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open, transparent learning culture. Our proposals aim to 
place wilful or reckless neglect or mistreatment of all NHS 
patients on a par with the offence that currently applies to 
vulnerable people under the Mental Capacity Act. (DH, 
2013, 33)
The Berwick Review had suggested that important lessons could be 
learned from the no-blame culture that had improved aviation safety. 
When addressing the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for 
Health reflected the overall tone of the Berwick Report: ‘That is not 
about penalising staff for making mistakes; it is about enabling them 
to learn from them’ (Hansard, 19 November 2013, column 1096). By 
then, however, it was the new criminal offence that had entered public 
consciousness. David Cameron’s initial response set the tone and was 
consistent with current practice: when faced with an apparent crisis the 
temptation to draft a new law seems almost overwhelming. The public 
could be forgiven for believing the Review to be another attempt to 
increase the number of criminal offences and to blame individuals. A 
letter to the Guardian made the following point:
So, five years for wilful neglect of patients. How long 
one wonders for wilful neglect (or is that destruction) 
of an entire health service? On the assumption that our 
elitely educated government cannot possibly be simply 
incompetent, there must be a reason for the continuing 
assault on the NHS. All I can come up with is that by the 
next election they will, in all honesty, be able to say that 
the NHS is no longer worth saving. (John Main, Clinical 
Director, Renal Medicine, James Cook University Hospital, 
Middlesbrough: Guardian, 19 November 2013) 
John Main raises the further issue of the extent to which blame is 
attached to individuals or wider society. One feature of contemporary 
society has been to focus more on person blame and less on system 
blame, although on occasion the focus is wider and we shall explore 
this theme in subsequent chapters. An adequate account of blame needs 
to provide some understanding of the circumstances when system 
blame is preferred to person blame and also, when both system and 
person are blamed, in what proportion that blame is to be allocated.
Philip Zimbardo, who conducted the Stanford Prison Experiment 
in 1971, wrote: ‘The most important lesson to be derived from the 
Stanford Prison Experiment is that Situations are created by Systems. 
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Systems provide the institutional support, authority, and resources that 
allow Situations to operate as they do’ (Zimbardo, 2007, 226).
Zimbardo continues by arguing that it is those ‘who had the power 
to design the behavioural setting and to maintain its operation in 
particular ways’ that should be held responsible for consequences and 
outcomes. In the context of the Stanford Prison Experiment, it was 
not the individual guards that should shoulder most of the blame, but 
rather the one who created the system: Zimbardo himself. Similarly, 
Zimbardo argues, abuses that occurred in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq 
were the responsibility of those who created the system. As we have 
already suggested, blaming others exonerates the rest of us; blaming 
the person rather than the system leaves the system unchanged and 
the possibility of further wrongdoing remains.
In recent years a new approach to criminology has emerged with a 
focus on social harm. Hillyard et al (2004) criticised criminology for 
the failure to pay adequate attention to social harm and sought to argue 
that the criminal justice system failed to protect us from harm while 
at the same time inflicting harm on those who are processed through 
the system. We argue that blame has similarly been neglected by 
criminology and has a similar central importance to an understanding 
of crime and criminalisation. We seek to show how blame acts as a 
lever for criminalising and marginalising behaviour and as such is legally 
transformative. We argue that an increasing pre-occupation with blame 
leads to an increasing resort to litigation. An understanding of blame 
will assist in a greater understanding of the criminalisation process.
This book was being completed as the death of Nelson Mandela was 
announced. Among the countless tributes made to him, the prevailing 
theme concerned his dignity and forgiveness and the fact that he 
sought to bring about reconciliation. Mandela’s view was that the 
future of South Africa would not be advanced by recrimination and 
blamestorming. The interests of South Africa would not be served by 
identifying scapegoats for the evils of apartheid. Instead there was the 
establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Victims of 
wrongdoing are often far more concerned that their story be told and 
that the truth is established than with the identification of individuals 











Blame in the criminal justice process
This chapter provides an overview of the role of blame in the criminal 
justice process in England and Wales. Although many view the 
orthodox trial as the usual state response to criminal behaviour, it is 
important to recognise that in many ways it represents the exception 
(Kirchengast, 2010). The criminal justice system, it has been argued, is 
designed to facilitate trial avoidance (Cammiss, 2013) by, for example, 
rewarding those who confess and then plead guilty to the offence. 
In order to recognise this reality, it is necessary to consider both the 
orthodox criminal trial and some of the most common ways in which 
offenders are otherwise processed. Dingwall and Harding (1998) have 
argued that the criminal justice process should be viewed as a path 
which allows and facilitates departure at various points from charge to 
sentence. While it may be possible to justify some of these departures 
– for example a criminal trial may be a disproportionate response to a 
particularly trivial offence – no systematic or holistic approach can be 
discerned. Instead, the process has developed in a reactive and haphazard 
fashion and has been driven by a number of potentially competing 
demands, including the desire to use limited resources sensibly. In our 
current analysis, we seek to evaluate the extent to which blame has an 
impact on and influences this process. This analysis would appear to be 
apposite if the system seeks to operate in a morally justifiable manner. 
Some of the themes introduced in this chapter will be revisited later in 
the book when attention is paid to particular types of offender whose 
blameworthiness could be viewed as atypical.
As many offenders avoid prosecution, the chapter will start by 
considering pre-trial diversion. A distinction will be drawn between 
diverting individuals who might be said to have limited blame and 
certain activities which are criminal but which are routinely diverted. 
After a consideration of pre-trial diversion, attention will be given to 
the trial. Decisions relating to mode of trial, or the court in which 
the case is heard, will be studied as this depends on a number of 
factors, some of which are allied to blameworthiness. Finally, the 
sentencing process will be analysed from both a philosophical and 
a legal perspective. A number of rationales influence sentence such 
as retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence and public protection. 
Throughout the book it will be seen that these competing objectives 
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help to explain the variable importance of blame in the criminal justice 
process. In this chapter the key facets of each potential justification will 
be outlined and it will be shown that, while blame is central to some 
of these aims, it is of marginal importance to others. 
Pre-trial diversion: removing those of limited culpability
Later chapters will have more to say about how the criminal justice 
system responds to certain categories of offender such as juveniles and 
the mentally disordered post-conviction. It is, however, usually the 
case that such offenders do not face trial in a criminal court. There 
is a long tradition of young offenders being dealt with informally by 
the police through a system of cautioning which involved no more 
than a warning by a senior police officer which was recorded and 
which could then influence future decisions to prosecute (see further 
Dingwall and Harding, 1998; Muncie, 1999). Guidelines stipulated 
that cautions could only be imposed in appropriate cases and when 
the offender admitted guilt. Research, however, demonstrated that 
police forces differed greatly in the extent to which they cautioned 
young offenders, raising suspicions that force culture was the most 
likely determinant of whether a caution would be imposed (Ball, 2004; 
Wilkinson and Evans, 1990). It also emerged that repeat cautioning 
was commonplace which suggested that it had limited deterrent effect. 
Repeat cautioning also undermined the underlying justification. Each 
caution did require an admittance of guilt on the offender’s part. 
Similarly, a defining characteristic which explained why the offender 
was less blameworthy (for example, relative immaturity) could often 
be found. Nonetheless, a caution carried with it an implicit message 
that the offender was being dealt with in an exceptional manner and 
this message became increasingly implausible with repetition. 
A more formal system of pre-trial diversion for juveniles was 
introduced in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Cautioning was 
abolished and replaced with reprimands and warnings. Reprimands 
were reserved for less serious cases and were similar in effect to a 
caution; however, a reprimand could only be issued if an offender had 
not received a reprimand before (s65(2)). If the case was adjudged by 
the police to be more serious (s65(4)) or if the offender had previously 
been reprimanded, a warning would be considered. The Act limited 
the use of warnings to situations where the offender had not previously 
been warned or, where the offender had been warned, the offence was 
committed more than two years after the date of the previous warning 
and the police officer considered the offence insufficiently serious to 
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require a charge to be brought (s65(3)). A warning required the offender 
to be referred to a youth offending team who would arrange for him 
or her to participate in a rehabilitative programme (s66(2)). 
This new model has the virtue of providing a framework where the 
individual’s blame, determined in part by his past record, is central 
to the decision whether to reprimand or warn. Ostensibly, this 
guarantees greater protection than the arbitrary system of cautioning. 
Peuch and Evans (2011, 804), however, reported that young offenders 
and youth offending team workers found the system to be ‘arbitrary, 
unfair and disproportionate, especially as it may involve compulsory 
participation in a rehabilitation (change) programme’. Research by 
Fox et al (2006) also found that the system could operate oppressively 
and discriminate against marginalised groups. Koffman and Dingwall 
(2007) recognised that reprimands and warnings were more punitive 
than cautioning (although there is case law which establishes that 
reprimands and warnings are not forms of punishment) but sought 
to argue that the framework could potentially be justified if it was 
used proportionately. Minor offenders would be subject to a minimal 
response while those who admit to a more serious offence would face 
a more invasive intervention. Which response is appropriate would 
depend, at least theoretically, on the offender’s culpability. Repetition 
is also a critical factor which suggests that the government viewed 
recidivism as sufficiently blameworthy to exclude some outcomes. 
Blame may dictate whether a warning can be issued but the terms of 
the rehabilitative intervention are assessed according to need. Therefore, 
a less blameworthy individual could receive a more onerous regime 
than an offender who committed an identical offence but with more 
personal responsibility. The effect of introducing this more involved 
diversionary scheme has, paradoxically, been to accelerate young 
offenders’ involvement with the criminal justice system. Where a 
caution would have sufficed, a warning may have to be issued which 
entails the involvement of a youth offending team. It is not unreasonable 
to ask whether the outcomes adequately reflect the culpability of young 
offenders or whether they are often disproportionate and counter-
productive. 
Cautioning remains an option for adult offenders. The decision 
to issue a caution is taken by the police except for the most serious 
category of offences which are classified as indictable only and which 
otherwise would be tried at the Crown Court. A Crown Prosecutor 
determines whether a caution is appropriate for these offences. 
According to Crown Prosecution guidance:
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When considering the Public Interest in any case, 
consideration will be given as to whether the matter can be 
appropriately dealt with out of court. What is appropriate 
in the circumstances of each individual case will depend on 
the seriousness of the offence, the results of the offending 
behaviour, the antecedents of the offender and the likely 
outcome at court. Where an out of court disposal offers 
an outcome appropriate to the circumstances of the case, it 
should be considered and any relevant guidance taken into 
account. Whenever possible, the views of the victim should 
also be obtained and taken into account. In cases that are 
referred to a prosecutor for a charging decision, the CPS 
may recommend the case is dealt with by a simple caution 
or a conditional caution if that is considered appropriate. 
(CPS, 2013a, para 9)
In 2012, 168,260 adult offenders were cautioned (Ministry of Justice, 
2013). As one would expect, most offenders were cautioned for 
comparatively minor offences such as common assault (25%), possession 
of a controlled drug (17%) and theft and handling stolen goods (16%). 
Small numbers, though, were cautioned for serious offences including 
threat or conspiracy to murder (93 offenders), wounding or other acts 
endangering life (53 offenders) and sexual activity with a child under 13 
(30 offenders). One offender was cautioned for rape. It is apparent that 
offence gravity dictates most cautioning decisions which is consistent 
with the advice above. The data mask other factors which may have 
influenced the police or the Crown Prosecution Service particularly 
in the cases involving serious offences. By definition, these must 
be exceptional cases and it is likely that some factor personal to the 
offender meant that prosecution was not deemed to be in the public 
interest. The guidelines above, however, do not specifically mention the 
offender’s blameworthiness as a relevant consideration. The seriousness 
of the offence would clearly favour prosecution in such a case and it 
is difficult to see how the conduct would not cause significant harm. 
Presumably prosecutors base their decisions either on the fact that 
the exceptional circumstances associated with the case would mean 
that any sentence imposed would be minimal or on a more holistic 
interpretation of what is in the public interest. 
Conditional cautions are also available for adult offenders. After 
changes in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
Act 2012, the police can issue a conditional caution for any offence 
apart from indictable offences and offences involving hate crime or 
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domestic violence. In the rare cases where it might be appropriate for 
an indictable offence, the Crown Prosecution Service must make the 
determination and the rules stipulate that this power can only be used 
exceptionally. Unlike standard cautions, conditional cautions contain 
rehabilitative, reparative or restrictive conditions. Conditional cautions 
are issued very infrequently. Nationally only 192 conditional cautions 
were issued pre-charge and 180 were issued post-charge in the first 
quarter of 2013/2014 (CPS, 2013b, 2). Of the conditional cautions, 
52% contained compensation conditions which is not surprising when 
34% of the offences related to damaging or destroying property. 
These statistics show that many minor offenders avoid any contact 
with the criminal court and suggest that care must be taken when 
discussing the ‘typical’ criminal justice process: prosecution and 
punishment are never seriously entertained for many minor offenders. 
To describe such a process as ‘diversionary’, as is usual, is therefore 
misleading as the term suggests a departure from the norm (Dingwall 
and Harding, 1998, 102–8); prosecution may more accurately be 
described as ‘diversion’ in such a context. What these statistics also 
suggest is that a simple caution is seen as an appropriate response to 
a significant amount of criminal behaviour. This recognises that the 
trial process itself would be a disproportionate response for many adult 
offenders. In deciding who should avoid trial, blame is an implicit 
consideration.
Pre-trial diversion: fixed penalties for particular categories 
of offence
The previous section considered situations where a general diversionary 
measure, such as a caution, could be justified because of the offender’s 
limited culpability. Often blame was limited as the harm caused was 
minor or the offender was a juvenile. Cautioning has a lengthy history 
(Dingwall and Harding, 1998, 102–8) and, while the processes have 
become more defined and invasive, reprimands and warnings continue 
a diversionary approach of long standing. Fixed penalty notices are 
not novel, either, as they have been used extensively for minor road 
traffic offences such as speeding and parking violations for some 
time. In recent years, however, fixed penalties have been used in an 
increasing range of circumstances. Their status in the criminal justice 
system is interesting. As the payment of a fixed penalty is not taken as 
an admittance of guilt a criminal conviction is avoided, although the 
financial impact (which to many individuals would be considerable) 
would be identical to a fine of the same amount. Fixed penalty notices 
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are interesting in another regard. Sometimes such a measure is genuinely 
diversionary in that it avoids prosecution. The question in such cases 
may be whether this form of diversion is more appropriate than a 
traditional approach such as cautioning. Fixed penalties are, however, 
more onerous and their availability may partly explain why conditional 
cautions are used so sparingly. More controversially, the growth of fixed 
penalties demonstrates an increased willingness to use the law to control 
‘undesirable’ behaviours such as excessive noise in residential areas. The 
expansion of fixed penalty notices evidences a trend towards social 
regulation through an increasing use of coercive measures, even if care 
is taken to disguise this through the use of semantic legal distinctions 
between civil and criminal responses.
The most significant development has been the introduction of 
penalty notices for disorder in the Criminal Justice and Police Act 
2001. Fixed penalty notices can be issued to offenders aged 18 and 
over for a considerable number of listed offences, such as being drunk 
and disorderly in a public place. ‘Lower-tier’ offences attract a fixed 
penalty of £60 while ‘higher-tier’ offences attract a £90 penalty. As 
the fixed penalty notice does not technically constitute a fine, prompt 
payment avoids a criminal conviction. Non-payment results in the 
fixed penalty being lodged as an unpaid fine at the magistrates’ court. 
As this system avoids prosecution and guarantees that the individual 
will not get a criminal record, there is an obvious incentive to pay the 
fixed penalty. This inducement carries the possibility that people will 
pay even if they are not guilty of the offence, however. 
Another category of offence which can be dealt with by a fixed 
penalty are minor environmental crimes such as littering and graffiti. 
The number of environmental offences which can be resolved by 
paying fixed penalties has grown substantially over the past decade, 
most notably through the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 and the 
Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act 2005. Also important 
in this context is the Noise Act 1996 which gives local authorities the 
power to investigate and issue fixed penalty notices for excessive night 
noise following complaints by neighbours.
The most controversial development relates to truancy. Section 23 
of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 allows head teachers, the local 
authority and the police to issue a £50 or a £100 fixed penalty notice 
to a parent who fails to ensure that their child attends school regularly. 
It has been argued that this power emphasises the punishment of 
‘flawed’ parents, pays insufficient regard to the reality of low-income, 
and often single-parent, families and offers a simplistic response to 
a complex socio-economic problem (Donoghue, 2011). Arguably, 
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resorting to the criminal law in this way fails to take account of the 
parent’s blameworthiness and demonstrates a naive belief in the ability 
of a sanction to ensure compliance when support may prove more 
effective. Granting a head teacher the right to impose a fixed penalty 
also allows head teachers to discipline parents and pupils, a strategy 
that is hardly conducive to fostering a positive relationship between a 
struggling parent and school staff.
Pre-trial diversion: the routine diversion of some types of 
criminal conduct to specialist state agencies
Some types of deviant conduct are not investigated by the police or 
prosecuted in the usual manner. Examples would include offences 
linked to tax evasion, benefit fraud and health and safety breaches. 
There may be compelling reasons why such activities are policed 
differently, but it is important to ensure that there is some parity of 
approach: it would be unjust if offenders were being convicted and 
sentenced for ‘routine’ offences if more blameworthy offenders were 
dealt with in a less public way and were not subject to the same degree 
of public condemnation and punishment. Conversely, as there are 
significant attractions for the individual in avoiding a trial, one has to 
ensure that adequate safeguards are in place to protect the innocent. The 
threat of prosecution may be a powerful weapon for law enforcement 
agencies but, for this reason, care has to be taken in establishing that the 
individual has indeed broken the law. There is, therefore, a common 
rationale for diverting such activities based on a mutual desire on the 
part of all stakeholders to arrive at a speedy and fair settlement. Against 
this, there is the danger that excessive discretion allied to the implicit 
threat of prosecution could undermine the protection to which an 
accused person is entitled. A more general question is why these factors 
favour diversion and not prosecution in these particular instances. If 
the case for diversion is so compelling, why is this approach not used 
more widely (Braithwaite, 2002)? 
Tax evasion is often presented as the archetypal crime which is 
seldom prosecuted by the authorities. Revenue raising bodies do not 
perceive their function to be prosecutorial. Rather, their aim is to 
recover taxes owed and a pragmatic approach reserves prosecution for 
a limited number of exceptional cases, often involving serial evaders or 
particularly elaborate evasionary schemes. According to HM Revenue 
& Customs:
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[The] law allows us the discretion to deal under a civil 
penalty regime with an offence which would otherwise 
require prosecution as a criminal offence. This not only 
provides an incentive for the taxpayer to co-operate with 
us once the fraud has been discovered, but prevents needless 
expense in taking cases involving small amounts of tax to 
the criminal court. (HM Revenue & Customs, 2013)
Ordinarily:
[HM Revenue & Customs] will try and reach an agreed 
figure…covering the amount of tax, interest and penalties 
due. We will only suggest adjustments that we consider to 
be reasonable in light of the information we hold…We 
will invite [the individual] to sign a letter offering to pay 
an agreed sum and if we agree the sum we will issue a letter 
of acceptance. This exchange of letters is a legal contract. 
(HM Revenue & Customs, 2013)
Research has shown that this strategy is effective if judged on purely 
economic grounds (Feld and Frey, 2007; Franzoni, 2004; Leviner, 
2008). This may be explained on the basis that there is little academic 
agreement about whether the threat of prosecution serves as a deterrent 
in tax cases (Klepper and Nagin, 1989), although one must not lose 
sight of the fact that a criminal offence has been committed. A broader 
concern is whether someone who deliberately breaks the criminal law, 
and in the process often goes to considerable lengths to deceive the 
authorities, should escape prosecution and punishment when other 
offenders, who are perhaps less blameworthy, do not.
A legal distinction is drawn between tax avoidance, a legal enterprise 
designed to minimise tax liability, and tax evasion which is a criminal 
offence. Few people enjoy paying tax and traditionally it would 
probably have been accurate to say that most people would not have 
regarded tax evasion as ‘criminal’ behaviour. More recently, however, 
there has been a widespread shift in attitudes towards the aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies which have been employed by some multi-national 
companies and wealthy individuals. The significant reputational damage 
caused has led to the ‘voluntary’ payment of taxes and public apologies. 
An obvious explanation is that these practices are taking place at a time 
of public austerity. The public mood seems to go beyond this, though, 
as the revulsion relates to avoidance and not evasion; deliberately taking 
steps to use the law to one’s personal advantage has widely been seen 
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as morally blameworthy and deserving of condemnation even if the 
actions are lawful. 
It does not necessarily follow from this that the public will view 
illegal tax evasion more harshly than legal tax avoidance (Orviska and 
Hudson, 2003). The legal and financial advice on which wealthy tax 
avoiders depend is beyond the means of most of the public, leading, 
perhaps, to a sense of injustice. Paying cash for work in the knowledge 
that it will not be declared to the revenue may resonate more with 
the average person and, because of its ubiquity, be perceived as less 
blameworthy. Shifts in what is believed to be acceptable behaviour can 
lead to legislative reforms designed to close particular tax ‘loopholes’ 
that avoiders have exploited. These changes, though, reflect a desire to 
criminalise such behaviour in order to block one avenue for avoiding 
tax liability rather than a change of strategy which would mean that 
such offenders are routinely prosecuted and punished.
A comparison has sometimes been drawn between tax evasion and 
benefit fraud, an activity committed disproportionately by the poor 
and which often involves small sums of money. Benefit fraudsters 
are proportionately more likely to be prosecuted than tax evaders, 
but prosecution remains far from certain. A common tactic is for 
an agreement to be reached whereby prosecution will be avoided 
on condition that the benefit is no longer claimed. This may appear 
sensible but two concerns emerge. The first is that many claimants 
are vulnerable and are not in a position to challenge the assertion 
that they are not entitled to the benefit. When the Liverpool Welfare 
Rights Centre did challenge a number of cases, every benefit was 
subsequently reinstated (Moore, 1981, 139). A secondary issue is that 
considerable discretion remains as to whether an offender is prosecuted. 
Prosecution is less exceptional for welfare fraud, heightening the risk 
of arbitrary decision-making. The public mood is also hardening 
with regards to welfare fraud. Dingwall and Harding (1998) have 
suggested that benefit fraud may be perceived as more serious than tax 
evasion because it involves taking as opposed to withholding public 
money. This has meant that it is easier to conceptualise benefit fraud 
as ‘criminal’. Whereas many would have regarded benefit fraud as a 
crime, there may have been some sympathy for perpetrators as they are 
often marginalised and carry little blame due to their financial plight. 
Jones (2011) has argued powerfully that this view has hardened and 
benefit claimants have become demonised, primarily by the media, 
in recent years and that this has led to a common belief that a lot of 
lawful welfare is undeserved. 
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Environmental offences are also investigated and selectively 
prosecuted by agencies other than the police, such as the Environment 
Agency and local government departments. This arrangement allows 
for expert involvement but again raises concerns about how this type 
of offending, which can have considerable impact on community well-
being, is dealt with in comparison to other types of crime. One possible 
rationale for differentiation is the difficulties of proving causality and 
intent on the part of the polluter. Negligence may have led to the 
pollution, but how much blame should attach to a failure to take 
adequate precautions? There are instances where such concerns do not 
arise, ‘fly tipping’ providing an obvious example, but the picture is often 
far from straightforward. Limited resources necessitate an extremely 
selective approach to prosecution which raises questions about how 
decisions to proceed are taken. The seriousness of the offence would 
appear to be central but should this be measured only with reference to 
the damage caused? Individual blame, or lack thereof, would demand 
that the assessment went beyond the harm to consider matters such as 
whether the individual’s actions were deliberate or negligent or whether 
an employer turned a blind eye to the practices of his or her employees.
A final category of offences which are seldom prosecuted are 
those relating to health and safety. If the inspectorate finds breaches 
of health and safety law, the preferred response is to issue a notice 
requiring rectification. Prosecution is reserved for the worst cases, 
usually following an accident. The working culture of the inspectorate 
is to work with employers to avoid harmful and illegal practices. 
Constructive dialogue may be the most appropriate way to secure 
compliance and limited resources may mean that inspectors have 
no practical alternative. Similar issues concerning blame, previously 
discussed with reference to environmental offences, arise. Negligence 
or ignorance of the law may be more common than deliberate attempts 
to avoid health and safety legislation and, in any event, proving the 
latter at trial would often be difficult. Another interesting dimension 
to health and safety law is that the inspectorate is often dealing with 
incidents which could have caused significant injury as opposed to 
situations where injury occurred. The individual’s blame in failing to 
comply with the law, whether innocently or intentionally, may have 
been identical but, when harm occurs, one instinctively appears to be 
dealing with a more serious offence.
Most of the inspectorate’s work attracts no public attention. If 
anything, health and safety has become a concept worthy of scorn even 
though there might be a tacit recognition that measures are necessary 
to protect public safety. It is only when a major incident, such as a 
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railway accident, occurs that the adequacy of the official response is 
questioned. Yet, by definition, major incidents are complicated and 
unusual events making it difficult to apportion responsibility and blame. 
One of the broader themes of this book is that there has become a 
greater readiness to apportion blame for incidents and that this urge 
leads to scapegoating. The way in which those who breach health and 
safety law are routinely dealt with appears not to cause public concern, 
even if this acceptance may be explained by ignorance, however the 
law is perceived to be wanting when a high-profile accident occurs 
leading to death or significant injury. Finding out where blame lies in 
the context of health and safety is admittedly complex. Yet this fails 
to capture the prevailing mood as it usually will be easier to apportion 
blame for an accident in a workshop or a factory. Perhaps the decline 
in manufacturing has meant that the public find it easier to identify 
with the victims of a transport disaster than an industrial accident.
Mode of trial: deciding which court will hear a case
Assuming that the case has not been diverted by this point, the next 
procedural decision relates to mode of trial. Criminal offences in 
England and Wales fall into one of three categories depending on 
their perceived seriousness. The least serious offences are classified as 
summary only and must be tried in the magistrates’ court. The gravest 
offences are classified as indictable offences and can only be tried before 
a jury in the Crown Court. Occupying the middle ground are triable 
either way offences which, as the name suggests, can be heard either 
in the magistrates’ court or in the Crown Court. Determining which 
court hears such cases is important for practical reasons – a Crown 
Court trial is far more expensive and the sentencing options available 
to the judge are more extensive (and potentially more expensive as 
well). Broader policy questions are as important: who should determine 
where a triable either way case is heard? What are the criteria for 
selection if the determination is to be made by an individual other 
than the accused? 
This section will address these points by considering the relevant 
law before reviewing empirical research which has challenged the 
extent to which decision-making in practice satisfies the need for full 
consideration of each case. There is a broader political context to the 
law relating to mode of trial (see Cammiss, 2013). Governments have 
been keen to encourage the use of magistrates’ courts for financial 
reasons and this has led to the reclassification of certain common 
offences and to more overt inducements to plead guilty at the earliest 
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opportunity. Both of these developments compromise the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial as the first development restricts the right to a jury 
trial and the second effectively penalises those who elect to plead not 
guilty as their penalty on conviction will be greater than those imposed 
on offenders who elect not to exercise this right.
The legal process starts with the defendant entering a plea of guilty 
or not guilty to the offence in the magistrates’ court (s17A Magistrates’ 
Courts Act 1980). If the defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the 
magistrates have to decide whether the case should be heard by the 
magistrates’ court or in the Crown Court. The Magistrates’ Courts Act 
1980 states that regard should be had to the nature and seriousness of 
the offence, whether the magistrates’ court would be able to impose 
an appropriate sentence if the defendant was convicted, and any other 
factors that appear relevant. Considerable discretion rests with the 
magistrates at this stage as all of these factors are inherently subjective. 
The nature and seriousness of the offence would allow for an appraisal 
of the defendant’s blame (even though the defendant maintains 
complete innocence) and a determination about the adequacy of 
sentencing options is again related to the individual’s culpability if 
guilt were to be established. Other factors could also cover specific 
issues related to blame, such as the fact that the defendant was elderly. 
The relationship between offence-severity and the residual category 
is interesting: should individual culpability, as distinct from the harm 
caused by the offence, inform an assessment of offence-severity or is it 
a distinct concern? The case is automatically sent to the Crown Court 
if the magistrates decline jurisdiction. Where the magistrates elect to 
hear the case, the defendant is granted the opportunity to consent to 
summary trial or can instead elect jury trial in the Crown Court. Most 
defendants accept the magistrates’ decision given the danger that a more 
exacting punishment could be imposed following a conviction in the 
Crown Court: around 80% of triable either way offences remain in 
the magistrates’ court (Cammiss, 2013).
Research by Cammiss (2009) found that there was rarely disagreement 
about where a case would be tried and that magistrates followed the 
prosecution’s recommendations in 96% of cases. This meant that 
decision-making was quick. However, Cammiss also found evidence 
that courts tended to follow their own working culture even where 
this went against official guidance. Citing domestic burglary as an 
example, the magistrates routinely declined jurisdiction even though 
national guidelines state that a Crown Court trial is only appropriate 
if specified aggravating factors are present (Sentencing Guidelines 
Council, 2008, 219). Guidelines are not prescriptive, but Cammiss’ 
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finding that decisions relating to seriousness and the appropriateness of 
available sentencing powers are determined according to local practice 
rather than national standards raises the issue of whether geographical 
disparity leads to injustice. The generic guidelines could hardly be 
described as illuminating or detailed: the ‘definitive’ guideline on 
allocation is only two pages long and the section dealing with mode 
of trial amounts to little over a hundred words (Sentencing Council, 
2012a). More comprehensive guidance is provided in the Magistrates’ 
Court Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2008) 
which considers each offence separately. Arson, for example, should be 
tried in the magistrates’ court where the damage is minor or moderate 
but jurisdiction should be declined where the damaged is judged to be 
serious (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2008, 23). Slavish devotion 
to the guidelines would undermine the statutory test that magistrates 
should follow in so far as the test deliberately grants magistrates 
discretion to arrive at the correct decision. The danger is that, rather 
than make determinations on a case by case basis, magistrates may feel 
constrained not by the national guidelines but by local custom.
How do these findings relate to the defendant’s blameworthiness? 
The fact that there is broad agreement between prosecution, defence 
and the magistracy suggests that either determining offence-severity 
is relatively easy or that the exercise is not being undertaken with due 
diligence. Official statistics suggest that many decisions are easy in that 
the bulk of triable either way cases remain in the magistrates’ court. 
There is also often a consensus of opinion among the prosecution, 
defence and the magistracy (Cammiss, 2009). There are, however, 
benefits for all parties if a Crown Court trial is avoided which has led 
to accusations that defence lawyers may exert considerable pressure on 
their clients to enter a guilty plea (McConville et al, 1994). Magistrates’ 
courts do have the ability to impose a short custodial sentence and 
magistrates may well believe that this usually gives sufficient scope to 
deal appropriately with most triable either way offences. What this 
means is that determinations about individual culpability are ordinarily 
taken after conviction at the sentencing stage.
Justifying sentence: the normative background
Punishment can be justified on a number of grounds which are usefully 
summarised in the Criminal Justice Act 2003:
(a) The punishment of offenders,
(b) The reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence),
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(c) The reform and rehabilitation of offenders,
(d) The protection of the public, and
(e) The making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their 
offences. (Criminal Justice Act 2003, s142(1))
Sentencers in England and Wales are supposed to take all of these aims 
into account when deciding what sentence to impose. The list does not 
provide a hierarchy; instead sentencers are meant to perform a balancing 
act between these diverse objectives. Problems arise, though, because 
each aim seeks a distinct end with the result that balancing renders 
the exercise futile. Prioritisation is essential if any of the justifications 
are to be realised. The fact that the 2003 Act fails to specify either an 
overriding objective or a hierarchy of aims engenders inconsistency as 
sentencers are forced to make such choices themselves.
Considering each objective in turn demonstrates why there are 
issues of incompatibility. A primary distinction can be drawn between 
retributive and utilitarian justifications. Retributive justifications rest 
on the notion that punishment is a deserved response to offending 
behaviour. Crucially, no future benefit has to accrue from the 
punishment. Utilitarian justifications, by contrast, demand future 
benefit on the basis that the harm of punishment can only be 
acceptable if a future harm of greater magnitude is avoided. Deterrence, 
rehabilitation and public protection are all utilitarian justifications.
Retribution attempts to justify punishment with reference to 
the offence committed. Punishment has to be proportionate to the 
seriousness of the offence in order to ensure that the offender receives 
his ‘just deserts’. Offence-severity then is crucial to retribution as a 
disproportionate sentence (regardless of whether it is too lenient or, 
more commonly, too severe) cannot be justified. The harm caused 
by the offence is obviously central to quantifying the severity of the 
offence, but most retributivists would recognise that the offender’s 
blameworthiness is also relevant. Blame does not just relate to the 
gravity of the harm caused but could include variables such as age or, 
more controversially, whether the offender has a prior record. Issues 
surrounding blame could legitimate the imposition of a lesser sentence 
or an increased sentence even if the harm caused by the offence was 
identical. A retributive approach would also allow for the pre-trial 
diversion of certain individuals for whom any form of punishment 
would be a disproportionate response.
Blame is of less direct importance to the utilitarian justifications, 
although those advocating such an approach would no doubt baulk 
at the punishment of the blameless. With each of the utilitarian 
41
Blame in the criminal justice process
justifications, the focus shifts to the means of achieving the future 
benefit. Deterrence, for example, would legitimate a sentence 
calculated to make the offender desist from committing like offences 
in the future (specific deterrence) or to make others minded to engage 
in such conduct refrain (general deterrence). It has been argued that 
deterrence is deeply problematic in that sentences which do not reflect 
the gravity of the offence, and hence the offender’s blameworthiness, 
could be justified. It is consistent with this aim that a more blameworthy 
offender who is less likely to offend in future receives a lesser sentence 
than a less blameworthy offender who, perhaps through no fault of his 
own, is more likely to reoffend. Taken to extremes, utilitarianism might 
sanction the ‘punishment’ of an innocent individual if that harm was 
outweighed by a significant reduction in offending by others. 
Public protection is similarly problematic. Here the (usually lengthy) 
confinement of ‘dangerous’ offenders is justified and determined by 
the perceived risk the individual would pose if at liberty. The offence 
for which the offender is being sentenced is usually of some relevance 
in that incapacitative sentences are not generally available for minor 
offences. If blame, though, has any relevance it is marginal. Legislation 
is often framed broadly so as to allow the possibility of incapacitating 
those who commit moderately serious violent or sexual offences. 
Sometimes little discretion is given to the court if certain specified 
criteria are met, as was the case with the notorious Imprisonment 
for Public Protection in England and Wales. The point here is that, 
logically, blame should play no part if public protection is the goal as 
it has no direct bearing on perceived risk as someone with limited 
culpability may nonetheless pose a vivid danger.
It is possible to argue that blame is of more relevance to the final 
utilitarian justification – rehabilitation – as it may help determine the 
most appropriate provision for the offender. Rehabilitative schemes for 
juvenile offenders may well differ from those for adult offenders, for 
example. As a utilitarian justification, however, the focus is on the future 
benefit of the punishment imposed. The aim, as with deterrence and 
public protection, is desistance and the method employed is to address 
underlying factors that may account for the offending behaviour. There 
may sometimes be a perception that offenders who are given probation 
rather than a custodial sentence have particular characteristics which 
make them less culpable and that providing assistance outside prison 
is likely to be more effective. Sentencers certainly have the scope to 
pass a non-custodial sentence in most cases, although there is little 
empirical evidence about the factors which determine whether an 
offender is imprisoned. 
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Justifying sentence: the legal background
Having considered the possible philosophical justifications for 
sentencing offenders, this section provides an overview of sentencing 
law in England and Wales. It will be shown that, although the main 
Act of Parliament requires sentencers to consider all of the objectives 
listed in the previous section, the framework for determining 
which disposition is appropriate favours a retributive approach. As a 
consequence, the individual’s blame should be highly relevant in the 
sentencing process.
The Criminal Justice Act 1991 provides a useful starting point as 
this Act, which was the first to state explicitly the aims of sentencing, 
provided that the primary determinant of sentence was the seriousness 
of the offence. The Act was welcomed by commentators both 
for providing clarity to the process and for attempting to curb the 
potential injustice of sentencing on utilitarian grounds (Koffman, 
2006a). Increasingly there had been concern that sentences justified 
on the basis of rehabilitation were disproportionate to the gravity of 
the offence committed. Sentencers were now required to assess the 
seriousness of the offence and, having done so, determine whether it 
met the threshold for different types of punishment. Imprisonment, for 
example, could only be imposed if ‘the offence, or the combination 
of the offence and one other offence associated with it, was so serious 
that only such a sentence can be justified for the offence’ (s1(2)(a)). The 
term had to be that which was ‘commensurate with the seriousness 
of the offence’ (s2(2)(a)). An offence could not be regarded as more 
serious on the basis of ‘any previous convictions of the offender or 
any failure of his to respond to previous sentences’ (s29(1)). Mitigation 
could still be taken into account by sentencers (s28(1)). A potential 
weakness with the Act was that no guidance was provided about how 
the seriousness of an offence should be measured and early guidance 
from the Court of Appeal added little of value (see Cox (1993) 14 Cr 
App Rep (S) 749).
It was not long before the government amended the law which 
diluted the singularity of approach contained in the 1991 Act (see 
further Hudson, 1995; Koffman, 2006a). After sustained judicial 
lobbying, and a lack of political nerve, two fundamental provisions 
were abolished in the Criminal Justice Act 1993. The first was the 
requirement that sentencers could not take account of previous 
convictions when deciding on the seriousness of an offence. Now 
they could (s66). This re-opened the danger that offenders could be 
sentenced on the basis of their record as opposed to the seriousness of 
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the current offence. More broadly, it sent a signal that a repeat offender 
was more blameworthy than a first offender and deserved a harsher 
sentence to reflect this. 
The 1991 Act also contained an innovative and progressive system 
of unit fines which took into account both the seriousness of the 
offence and the offender’s means. In order to determine the amount 
of a fine a two-stage process had to be followed. First, the sentencer 
had to calculate the seriousness of the offence and attribute this a 
unit value. The unit value would then be multiplied by the offender’s 
disposable income to arrive at the amount of the fine. Equality of 
impact is an important notion in sentencing and taking full account 
of the offender’s income meant that financial penalties would affect 
offenders who had committed offences of similar gravity in the same 
way. The results were, however, ridiculed in the media as offenders who 
were of limited means but had committed relatively serious offences 
were fined smaller amounts than more affluent offenders who were 
guilty of lesser crimes. In the popular imagination, the system was 
unjust because it did not reflect the blame of the offender. The irony 
was that that it did, but in a more sophisticated manner. Rather than 
modify the unit system, or seek to defend the underlying philosophy, 
the government abolished the system while maintaining the general 
principle that the offender’s means should be taken into account when 
setting the level of a fine (s65). 
Abolishing unit fines did not represent a rejection of the principle 
that a proportionate fine has to incorporate the wealth of the offender. 
Instead the 1993 Act retained the principle, but jettisoned a formulaic 
system. Returning discretion to sentencers did not mean that sentencers 
could ignore an offender’s income, instead it gave them the discretion 
to determine how to modify the amount of a fine to accommodate 
means. In practice, considerable ground was conceded. Legislating 
for a unit system represented a clear acknowledgement that fairness 
demanded that offenders of equal blame were treated consistently 
and that uniform fines were unjust on this basis. There was value in a 
system which saw this as a two-stage process: first a determination of 
the gravity of the offence (where the offender’s blame was key) followed 
by a consideration of a proportionate sentence (where the offender’s 
financial means was fundamental). Although the revised provision 
suggested that these two stages had to be followed, the absence of a 
defined process made it difficult for sentencers, even if so minded, to 
undertake a meaningful financial assessment prior to setting the amount 
of a fine. Perhaps it is best to view the change of procedure as a way 
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of minimising the effect of the realisation that equal impact required 
setting different fines for offenders with similar culpability.
The accepted account is that the Criminal Justice Act 1993 was the 
first incremental step in a process which reduced the importance of 
retribution in the sentencing process (Koffman, 2006a). Subsequent 
Acts did expand the opportunity for other sentencing aims to be 
pursued, particularly the incarceration of ‘dangerous’ offenders. Such 
individuals did not have to be especially blameworthy if they were 
perceived to pose a risk to the public. The efficacy of this approach 
depends on whether it is legitimate or desirable to punish on the basis 
of a potential future offence, even if this offence is likely to be serious. 
Research shows that risk is inherently difficult to predict which means 
that many of those classed as ‘dangerous’, and incapacitated on this 
basis, would not offend if at liberty (Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990; 
Golash, 2005; Mathiesen, 2006). Incapacitative sentencing represents 
a direct challenge to notions of proportionality in that the offence 
for which the offender is being sentenced – and for which he may 
be said to be blameworthy – is of marginal concern. There is a rich 
body of work on what has been termed the ‘risk penology’ which 
has sought to account for what is an international trend in criminal 
justice (Ericson, 2007; Garland, 2001; Simon, 2007). Given the lack 
of a sound empirical basis, the moral justification becomes weak and 
it is regrettable that governments have become increasingly willing to 
embrace such an approach. 
Despite this undeniable shift towards public protection, it has been 
argued by one of the present authors that retribution still dominates 
the current sentencing framework (Dingwall, 2008). The law is mainly 
found in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In order to pass any particular 
sentence, the sentencer has to assess the seriousness of the offence. 
Section 143(1) states that: ‘In considering the seriousness of any offence, 
the court must consider the offender’s culpability in committing the 
offence and any harm which the offence caused, was intended to cause 
or might foreseeably have caused.’
The offender’s culpability is then distinct from the harm (whether 
realised, intended or foreseen). Section 143(2) stipulates that courts are 
to view previous offences as aggravating factors which should increase 
the sentence. Whether a particular sentence can be imposed depends 
on whether or not a threshold has been met and this in turn depends 
on the seriousness of the offence. Taking the example of imprisonment: 
The court must not pass a custodial sentence unless it is 
of the opinion that the offence, or the combination of the 
45
Blame in the criminal justice process
offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so 
serious that neither a fine nor a community sentence can 
be justified for the offence. (s152(2))
A criticism that was made earlier related to the lack of guidance that 
sentencers had when deciding how serious a case was. The 2003 Act 
provides a statutory test that was lacking in the 1991 Act. A more 
important development, however, is that sentencers now have more 
detailed guidelines from which to work. At the time of the 1991 Act, 
the Court of Appeal had issued some guideline judgments which 
offered starting points for sentencing that offence. The problem with 
this approach was that the guideline judgments concentrated on 
particularly serious offences, such as armed robbery, where the primary 
issue was not what type of punishment should be imposed but on 
the length of sentence. What was lacking was guidance on whether 
a particular disposition threshold had been met. This was particularly 
unsatisfactory with regards to certain property offences, notably 
robbery and domestic burglary, which the court had to sentence on a 
regular basis. A paucity of guidance meant that, even if the 1991 Act 
was clear about the purpose of sentencing, its application was likely to 
be inconsistent. Devising and implementing an alternative framework 
was always going to be contentious. The judiciary are vocal about the 
need for discretion so that they can accommodate the variables that 
each case presents. Similarly, there is a legitimate constitutional debate 
about the respective roles of the government and the judiciary in 
determining sentencing policy. It is no surprise that the government’s 
reforms were incremental.
The Sentencing Advisory Panel was established in the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998. Their role was to assist the Court of Appeal before 
a guideline judgment was issued by, for example, providing information 
to the court on current sentencing practice or on the effectiveness of 
different punishments (s81(4)(c)). The Court of Appeal was obliged 
to consider the Panel’s views but could depart from them if they saw 
fit. A Sentencing Guidelines Council was created by the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003. Comprising mainly, although not exclusively, of 
judicial members, the Council was charged with drafting guidance 
which sentencers would have a duty to ‘have regard to’ (s172(1)). The 
first guideline passed by the Council (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 
2004) related to calculating offence seriousness in recognition of the 
fact that this judgment remained fundamental to the framework of 
the 2003 Act. This guideline remains important as it directly addresses 
individual blame.
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It will be recalled that s143(1) of the 2003 Act drew a distinction 
between the culpability of the offender and the actual, intended or 
foreseeable harm caused. The guideline dealt with both considerations 
in turn. Four levels of criminal culpability were identified: intention; 
recklessness; knowledge; or negligence (Sentencing Guidelines 
Council, 2004, para 1.7). These ‘levels’ are presumably listed in 
descending order of culpability. Harm was similarly divided into 
harm to individual victims, harm to the community and a residual 
category of other types of harm. Unlike culpability, the guideline did 
not specify the relative gravity of these harms recognising, correctly, 
that this was impossible.
The Council recognised that ‘[a]ssessing seriousness is a difficult task, 
particularly where there is an imbalance between culpability and harm’ 
(para 1.16). The task was especially problematic either where the harm 
that materialised was greater than that intended or where the offender’s 
culpability exceeded the harm that arose. Harm, they argued, ‘must 
always be judged in the light of culpability’ (para 1.17). Therefore, 
the initial factor in determining seriousness was the culpability of the 
offender. Dingwall comments (2006/2007, 308–9) that:
The use of the word ‘initial’ is intriguing. Does this 
imply that culpability should be the primary determinant 
of seriousness? Or does it describe a process whereby 
culpability should be considered prior to harm in an overall 
assessment of severity? The latter would certainly appear to 
reflect the process in section 143(1) of the 2003 Act more 
accurately, in that culpability and harm are seen as two 
distinct elements which are to be amalgamated in order 
to determine seriousness. On the other hand, if the use of 
the word ‘initial’ is taken to denote a hierarchy, an apparent 
way of addressing the two problematic scenarios that were 
identified in the report is provided. (Italics in the original) 
Although the guideline provides a thoughtful appraisal of how 
seriousness can be quantified, its practical benefit is limited as it 
fails to provide concrete guidance to sentencers faced with deciding 
whether a particular offence is so serious that a particular punishment is 
warranted. Instead, it stated that this guidance would be best provided 
in discrete guidelines on individual offences (Sentencing Guidelines 
Council, 2004, para 1.37). Subsequent guidelines do address when 
particular punishments are appropriate but there is a danger that, by 
concentrating on particular offences in isolation, broader questions 
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about relative severity are lost (Ashworth, 2005, 132). The Sentencing 
Guidelines Council and the Sentencing Advisory Panel were abolished 
in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and replaced by a Sentencing 
Council who maintain a responsibility for producing guidelines. A 
crucial difference is that courts are now obliged to follow such guidance 
unless departure can be justified in the interests of justice (s125(1)). 
The Council has not revisited the issue of determining seriousness at 
a generic level but has continued to provide guidance on an offence-
specific basis.
It is evident that blame remains central to the sentencing process. 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 and subsequent guidance from the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council (2004) both state categorically that 
offence-severity cannot be measured adequately if one concentrates 
exclusively on the harm caused, intended or foreseen. This realisation 
can complicate matters. As the Sentencing Guidelines Council 
recognised, scenarios can arise where an individual’s culpability is low 
but the ensuing harm is considerable. Conversely, those who intend 
serious harm can sometimes be thwarted. Individual guidelines do 
provide a clear framework which, if followed (and that is not certain), 
would lead to a degree of consistency. Whether the sentences deemed 
appropriate in the guidelines adequately reflect the blame of individual 
offenders remains contentious as determining what constitutes a just, 
proportionate sentence remains subjective.
Conclusions: blame and procedural decision-making
In one of the most influential contributions to criminal justice 
scholarship, Packer (1968) drew a distinction between crime control 
and due process values in the criminal justice process. Although 
Packer’s model is not without flaws, this dichotomy has explanatory 
value in understanding the inherent tension between the need for a 
practical and effective system for dealing with alleged law-breakers and 
the desire for a system which contains robust procedural safeguards at 
all stages to ensure that justice is achieved. The crime control model 
is outcome-focused, in so far as any system should be judged on the 
efficiency with which desired objectives are realised. By contrast, a 
due process model would prioritise fairness over expediency at each 
and every stage. Gilchrist (2006, 169) comments:
This balancing between due process and crime control 
can be translated into a conflict between ‘expediency’ 
and ‘legality’, which is interesting to consider in terms 
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of the smaller decision points involved in the prosecution 
process. This area can also be researched in terms of factors 
influencing these, and what this might mean in terms of 
‘justice’. Consideration can also be given to what requires 
challenge and change, and how this might be achieved.
It has been argued that Packer’s models have limited potential for 
reforming the criminal justice process:
One of the strands of thought underlying the due process 
model is a scepticism about how the criminal sanction is 
used. Packer stated that this scepticism leads in turn to 
concern about the criminal justice process. Since the range 
of possible concerns about the use of the criminal sanction 
is so diverse, however, this strand of thought does not in 
itself give us any guidance on what form the criminal justice 
process should take. It simply acts as a catalyst for further 
evaluation. It is therefore not possible to construct an ideal-
type with concern about the use of the criminal sanction as 
a starting-point. That is not to say that concern about the 
use of the criminal sanction is irrelevant. Not only might 
it provoke consideration of the criminal justice process, it 
might also be relevant in making the value judgments that 
the ideal-types open up. (Macdonald, 2008, 270) 
To what extent do these models explain the criminal process outlined 
in this chapter? Can they help us to evaluate whether blameworthiness, 
as a factor influencing fairness and justice, is given sufficient weight? 
Packer himself invoked images of conveyor belts and obstacle courses 
to describe the criminal justice process and so it makes sense to evaluate 
the system in a sequential manner.
Determining whether prosecution is in the public interest or whether 
an alternative diversionary strategy is more appropriate represents the 
starting point. The processing of offenders in an expedient fashion with 
minimal financial outlay clearly satisfies crime control objectives, not 
least as it relieves pressure on the courts to try those who cannot be 
diverted. It is not necessarily the case that diversionary approaches are 
inimical to a due process model. What is necessary, though, is that the 
offender is given adequate protection as there is an obvious temptation 
to confess to an offence in the knowledge that a denial would lead 
to prosecution. There are requirements that guilt is established in 
most cases and many measures demand an admittance of guilt. For 
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example, cautions can only be administered when there is a sufficiency 
of evidence as well as a confession. The growing use of fixed penalty 
notices is less easy to accommodate in a due process model as there is 
no formal admittance of guilt. Expediency is the obvious driver and 
their use prioritises crime control values. Some may object to this 
analysis on the basis that the models are inapplicable as fixed penalty 
notices are not technically punishments, but this ignores the reality: 
notices are being issued for conduct that is criminal and the financial 
penalties have an impact in exactly the same way as does a fine. It is 
suggested that diversionary approaches can be accommodated within a 
due process model if: (1) meaningful safeguards are in place to ensure 
that the factually innocent do not ‘admit’ guilt in order to avoid 
prosecution; (2) clear national guidelines are provided as to when 
diversion is appropriate; (3) there is an adequate review process to 
monitor how any diversionary scheme operates.
These conditions all relate to blame in that they are designed 
to protect the blameless from any intervention while providing a 
framework which aims to achieve consistent outcomes for those who 
can be deemed blameworthy. For justice to be realised though, diversion 
must be a proportionate response to the gravity of the offence which 
means that a determination has to be made by some actor as to whether 
a given offence meets the threshold for prosecution. Inevitably, and 
despite objective criteria, this involves a subjective value judgement 
by the police or a crown prosecutor. The cautioning statistics suggest 
that the correct cases are being dealt with pre-trial, although one 
does not know how many of those cautioned are factually innocent. 
Reprimands and warnings are more difficult to evaluate using Packer’s 
models. Keeping juvenile offenders out of court may suggest a pre-
occupation with crime control, but the system replaces a less invasive, 
quicker and cheaper system for dealing with youth offending. From 
a due process perspective, statutory criteria are listed which offer 
procedural protection of a degree although key decisions, such as 
whether a first offence is sufficiently serious to justify a warning rather 
than a reprimand, remain arbitrary. Blame does appear relevant to this 
new framework provided decisions on offence-severity do not just 
measure the harm caused. One cannot, however, ignore empirical 
evidence from stakeholders which suggests that the process operates 
inconsistently and unfairly (Peuch and Evans, 2001).
Diverting particular activities from the orthodox criminal process also 
exposes tensions between crime control and due process values. Some 
of these offences, for example breaches of health and safety law, require 
specialist investigation and hence it may well be legitimate to transfer 
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this function from the police to bespoke agencies with the necessary 
expertise. The benefits of a speedy resolution to some offences are 
obvious. In that respect, aspects of a crime control model are clearly 
visible. Due process concerns are not wholly absent, but their role is 
often limited. Three factors help explain this balance. First, these types 
of activity are often seen as quasi-criminal and attract less stigma 
than ‘normal’ criminality. Second, such offences are often classed as 
strict liability offences (see further, Chapter Four). Conviction is not 
dependent on proving a particular state of mind on the part of the 
offender; there is, therefore, no legal requirement for the offender to 
be blameworthy provided he is factually responsible for the specified 
harm. Finally, and partly because strict liability commonly suffices, the 
likely punishment is often comparatively minor. Later chapters will 
challenge the assertion that these crimes are relatively minor and that 
those who commit them are less blameworthy than those offenders who 
are routinely prosecuted. There is the added problem that a vigorous 
campaign to prosecute deviant organisations could indirectly punish 
those whom the law is seeking to protect:
[Corporations] act according to capitalist laws of economic 
behaviour rather than laws of due process or social justice. 
If forced to comply with laws which make processes 
uneconomic (or, more realistically, less profitable) firms 
will simply scale down or move their business. Regulatory 
agencies which genuinely care about their true clients 
(the workers within the industry they regulate) are thus 
forced into choosing between two unpalatable alternatives: 
corporate law breaking or reduced economic activity. 
(Sanders et al, 2010, 420)
Mode of trial decisions have an impact both on the likelihood of 
conviction (the acquittal rate is higher in the Crown Court) and on 
the potential punishment (as magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers are 
more limited). The criminal justice system already determines where 
the least serious and the most serious offences are heard largely on the 
basis of offence-severity. Although the classification of offences has to 
be decided at a general level, an assessment of the typical offence 
demands consideration not only of the typical harm caused but of the 
typical offender’s blameworthiness. A useful example is fraud where 
the average financial loss may suggest that this is a comparatively minor 
offence, yet the fraudster’s actions might demonstrate considerable 
culpability. At a general level, dividing offences into three generic 
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categories has not been questioned presumably on the basis of necessity: 
unless the magistrates’ courts deal with the bulk of cases the criminal 
justice system would collapse. Nor is this objectionable at a theoretical 
level as the magistrates’ courts have sufficient sentencing powers to deal 
with most offenders in a just and proportionate manner. It goes without 
saying that there will be a degree of arbitrariness in the classification 
of offences as determinations of seriousness are inherently subjective 
and political. The political dimension means that some offences will be 
classified as a triable either way, or an indictable offence for symbolic 
reasons rather than on an objective assessment of seriousness, while 
others will be classified as summary offences solely because it will 
help reduce pressure on the Crown Court. Broadly, however, the 
categorisation appears defensible on grounds of offence-severity.
Many triable either way offences have a wide legal definition and 
it therefore comes as a surprise that most decisions are uncontested 
and unproblematic in practice (Cammiss, 2009). If this was because 
national guidelines were sufficiently clear and were followed sensibly, 
one might conclude that there was adequate due process protection at 
this vital juncture. Instead, the fact that court custom was crucial and 
that the majority of cases remain in the magistrates’ court highlights 
the importance of crime control at this stage. This is not necessarily 
problematic in that defendants have to consent to summary trial, 
but the risks associated with a Crown Court trial serve as a powerful 
disincentive.
Finally, we turn to sentencing. The argument advanced earlier in 
the chapter was that other writers have over-stated the retreat from 
retribution in the criminal justice system. This is not to deny the 
resurgence of public protection over the past 15 years, rather it is to 
situate it in the everyday reality of sentencing decision-making. In 
most cases, sentencers are legally bound to determine the seriousness 
of the offence – which explicitly includes the offender’s culpability 
– before determining whether a statutory threshold for a particular 
type of punishment is met. In many cases they are assisted in this task 
by sentencing guidelines which they are required to follow unless 
the interests of justice demand otherwise. Sentencers are routinely 
making assessments about seriousness, in part on the basis of individual 
culpability. Our thesis then is that blame remains central to sentencing 
and the imposition of punishment.
From decisions to prosecute to determining sentence, blame plays 
a crucial role in the criminal justice system. It is far from the only 
factor that dictates policy and, at times, policy appears to prioritise 
concerns other than blame, perhaps most notably the need to manage 
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the criminal justice system in an expedient manner. Many competing 
influences are important and it can be justifiable to marginalise or 
exclude blame from the calculus at times. Blame is used in this book 
primarily as a means of evaluation rather than an exemplar. That said, 
a criminal justice system which fails to consider individual blame risks 
losing any claim to legitimacy. Assessments of blame are sufficiently 
entrenched in our current system to ensure that this is not the case 
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Some categories of individual are excluded from criminal liability even 
though they have caused a criminal harm. In English Law children 
under the age of 10 cannot be held criminally liable; the International 
Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over anyone under the age of 18. 
Most legal systems also recognise that mental capacity affects criminal 
liability: less or no blame may be attached to those who lack the 
mental capacity to control their actions. Chapter Three considers the 
influences and effects of both age and mental capacity on blame. The 
chapter will also survey a number of additional excuses or justifications 
to crime to ascertain the extent to which they depend on an absence 
or reduction of blame. The chapter concludes by exploring the notion 
of moral luck. Those following the Kantian tradition would argue that 
intention is the key to moral assessment: HLA Hart posed the question: 
‘Why should the accidental fact that an intended harmful outcome has 
not occurred be a ground for punishing less a criminal who may be 
equally dangerous and equally wicked?’ (Hart, 1968, 129). Yet often 
the person making the unsuccessful attempt is assessed differently from 
the one who succeeds.
The minimum age of criminal responsibility
On 8 November 2013 the Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill received 
its second reading in the House of Lords. The bill’s sponsor, the 
Liberal Democrat peer Lord Dhokalia, pointed out during the debate 
that at 10, the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales 
was the lowest in Europe. The introduction of the bill followed the 
publication of a report by the Centre for Social Justice which had been 
commissioned by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. Rules of 
Engagement: Changing the Heart of Youth Justice (Centre for Social Justice, 
2012) considered a number of aspects of the current system of youth 
justice in England and Wales including the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility. The Centre for Social Justice pointed out that discussion 
of the topic has for long been almost taboo in England and Wales and 
those who have suggested increasing the age have faced vilification 
from the tabloid press. It is clear that part of the reason for setting a 
minimum age relates to concerns about the degree to which children 
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are competent to participate in the criminal process. There has also 
been much discussion about the impact of criminalisation on children. 
Adopting a minimum age is also fundamentally about allocation of 
blame: all societies seem to accept that there is some age below which 
an individual cannot be considered fully responsible for their actions.
Early to mid-adolescence is a period during which the 
domains that control and coordinate thoughts, behaviours 
and emotional responses undergo significant development. 
In particular, the likelihood of impulsive, sensation-seeking 
and risk-taking actions is greatly increased. Capacity to 
accurately gauge the consequences of actions is developing, 
as is the ability to empathise. Young people are also much 
more susceptible to the influences of others, especially their 
peers: they find it harder to resist or say no to behaviours 
that in the adult world would be called crimes. This does 
not mean that children bear no responsibility for their 
behaviour, but that they may be less responsible. (Centre 
for Social Justice, 2012, 202)
The issue of culpability was considered extensively by the United 
States Supreme Court in Roper v Simmons (543 US 551 (2005)). At 
the age of 17, Christopher Simmons persuaded a younger friend to 
help him break into a woman’s apartment, tie her up and then throw 
her over a bridge. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death 
by a Missouri court in 1994. Following a number of appeals the case 
reached the Supreme Court in October 2004 and the opinion of the 
Court was delivered in March 2005. According to the Court: ‘Capital 
punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit “a narrow 
category of the most serious crimes” and whose extreme culpability 
makes them “the most deserving of execution”’ (p 14).
Since a major purpose of the death penalty, according to the Supreme 
Court, is retribution and: 
Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s 
moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for 
the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as 
strong with a minor as with an adult. Retribution is not 
proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on 
one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, 
to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity. 
(p 17)
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The extent to which the culpability of juveniles is in some way 
diminished was therefore a central issue in the case. To assist it the Court 
was able to refer to the brief prepared by the American Psychological 
Association and the Missouri Psychological Association on behalf of 
Simmons. The amicus brief argued forcefully against imposing adult 
levels of culpability on juveniles: 
At ages 16 and 17, adolescents, as a group, are not yet 
mature in ways that affect their decision-making. Behavioral 
studies show that late adolescents are less likely to consider 
alternative courses of action, understand the perspective of 
others, and restrain impulses. Delinquent, even criminal, 
behavior is characteristic of many adolescents, often 
peaking around age 18. Heightened risk-taking is also 
common. During the same period, the brain has not 
reached adult maturity, particularly in the frontal lobes, 
which control executive functions of the brain related to 
decision-making…Developmentally immature decision-
making, paralleled by immature neurological development, 
diminishes an adolescent’s blameworthiness. (American 
Psychological Association, 2004, 2)
The brief cited with approval the work of Jeffrey Jensen Arnett on 
adolescence. Beginning at the end of childhood at the age of about 
10 or 11, adolescence provides the key development bridge to 
adulthood which is not always achieved until the early 20s (Arnett, 
2000). Arnett (1992) found that adolescents as a group were statistically 
overrepresented in almost every kind of reckless behaviour and that 
adolescents appear to be particularly attracted to high risk behaviour. As 
Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) point out ‘One of the few facts agreed 
on in criminology is the age distribution of crime’ (p 552). One of the 
‘brute facts’ (p 552) of criminology which varies little across time or 
different cultures is that the highest levels of crime occur during late 
adolescence, typically between the ages of 15 and 18.
The amicus brief cited a number of studies which demonstrated that 
adolescents were ‘less future oriented and less likely to consider properly 
the consequences of their actions’ (American Psychological Association, 
2004, 7). Furthermore, ‘Neuropsychological research demonstrates that 
the adolescent brain has not reached adult maturity’ (p 9):
Of particular interest with regard to decision-making and 
criminal culpability is the development of the frontal lobes 
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of the brain. The frontal lobes, especially the prefrontal 
cortex, play a critical role in the executive or ‘CEO’ 
functions of the brain which are considered the higher 
functions of the brain…Neurodevelopmental MRI studies 
indicate this executive area of the brain is one of the last 
parts of the brain to reach maturity. (p 10)
Ruben Gur of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia has 
stated: ‘The brain’s frontal lobe, which exercises restraint over impulsive 
behaviour doesn’t begin to mature until 17 years of age…The very 
part of the brain that is judged by the legal system process comes on 
board late’ (Beckman, 2004).
The majority in the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional 
to impose the death penalty on offenders who were under the age 
of 18 at the time of the offence. The decision was partly based on 
acceptance of the diminished culpability of juveniles. Even O’Connor 
J, dissenting from the majority opinion, accepted that: ‘It is beyond 
cavil that juveniles as a class are generally less mature, less responsible, 
and less fully formed than adults, and that these differences bear on 
juveniles’ comparative moral culpability’ (Roper v Simmons, p 13).
According to Cipriani (2009) the minimum age ranges globally 
from six to 18. The median age is 12 and this is the minimum age 
recommended by the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
established by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 
(CRC, 2007, para 32). The CRC states that even children above the age 
of criminal responsibility have a lesser culpability than adults because 
they ‘differ from adults in their physical and psychological development, 
and their emotional and educational needs’ (para 10). In England and 
Wales the minimum age of criminal responsibility is currently set at 
10 years by s16 Children and Young Persons Act 1963. Many have 
pointed to the discrepancy between this age and the minimum age 
required in respect of other functions and activities. Perhaps the best 
example is provided by Goldson and Peters (2000, 4) who note:
Section 3 of the Pet Animals Act 1951 provides that it is 
not until a child has reached the age of 12 that they may be 
regarded as being sufficiently responsible, and thus legally 
entitled, to buy a pet. This seems perfectly sensible. It is 
curiously anomalous and legally inconsistent therefore, 
to regard the same child, albeit two years younger, to be 
sufficiently responsible to face the full rigour of criminal law.
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Brooks points to the almost absurd inconsistency that provides that:
[A] defendant not old enough to legally buy a hamster can be 
tried in an adult court, as though the level of psychological 
sophistication required to look after a domesticated rodent 
is worthy of a longer period of development than the 
capacity to understand the moral responsibility inherent in 
the commission of a serious criminal act. (Brooks, 2011)
Yet criminalising juveniles might appear less absurd viewed through 
the prism of blame. Juveniles can provide convenient scapegoats. 
Hendrick (1994) identifies how the social construction of childhood 
produces two types: the innocent, vulnerable child-as-victim and 
the impulsive, incorrigible child-as-threat. Arguably the growth of a 
blame culture has coincided with an increasing awareness and concern 
with the child-as-threat. Many point to the murder of two-year-old 
James Bulger in February 1993 as a defining moment in this process. 
In sentencing 11-year-old Robert Thompson and Jon Venables, Mr 
Justice Morland stated that their ‘cunning and very wicked behaviour’ 
had resulted in an act ‘of unparalleled evil and barbarity’ (Guardian, 
25 November 1993).
Sadly, one can probably find many parallel acts of evil and barbarity. 
Elsewhere in this book there are references to young children who 
have died under circumstances little less horrific than those endured 
by James Bulger in his final hours. Yet the fact that his attackers were 
only 10 at the time seems to have somehow made them more, not 
less, blameworthy. The Times editorial stated on the day after Venables 
and Thompson were sentenced:
Childhood has a darker side…children should not be 
presumed to be innately good. In the lexicon of crime 
there is metaphysical evil, the imperfection of all mankind; 
there is physical evil, the suffering that humans cause each 
other; and there is moral evil, the choice of vice over virtue. 
Children are separated by necessity of age from none of 
these. (The Times, 25 November 1993)
Shortly after the murder of James Bulger, the then Home Secretary, 
Michael Howard, described child ‘offenders’ as ‘adult in everything 
except years’ who would not be allowed to ‘use age as an excuse 
for immunity from effective punishment’ (cited in Goldson, 1997, 
130). Such a view was not uncommon in the UK in the 1990s and 
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represented a growing process of ‘responsibilization and adultification’ 
(Goldson, 2013, 113) of juvenile offenders.
Until 1998 offenders between the ages of 10 and 13 had the additional 
protection of the doli incapax presumption. It was for the prosecution 
to rebut the presumption that the child was aware of the difference 
between right and wrong by proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the child knew that what she or he had done was seriously wrong and 
not merely naughty or mischievous. The presumption was abolished 
by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The following year saw a 29% 
increase in the number of 10- to 14-year-old children cautioned and/
or convicted (Goldson, 2013, 114). The change to the law occurred 
at a time of growing concern about juvenile crime and the existence 
of a growing number of persistent young offenders. 
Many of the arguments that led to the abolition of the 
presumption of doli incapax…did not address the issue of 
whether children are developed enough by the age of 10 to 
be criminally responsible. Instead the focus was on making 
children take responsibility for their actions. Arguments 
which related to children’s actual capacity to understand 
the wrongfulness of their actions tended to not go beyond 
basic appeals to common sense, claiming that children 
develop quicker in modern society and are better able to 
distinguish right from wrong due to compulsory education. 
Such claims were made without a thorough examination of 
whether children today really are mentally or socially mature 
from an earlier age…A common claim was that it flies in 
the face of common sense to presume that children cannot 
distinguish right from wrong. This view of when a child is 
criminally responsible is, however, a gross simplification of 
the issue. (Crofts, 2009, 285)
The child-as-threat provides a convenient scapegoat. The ‘common 
sense’ view that children develop quicker in modern society and that 
criminal responsibility is only about distinguishing between right and 
wrong is, as we have already seen, refuted by the scientific evidence. 
The Centre for Social Justice Report found that ‘young people who 
offend, particularly those who commit the most serious crimes, are 
likely to be the most vulnerable (often being victims themselves) and 
least competent to engage with the criminal justice system’ (Centre for 
Social Justice, 2012, 202). The CSJ argues that questions of culpability 
are:
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[distinct] from the question of the age at which children 
understand the difference between right and wrong, a 
question on which the MACR debate often misguidedly 
centres. Most children can broadly differentiate between 
right and wrong from a very young age. Children, however, 
have a limited capacity to judge the magnitude of right and 
wrong: that is, what is criminal and what is not. This is 
likely to be particularly true of children who have grown 
up in highly dysfunctional family circumstances and hence 
not learned law abiding behaviour in the home. There is 
also some indication that children who have experienced 
abuse may ‘learn through modelling and reinforcement 
(social learning theory) that aggressive behaviour is linked 
to attention and status’, leading them to emulate such 
behaviour themselves. (p 203)
The conclusion drawn by the CSJ is that ‘The evidence indicates 
strongly that the current low MACR in England and Wales is unsafe, 
unjust and harmful to wider society’ (p 210). Yet the report accepts 
that reform of the law is ‘unlikely in the immediate term’ (p 211). 
The second reading of Lord Dhokalia’s bill was the last occasion it 
was discussed in Parliament: with the prorogation of the 2013–14 
Parliamentary session, the bill lapsed. 
The position of English law in relation to juveniles contrasts with 
the approach taken by international criminal law. While the CSJ 
recommends raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility to 
12 ‘for all but the most grave offences (murder, attempted murder, 
rape, manslaughter and aggravated sexual assault)’ (p 211), those 
under 18 who commit war crimes or crimes against humanity will 
not find themselves indicted before the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). The Rome Statute of the ICC provides that the Court shall 
have no jurisdiction over those who were under the age of 18 at the 
time of the alleged commission of the offence (Rome Statute, 2002, 
article 26). This is consistent with the Principles and Guidelines on 
Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups 2007 (Paris 
Principles, 2007). The Paris Principles were drawn up under the 
auspices of UNICEF and formally endorsed by 58 states in February 
2007. Principle 3.6 provides that ‘children who are accused of crimes 
under international law allegedly committed while they were associated 
with armed forces or armed groups should be considered primarily as 
victims of offences against international law, not only as perpetrators’.
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The Paris Principles themselves are consistent with the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice (the Beijing Rules) which were adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly on 29 November 1985 (United Nations, 1985). 
Principle 4 provides:
4.1 In those legal systems recognizing the concept of the 
age of criminal responsibility for juveniles, the beginning of 
that age shall not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing 
in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual 
maturity.
The Commentary to the Beijing Rules indicates that there is a 
close relationship between notions of responsibility for criminal or 
delinquent behaviour and other social rights and responsibilities. A 
minimum age of criminal responsibility set at 10 provides an interesting 
comparison with a minimum age for giving consent to sexual activity 
set at 16 and a minimum voting age of 18.
Surprisingly, particularly given the foregoing discussion on the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility, ‘little has been written about 
the substantive reasons that support a separate policy towards crimes 
committed by young offenders’ (Zimring, 1998, 447). Zimring suggests 
that the reason for this stems partly from the fact that the different 
treatment of children seems intuitively right. He goes on to suggest 
two policy areas which determine official attitudes to youth crime: 
one aspect is the fact that adolescents may be more susceptible than 
adults to efforts at rehabilitation; the other aspect relates more directly 
to the issue of blame. Zimring proposes that age be considered as a 
species of diminished responsibility: ‘Just as psychiatric disorder or 
cognitive impairment that does not render a subject exempt from the 
criminal law might still mitigate the punishment justly to be imposed, 
so a minimally competent adolescent should not be responsible for the 
whole of an adult’s desert for the same act’ (p 448).
Zimring argues there are three types of personal attribute affecting 
decisions to commit crimes where juveniles may lack full adult 
competency. First, juveniles may not have the fully developed cognitive 
ability to be able to understand moral and legal rules and apply them 
to social situations. An infant may lack such ability entirely and for this 
reason we would not hold a four-year-old child criminally responsible. 
Cognitive ability develops with age and older children and adolescents 
have an increased ability but may not possess the full ability of adults. 
For this reason the degree of criminal responsibility and blame should 
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be diminished. Second, juveniles may not possess full adult ability to 
exercise self-control: ‘Long after a child knows that taking candy is 
wrong, the capacity to resist temptation when a taking is the only 
available route to the candy may not be fully operational’ (p 448).
Zimring accepts that understanding and knowledge of self-control is 
limited but argues that it is a behaviour that develops with practice and 
experience and that bad decisions by juveniles should not be regarded 
in the same way as similar decisions by adults who have had the time 
and experience to develop self-control. Third, Zimring identifies the 
ability to resist peer pressure: 
A teen may know right from wrong and even may have 
developed the capacity to control his or her impulses if 
left alone to do so, but resisting temptation while alone 
is a different task than resisting the pressure to commit 
an offense when adolescent peers are pushing for the 
adolescent to misbehave and witnessing whether or not 
the outcome they desire will occur. (p 449)
We may not yet have sufficient knowledge of developmental psychology 
to be able to quantify precisely the extent to which blame and 
responsibility should be diminished in juveniles. It seems incontestable, 
however, that attribution of blame to juveniles cannot be set at the 
same level as it is for fully competent adults.
Mental capacity
In March 2013 the Catholic Archbishop of Durban, Cardinal Wilfred 
Fox Napier was widely criticised for describing paedophilia as a 
psychological ‘illness, not a criminal condition’ (BBC, 2013). The 
main basis for the criticism was the assumption that the Cardinal was 
attempting in some way to excuse child sex abuse. Barbara Dorries, 
who as a child was abused by a priest and who works for the Chicago-
based Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests told the BBC: ‘If 
it is a disease that’s fine, but it’s also a crime and crimes are punished, 
criminals are held accountable for what they did and what they do.’ 
The relationship between illness, mental capacity and blame has a 
long history. 
On Friday, 20 January 1843 Daniel M’Naughten shot Edward 
Drummond in the back. As he attempted to fire a second shot, 
M’Naughten was apprehended by a police constable. Edward 
Drummond, private secretary to the Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, 
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died five days later. Significantly, in relation to the issue of moral luck 
discussed later in this chapter, there is some discussion as to the precise 
cause of death. At the trial of M’Naughten, the doctors who attended 
Drummond were in no doubt that the shooting was the direct cause 
of death. Yet there is some suggestion that it would have been possible 
for Drummond to make a full recovery from his injury and that what 
killed him was the medical intervention. Had Drummond been treated 
differently it is possible he might not have died from the bullet wound 
and the M’Naughten Rules may never have seen the light of day. In any 
event, M’Naughten was subsequently indicted for the wilful murder 
of Edward Drummond and his trial took place at the Old Bailey on 
27 February 1843 (Old Bailey, 1843). At the trial a number of medical 
experts gave evidence on the state of M’Naughten’s mind. Among 
the medical experts was William Hutchinson, physician to the Royal 
Lunatic Asylum in Glasgow who had examined M’Naughten and 
found him to be suffering from ‘morbid delusions’ which would fully 
explain and account for the action of shooting Edward Drummond. 
Under cross examination Hutchinson was clear: “[M’Naughten] was 
perfectly incapable of exercising control in any matter connected 
with the delusion – I am decidedly of opinion that the act flowed 
immediately out of that delusion.”
On the basis of this and similar evidence M’Naughten was found 
not guilty on the basis of insanity.
The verdict was widely criticised. In a debate on insanity and 
crime in the House of Lords on 13 March 1843 the Lord Chancellor 
explained the situation:
A gentleman in the prime of life, of a most amiable 
character, incapable of giving offence or of injuring any 
individual, was murdered in the streets of this metropolis 
in open day. The assassin was secured; he was committed 
for trial; that trial has taken place, and he has escaped with 
impunity. Your Lordships will not be surprised that these 
circumstances should have created a deep feeling in the 
public mind, and that many persons should, on the first 
impression, be disposed to think that there is some great 
defect in the laws of the country with reference to this 
subject which calls for a revision of those laws, in order 
that a repetition of such outrages may be prevented. (HL 
Deb, 13 March 1843, vol 67, cc714–44)
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Part of the concern related to the manner in which the trial was ended 
and the fact that the issue of insanity was not put to the jury. A number 
of the medical experts had not examined M’Naughten and based their 
evidence on what they had heard in court. Yet there was also disquiet 
at the fact that M’Naughten had seemingly ‘escaped with impunity’. 
Edward Drummond had been murdered and yet there appeared to be 
nobody to blame. The continuing concern led the House of Lords to 
assert a right to ask abstract questions of law of the trial judges. It is 
the report of these questions and the answers to them that constitutes 
the M’Naghten Rules ((1843) 10 CI & Fin 200). The rules provide 
that there is a presumption of sanity. The burden of proof is on the 
defence to show that the defendant was labouring under such a defect 
of reason, due to disease of the mind, as either not to know the nature 
and quality of his or her act or, if he did know this, not to know that 
he or she was doing wrong. Where a defence of insanity is successful 
the verdict of the court will be not guilty by reason of insanity and 
the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 s.5 provides that where a 
defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity the judge may make 
a hospital order, a supervision order, or an order for the defendant’s 
absolute discharge. 
In Sullivan [1984] AC 156 Lord Diplock stated that, although ‘defect 
of reason’ and ‘disease of the mind’ might not be terms currently used 
by the medical profession, the meaning was clear: 
‘Mind’…is used in the ordinary sense of the mental faculties 
of reason, memory and understanding. If the effect of a 
disease is to impair these faculties so severely as to have 
either of the consequences referred to in the latter part 
of the rules, it matters not whether the aetiology, of the 
impairment is organic, as in epilepsy, or functional, or 
whether the impairment itself is permanent or is transient 
and intermittent, provided that it subsisted at the time of 
commission of the act. (p 172)
The courts have distinguished between mental impairment caused by 
disease and other causes by requiring that where impairment is due 
to disease the immediate cause must be internal to the defendant, 
although in Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92 the Court of Appeal pointed out 
that this is not always a clear distinction. 
The key aspect of the insanity defence as far as blame is concerned is 
that the defendant was unable to appreciate what he or she was doing 
or that what was being done was wrong. The jury needs to be satisfied 
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that either the defendant was unaware of the act, or its effects, or the 
material circumstances in which the act occurred. Even if the defendant 
is able to appreciate what he or she is doing, the insanity defence 
will succeed if it can be shown that the defendant was unaware that 
the action was wrong. This alternative aspect of the defence perhaps 
causes more problems. In Windle [1952] 2 QB 826 it was held that 
an insanity defence will not succeed if the defendant knew what they 
were doing was prohibited by law. It may be argued that this would 
allow relatively few successful pleas of insanity since, as the Butler 
Committee suggested, even grossly disturbed persons generally know 
that murder, for example, is prohibited by law and thus legally wrong 
(Butler Committee, 1975, para 18.8). Windle has been criticised and 
both the High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of Canada 
(Chaulk (1990) 2 CR (4th) 1) have declined to follow the decision. In 
Stapleton v R (1952) 86 CLR 358 the High Court of Australia took the 
view that ‘wrong’ should be taken to mean morally wrong, in the sense 
of being contrary to the moral views of the majority of the population.
The defence of insanity covered by the M’Naghten Rules is a 
complete defence to most offences and results in an acquittal. In cases 
of murder evidence of mental impairment may result in a diminution 
in the extent to which the defendant is held responsible. S2 of the 
Homicide Act 1957 as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
provides:
 (1) A person (‘D’) who kills or is a party to the killing 
of another is not to be convicted of murder if D was 
suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning 
which –
 (a) arose from a recognised medical condition,
 (b) substantially impaired D’s ability to do one or 
more of the things mentioned in subsection 
(1A), and
 (c) provides an explanation for D’s acts and omissions 
in doing or being a party to the killing.
 (1A) Those things are –
 (a) to understand the nature of D’s conduct;
 (b) to form a rational judgment;
 (c) to exercise self-control.
 (1B) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), an abnormality 
of mental functioning provides an explanation for D’s 
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conduct if it causes, or is a significant contributory 
factor in causing, D to carry out that conduct.
A successful plea of diminished responsibility under s2 will result 
in the defendant, otherwise guilty of murder, being convicted of 
manslaughter. The practical implication of this is that the court has a 
discretion in regard to sentencing. Under English law a conviction for 
murder carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. It was the 
view of the UK government and the Law Commission that establishing 
diminished responsibility requires a causal connection between the 
abnormality of mental functioning and the killing (Hansard, 3 March 
2009L, Column 414). This had not been clear in the legislation as 
originally drafted in 1957. In relation to s2(1)(a) it is expected that 
reference will be made to existing accepted classificatory lists such as 
the World Health Organisation’s international classification of diseases 
and the American Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic and statistical 
manual of mental disorders.
A particular type of diminished responsibility is provided by the 
Infanticide Act 1938 (as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009). This provides that a woman who kills her own child under 
the age of 12 months will be guilty of infanticide rather than murder 
or manslaughter if, at the time of the act or omission leading to the 
death of the child: 
[The] balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her 
not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to 
the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent 
on the birth of the child. (s1(1))
The law has been criticised on a number of grounds including the fact 
that it fails to cover situations where the balance of the mother’s mind 
is disturbed by factors connected to but not consequent on the birth of 
the child (see Kai-Whitewind [2005] EWCA Crim 1092). The reference 
to lactation is regarded as outdated since at the time the legislation 
was originally introduced it was widely, although it turns out to be 
incorrectly, believed that post-natal depression was linked to lactation. 
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 also introduced a new partial 
defence to murder. English common law had long recognised that 
provocation had a bearing on criminal responsibility and s3 of the 
Homicide Act 1957 provided:
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Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which 
the jury can find that the person charged was provoked 
(whether by things done or by things said or by both 
together) to lose his self-control, the question whether the 
provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as 
he did shall be determined by the jury. 
A number of cases resulted in the law on provocation being criticised. In 
some cases it was felt too broad a view of what constituted provocation 
was taken: for example, in Doughty [1986] EWCA Crim 1 the Court 
of Appeal accepted that the persistent crying of a 17-day-old baby 
could constitute provocation. On the other hand, the need to show 
sudden and temporary loss of control left a number of women who 
killed persistently violent partners without a defence. S54–56 of the 
2009 Act abolishes the partial defence of provocation and replaces it 
with a new defence of loss of control. The loss of control must result 
from a ‘qualifying trigger’ and: ‘a person of the defendant (D)’s sex 
and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in 
the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar 
way to D’.
The ‘qualifying triggers’ are: where the defendant fears serious 
violence; when certain things have been said or done which amount 
to circumstances of an extremely grave character and caused the 
defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged; or, 
when a combination of the first two situations applies. Unlike with the 
defence of provocation, the loss of control need not have been sudden 
but the judge and jury may take any delay into account when deciding 
on whether there has been a loss of control. The changes to the law 
here appear to reflect common views about blame. It recognises the 
fact that in certain circumstances (the qualifying triggers) individuals 
with otherwise ‘normal’ levels of tolerance and self-restraint may lose 
self-control. It is perhaps worth noting that the reforms made to the 
law here do not appear to have been based on significant amounts of 
scientific research on self-control. Parallels might be drawn here with 
the attitude taken toward adolescent self-control discussed earlier in 
this chapter. 
It can be seen that mental impairment and loss of self-control can 
have an effect on levels of criminal responsibility and, we would argue, 
blame. In many cases, a finding of diminished responsibility (in its 
wider sense) reflects a diminution in attribution of blame: a mother 
suffering from post-natal depression who kills her very young child is 
regarded as deserving of less blame than the mentally well child-killer. 
67
Blame and the blameless
Yet put like this one raises more fundamental questions about blame 
and responsibility: to what extent is it possible to refer to the ‘normal’, 
‘reasonable’, ‘self-controlled’, ‘self-restrained’, ‘tolerant’ child-killer? 
The reaction to Cardinal Napier’s comments regarding paedophiles 
demonstrates the problem here. There is more than a hint of suspicion 
that in some cases the demand for blame will outweigh considerations 
of mental capacity and impairment. The public reaction to Daniel 
M’Naughten’s acquittal was partly based on a sense of outrage that 
an innocent man had been killed and the murderer had ‘escaped with 
impunity’. In May 1981 Peter Sutcliffe was convicted of 13 counts 
of murder. The murders were carried out in West Yorkshire over a 
five-year period and involved mutilation. Sutcliffe unsuccessfully put 
forward a defence of diminished responsibility on the grounds that he 
was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and that his killings were 
carried out as a mission to clear the streets of prostitutes (see R v Peter 
William Coonan (formerly Sutcliffe) [2011] EWCA Crim 5).
The prosecution had intended to accept Sutcliffe’s plea after four 
psychiatrists diagnosed him with paranoid schizophrenia. The trial 
judge unusually demanded an explanation of the prosecution decision, 
however, and, having heard legal submissions, rejected the plea and the 
trial proceeded before the jury. Following conviction and imprisonment 
Sutcliffe was found to be suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and 
subsequently transferred to Broadmoor Hospital, a high security 
psychiatric hospital. Given the fear which Sutcliffe’s offences generated 
and the level of publicity which surrounded the police investigation 
and trial it is perhaps unsurprising that the defence of diminished 
responsibility was rejected. This was a case that required someone to 
be blamed; a successful plea of diminished responsibility would have 
diminished the blame. 
Justifications, excuses and circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness
Ann swings her arm and injures Ben. She faces moral 
condemnation and legal liability unless she can offer an 
explanation that absolves her of full blame. She might make 
a claim of justification that, despite initial appearances, 
her action was desirable or proper, or she might make a 
claim of excuse that she does not bear full responsibility 
for injuring Ben. If Ann is fully justified, she will not be 
subject to blame or to classification as a weak or defective 
person. If Ann is excused, she may be regarded as wholly 
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or partly free of blame, but she will have demonstrated 
weakness or some defect. Because the moral evaluation 
of a justified actor differs from the moral evaluation of an 
excused actor, deciding whether Ann is justified or excused 
is an important moral question. (Greenawalt, 1986, p 89)
In this section we are concerned with the circumstances where what 
might at first appear to be blameworthy conduct is excused or justified 
to the extent that no blame is attached. Although a distinction is 
properly drawn between excuses and justifications both have an effect 
on blame: as Greenawalt indicates, the extent to which we blame Ann 
is connected to the extent to which we accept her justifications or 
excuses.
Consent may provide an excuse to what would otherwise be regarded 
as wrongful activity. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility (ILC, 2001) set down the circumstances that 
will preclude wrongfulness in chapter V and the opening article 
provides: ‘Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act 
by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to 
the former State to the extent that the act remains within the limits 
of that consent’ (Article 20).
Within municipal legal systems there is often a recognition that 
many offences against the person may be excused if the victim gives 
a valid consent. The least controversial area is probably consent given 
to reasonable surgical interference. Surgical interference will usually 
involve permanent or short-term harm to the body but where it 
is carried out for therapeutic purposes and consent is validly given 
there is little question of blame arising. Yet where surgery occurs for 
non-therapeutic reasons the position may be less clear. The Female 
Genital Mutilation Act 2003 prohibits female circumcision which 
would therefore be regarded as unreasonable surgical interference to 
which consent could not be validly given. Those who participate in 
contact sports are deemed to consent to the risk of such accidental 
harm as can reasonably be expected. Consent clearly extends to harm 
sustained within the rules of the sport but may also go beyond that: it 
is to be reasonably expected that, in the heat of the moment, conduct 
outside the rules may occur. It seems clear that conduct which in other 
contexts would be regarded as deserving of blame will be condoned 
in the context of recognised sporting activity. 
In recent years much of the debate about consent has focused on 
sexual behaviour. The leading English case is Brown [1994] 1 AC 212. 
The defendants had consented to acts of violence against each other 
69
Blame and the blameless
for the sexual pleasure of giving and receiving pain. The defendants 
appealed against their convictions for assault occasioning actual bodily 
harm and unlawful wounding on the grounds that the acts in question 
had been carried out in private with the victim’s consent. The House 
of Lords in dismissing the appeals upheld an earlier Court of Appeal 
decision (A-G’s Reference (no 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715) that a person 
cannot validly consent to non-trivial injuries that were intended and/
or caused. The House of Lords took the view that consent would have 
been relevant if it was in the public interest to permit the intentional 
causing of harm but it could find no such reasons. Despite their criminal 
liability the extent to which Brown and the others involved would 
be ‘blamed’ for their actions might be more debatable. Clearly there 
would be a difference in levels of blame between consensual and non-
consensual acts of genital torture. The extent to which consent may 
reduce blame may also be limited by the limits on consent: ‘Consent 
provides an objective reason for allowing a person to make choices 
that may involve consenting to harm, but consent is not absolute. 
Consent protects personal autonomy, but it does not allow a person 
to degrade or destroy the human dignity of the consenting party’ 
(Barker, 2009, p 98).
The two main justifications recognised by criminal law are necessity 
and public or private defence. Under the ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility Article 25 (ILC, 2001), necessity arises when a state acts 
to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril. 
Most legal systems will recognise that in certain situations behaviour 
which would otherwise be regarded as criminal will not be so regarded 
if it is done to prevent a more serious harm. A common example 
would be an ambulance or fire engine exceeding the speed limit in 
order to attend an emergency. Legal provision for the defence is often 
quite minimal although public policy considerations and prosecution 
authority discretion will often mean that in cases where necessity might 
be an issue charges will be dropped or never brought. Where action 
is genuinely based on necessity it seems unlikely that blame will arise.
Where someone acts to prevent the commission of a crime, or to 
effect a lawful arrest then use of a reasonable amount of force may 
be justified and the action will not be regarded criminal. Similarly, if 
someone acts in defence against an actual or imminent attack or to 
defend property against attack then the action may be justified. Action 
taken to prevent unlawful imprisonment or an imminent or actual 
trespass may also be justified. While the concept of self-defence and 
the right to defend and protect others is well recognised, the extent to 
which any particular defensive action is proportionate and reasonable 
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may be more difficult to ascertain. The reasonableness of the action 
should be judged on objective grounds taking into account all the 
immediate circumstances in which the defendant believed he was 
situated. The case of Martin (Anthony Edward) [2003] QB 1 particularly 
captured the public imagination. Tony Martin was a farmer who 
shot and killed 16-year-old Fred Barras who was burgling his house. 
Although the issue of self-defence was raised at his trial it was rejected 
by the jury who found him guilty of murder. The trial attracted 
considerable publicity and there was a degree of media sympathy for 
the farmer who, according to popular view, was merely defending his 
property. There seemed to be little public sympathy for Barras who 
was revealed to have a number of previous convictions for burglary. 
Although Martin was held criminally responsible it seemed the public 
(or certainly sections of the media) were unwilling to blame Martin 
for his actions. He appealed against the conviction. The Court of 
Appeal rejected arguments based on self-defence, but did find Martin 
to be suffering from depression and a paranoid personality disorder 
and substituted a conviction for manslaughter on the grounds of 
diminished responsibility. 
In International Law self-defence is recognised as providing 
justification for military action which would otherwise be unlawful by 
virtue of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. Article 51 of the 
Charter refers to the preservation of an inherent right of self-defence 
‘should armed attack occur’. Here, too, debate often centres on the 
extent to which action taken in self-defence is proportionate. In recent 
years the concept of self-defence has undergone some changes as a 
result of a perceived increased terrorist threat. Following the attack on 
the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 military action was 
taken by the United States and other states against Afghanistan. The 
justification given was self-defence on the basis that Al Qaeda, largely 
based in Afghanistan, posed an ongoing military threat to the United 
States and its allies. The 2003 invasion of Iraq by United States and 
others was also partly justified on the basis of self-defence. The extent 
to which the justification was accepted remains a matter for debate.
Blame and luck
The death of Thomas Inglis, discussed in Chapter One, raises some 
important questions about the relationship between blame and luck. 
Thomas Inglis died as a result of his mother injecting him with a fatal 
dose of heroin. At the time that she administered the drug to her son 
it was clear that she intended to kill him: she wished to put an end to 
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the pain and suffering she believed he was experiencing. Yet, prior to 
her son sustaining a serious head injury there was never any suggestion 
that Mrs Inglis harboured any ill feelings towards her son and it seems 
clear that prior to 7 July 2007 she had had no intention of killing him. 
The situation changed as a result of a tragic chain of events, most of 
which were out of Mrs Inglis’s control. No single link in the chain was 
inevitable: what occurred was a catastrophic, but largely unpredictable 
combination of chance happenings. Had any of the chance happenings 
not occurred it is likely that Thomas would still be alive today and 
his mother, Frances Inglis, would not be serving a sentence of life 
imprisonment for murder. It is clear that the direct cause of Thomas 
Inglis’s death was the administration of the fatal heroin dose by his 
mother. She is to be ‘blamed’ for his death because it was her intention 
and actions that directly caused his death. Yet the ill luck that led to 
her contemplating killing her son seems to be directly related to the 
extent of her blame.
In his 2009 study of the concept of causation Michael Moore states 
‘Causation matters to legal liability’ (Moore, 2009, 3) and ‘[Causation] 
is a prerequisite of legal liability throughout both the law of torts and 
the law of crimes’ (p 20). Moore then poses a question of central 
relevance to this book: does causation matter to moral responsibility? 
To what extent is blame dependent on causation? As Moore points 
out the issue is one faced by all systems of criminal and civil liability. 
In criminal law the issue is raised by the attitude taken to inchoate 
offences: do attempted crimes carry the same degree of culpability as 
completed offences? Moore suggests that:
To cause a death that one intends to cause is morally worse 
than merely intending or trying to cause such a death: to 
cause a death that one has knowingly and/or unreasonably 
risked, is worse than merely knowingly and/or unreasonably 
risking such a death. How much worse? The common legal 
metric (for attempts) was by a factor of 2: it was believed 
to be twice as bad to kill, to rape, to hit, and so on as it 
was to try (unsuccessfully) to do any of these things, which 
resulted in punishments for these inchoate crimes being 
put as one-half the punishments of the completed crime 
analogues. (Moore, 2009, 21)
Although many legal systems (including the California Penal Code 
section 664) do apply the factor of two to attempts, not all do. The 
Sentencing Council’s Definitive Guidelines on Attempted Murder 
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suggest that offenders in such cases may have high levels of culpability 
which will be reflected in sentences broadly similar to the terms actually 
served by those convicted of murder (Sentencing Council, 2009). 
Kant argued that moral judgement, and, by implication, blame, 
should only attach to intention and not to actions: ‘The good will is 
not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its 
adequacy to achieve some proposed end; it is good only because of its 
willing, ie, it is good of itself ’ (Kant, 1959, sec I, para 3).
From this it must logically follow that bad will is bad only because 
of its willing. The basis of Kant’s argument is that we have control 
over our intentions while our actions are often determined by external 
factors. Kant’s view is linked to the Control Principle: individuals 
can only be morally assessed or blamed to the extent that the actions 
for which we are blamed depend on factors under our control. The 
corollary of this principle is that amounts of blame allocated to two 
people should not vary if the only differences between them are due 
to factors beyond their control. If A and B both intend to kill C and A 
succeeds in killing C but B fails because of factors outside B’s control 
the moral assessment of A is the same as B; B is equally deserving of 
blame as A.
According to this view one should judge attempts no differently 
than completed offences. An intention to commit a bad act, a bad 
will, cannot become good simply because the intended outcome is not 
achieved. In her analysis of the role of luck in criminal justice, Kim 
Kessler imagines Alice shooting at Bob with the intention of killing 
him (Kessler, 1994). She suggests four possibilities:
1. The bullet hits Bob and kills him. Alice is guilty of murder.
2. The bullet hits Bob at exactly the same time Carla’s bullet hits Bob, 
thus frustrating but-for causation. The court will most likely still 
hold Alice guilty of murder.
3. A large bird flies in the bullet’s path. Thus, the bullet misses Bob 
completely. Alice is only guilty of attempted murder. 
4. The same large bird flies in the bullet’s path and deflects the bullet. 
The bullet misses Bob but hits Carla. Alice is guilty of Carla’s murder.
This seems, initially at least, to be unsatisfactory: the ‘chance’ influence 
of another actor or some act of fate affects Alice’s liability. Consistent 
with Kant, Kessler argues that luck should not play a part in the criminal 
justice system and that criminal liability should be determined by 
intention. She offers another hypothetical example:
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For example, imagine that Leigh is recklessly driving in a 
school zone. She does not hit anyone. Patty, on the other 
hand, recklessly drives through the school zone and hits 
three children. When Leigh passes by a group of bystanders, 
they may think that she is a bad driver and should be arrested 
before she kills someone. When Patty hits the children, they 
can point to the results of her actions as an indicator of how 
culpable she is, whereas they can only imagine what Leigh 
would have done. Such an indicator of culpability (having 
caused a harm) causes people to recognize that Patty is a 
bad person. Should people rationally think about the harm 
that Leigh might have caused, however, they will conclude 
that there is no distinction to be made between the two 
women’s culpability. (pp 2188–9)
Yet blame is not allocated on a rational basis and often reckless driving 
is only recognised as such when it results in harm. Kessler accepts that 
Patty may feel more guilt than Leigh and, arguably, feelings of guilt 
are closely linked to self-blame. Many people continue to drive with 
blood-alcohol levels above the legal maximum yet considerably more 
blame (including self-blame) is attached to the drunk driver who kills 
someone than to the drunk drivers who manage to navigate themselves 
safely home. 
According to Thomas Nagel:
When we blame someone for his actions we are not merely 
saying it is bad that they happened, or bad that he exists: 
we are judging him, saying he is bad, which is different 
from his being a bad thing. This kind of judgement takes 
only a certain kind of object. Without being able to explain 
exactly why, we feel that the appropriateness of moral 
assessment is easily undermined by the discovery that the 
act or attribute, no matter how good or bad, is not under 
the person’s control. While other evaluations remain, this 
one seems to lose its footing. So a clear absence of control, 
produced by involuntary movement, physical force, or 
ignorance of the circumstances excuses what is done from 
moral judgement. (1979, 25) 
Nagel offers the hypothetical case of the truck driver who accidentally 
runs over and kills a child who runs out in front of the truck. If the 
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driver is entirely without fault then no blame will attach. Yet should the 
driver be guilty of some degree of negligence then blame would arise:
And what makes this an example of moral luck is that he 
would have to blame himself only slightly for the negligence 
itself if no situation arose which required him to brake 
suddenly and violently to avoid hitting a child. Yet the 
negligence is the same in both cases, and the driver has no 
control over whether a child will run into his path. (p 29)
Blame therefore is not about intention or result: it is a moral judgement 
based on both: ‘Actual results influence capability’ (p 32). Yet the 
problem of moral luck remains. Nagel identifies four types of luck: 
resultant, constitutive, circumstantial, and causal.
Resultant luck: Resultant luck is luck in the way things turn out and 
is at play in the case of Alice, and Leigh and Patty and the hypothetical 
truck driver. Leigh and Patty have exactly the same intent, drive in 
an identical way but the results are very different. Bernard Williams 
discussed the case of ‘a creative artist who turns away from definite 
and pressing human claims on him in order to live a life in which, as 
he supposes, he can pursue his art’ (Williams, B, 1981, 22). Williams 
recalls the artist Gauguin. When Gauguin leaves his family to take up 
a life of painting in Tahiti he has no way of knowing whether or not 
the decision will result in him becoming a great artist. Yet, Williams 
argues, we judge Gauguin very differently depending on whether he 
succeeds in his wish or fails: ‘Actual results influence culpability or 
esteem in a large class of unquestionably ethical cases ranging from 
negligence through political choice’ (Nagel, p 32).
Constitutive luck: Here Nagel is referring to those qualities of 
temperament and personality we possess over which we have no 
control. Our personality is partly determined by factors outside our 
control: our genes, our carers, our peers and other environmental 
influences. To that extent who we are is largely a matter of luck. Since 
who we are determines, to some extent at least, how we are and how 
we behave; our actions are affected by constitutive luck:
One may want to have a generous spirit, or regret not 
having one, but it makes no sense to condemn oneself or 
anyone else for a quality which is not within the control 
of the will. Condemnation implies that you should not 
be like that, not that it is unfortunate that you are. (p 34)
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Yet although this argument is entirely rational, Nagel accepts that it is 
intuitively unacceptable. We blame the coward for failing to intervene 
to prevent a fight even though cowardice maybe a character trait over 
which the non-intervener has no control.
Circumstantial luck: We have already seen how a combination 
of circumstances led Mrs Inglis to murder. Nagel raises the example 
of Nazi Germany:
Ordinary citizens of Nazi Germany had the opportunity to 
behave heroically by opposing the regime. They also had the 
opportunity to behave badly, and most of them are culpable 
for having failed this test. But it is a test to which citizens 
of other countries were not subjected, with the result that 
even if they, or some of them, would have behaved as badly 
as the Germans in like circumstances they simply did not 
and therefore are not similarly culpable. Here again one 
is morally at the mercy of fate, and it may seem irrational 
on reflection, but our ordinary moral attitudes would be 
unrecognizable without it. We judge people for what they 
actually do or fail to do, not just for what they would have 
done if circumstances had been different. (p 34)
Causal luck: In many respects causal luck is a combination of 
constitutive and circumstantial luck:
If one cannot be responsible for consequences of one’s acts 
due to factors beyond one’s control, or for antecedents of 
one’s acts that are properties of temperament not subject to 
one’s will, or for the circumstances that pose one’s moral 
choices, then how can one be responsible even for the 
stripped down acts of the will itself, if they are the product 
of antecedent circumstances outside of the will’s control? 
(p 36)
This returns us to the problem of free will outlined in Chapter One 
and Nagel does not provide any real answers seeking only to make the 
links with the other types of moral luck.
For Nagel the existence of moral luck undermines blame and the 
distinction drawn between causing harm and merely intending or 
risking harm. Michael Moore sees a solution in denying the existence 
of moral luck and instead relying on the doctrine of proximate causation. 
Proximate causation limits responsibility and liability, and thus blame, 
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to those events which are normal or routine. ‘Luck’ and the exclusion 
of liability only arises when events are too ‘freakish’:
When a defendant negligently operates a train too fast, so 
that he cannot stop it before it hits another’s railroad car, 
there is no luck involved in his injuring the second car 
because that is how such things normally happen. When, 
however, the same negligently speeding defendant causes 
the same damage to the same car, but does so because the 
first collision (which does no damage) throws the defendant 
against the reverse throttle of his engine, thereby knocking 
him unconscious, whereon his engine goes in reverse 
around a circular track, colliding with the other’s car and 
then causing it damage, there is luck involved because of 
the abnormal conjunction of events taking place between 
the defendant’s act and the harm. (Moore, 1997, 216)
In many cases this may provide a solution but there remains the 
difficulty of the precise assessment of proximity.
We have seen how blame and criminal responsibility often run 
alongside one another but at times their paths can diverge. While 
Durkheim may be correct in asserting that crime offends sentiments 
which are found among all normal individuals within a society, 
there may sometimes be a time delay before moral sentiments are 
accurately reflected in criminal law. In some ways blame may be seen 
as a safety valve for moral sentiment. In this chapter we have seen that 
on occasion clearly criminal behaviour may attract little or no blame; 
on other occasions conduct which is perfectly lawful may still attract 
blame. One final thing to note here is the fact that although levels of 
blame arising from similar activities may vary considerably, the task of 




In order to understand the operation of the criminal justice process 
it is necessary first to consider the substantive criminal law because 
the criminal justice system can only respond to those who transgress 
it. The definition of crime is not only a concern for criminal lawyers 
but sets the boundaries of criminology. What constitutes criminal 
behaviour is particularly important when the criminological analysis 
is theoretical as forms of culpable and harmful behaviour that are not 
defined as criminal tend to escape criminological study on the basis 
of legalistic, and often arbitrary, definitions. A further complication is 
that the criminal law does not remain static: behaviours which were 
once tolerated are criminalised while acts that were deemed worthy 
of punishment become legalised. Parliament and the courts also have 
to respond to new threats, for example, those posed by the internet. 
Finding commonality between the thousands of offences in existence 
is impossible; the only certain link is that all of these behaviours have 
been defined as crimes by Parliament or the courts. In many cases, the 
case for criminalisation is beyond dispute; variants of the most serious 
offences are found in most, if not all, jurisdictions. The necessity of 
many other offences is far less obvious. Sometimes this is because the 
conduct appears innocuous and sometimes because criminalisation 
seems a disproportionate response even though the behaviour is 
culpable.
The parameters of the criminal law are clearly important to this work. 
If one wishes to investigate the role that blame plays in the criminal 
justice system one first has to evaluate the extent to which it informs 
the criminal law. If, for example, the criminal law protects the blameless 
from conviction, an exploration of the role of blame in the criminal 
justice process would be unnecessary. Conversely, if the blameless are 
routinely convicted, one would be bound not only to review why 
this was occurring and how it was justified but would also force an 
assessment of how such individuals were then processed and punished.
Offences usually specify a particular mental state, or mens rea, that 
the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt (see generally 
Ashworth, 2009; Card, 2012; Ormerod, 2011; Simester et al, 2010). 
Common examples include intention, recklessness and dishonesty. 
A failure to prove that the defendant acted in the way required should 
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result in an acquittal. The existence of a mens rea requirement, however, 
does not always mean that a blameless individual will be acquitted. 
‘Intention’ is a common form of mens rea. A relative distraught at the 
sight of a family member facing a prolonged and painful death and 
an assassin may both intend to kill, thereby satisfying the mens rea for 
murder, despite having very different motives. Some may regard the 
relative as morally blameless but the courts would still find that the 
mens rea had been satisfied. There are powerful reasons for excluding 
motive from assessments of intent (Kaufman, 2003), although judicial 
practice, as will be shown, has not been wholly consistent. Recklessness 
has also sometimes been interpreted in a way which failed to protect 
the blameless (Norrie, 1992; Williams, 1988). Conviction was possible 
where an individual failed to see a risk that was obvious to others. 
A final category of offence, those of strict liability, poses perhaps 
the greatest challenge to the idea that the blameless should not be 
convicted. Strict liability offences are those which specify no mens 
rea in their definition with the result that the incompetent, the naive, 
the incapable and the young have no escape. Parliament, however, 
sometimes fails to make its intention clear and the failure to specify 
mens rea does not mean that the courts will always deem the offence 
to be one of strict liability. Particularly where the offence is seen to be 
a ‘real crime’ which carries stigma on conviction and the likelihood 
of serious punishment, the courts have been willing to hold that there 
is a presumption of mens rea. As will be shown later, the justification 
for imposing mens rea has been the need to protect the blameless from 
conviction in such cases.
This chapter will start with an analysis of motive in the Criminal 
Law and, in particular, with its relationship to intention. Although 
conceptually distinct and seemingly of limited legal relevance, it will 
be shown that motive has been considered, albeit in limited situations, 
to spare the blameless from conviction. Recklessness will then be 
analysed. The key debate with recklessness has been whether the test 
should be subjective (in which case account is taken of the defendant’s 
perception at the time) or objective (in which case conviction does 
not necessarily depend on the defendant’s perception). Objectivism 
would allow for the conviction of the blameless and, after a series of 
cases where vulnerable and blameless individuals were held criminally 
liable, the test reverted to a subjective one in recognition of the potential 
for individual injustice. After considering recklessness, attention will 
be given to negligence and gross negligence. Negligence relates to 
conduct and not to the individual’s state of mind and so it is important 
to consider why it is appropriate to disregard the individual’s perceptions 
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in determining liability. Finally, strict liability will be considered. 
Blame would appear to be totally irrelevant in such cases but judicial 
interpretation has limited the scope for injustice for the more serious 
offences which fail to specify mens rea. As with recklessness, a desire 
to spare the blameless from conviction is evident in the jurisprudence 
from the courts. The conclusion will argue that the courts are mindful 
that convicting the blameless is unjust and that this has informed the 
judicial interpretation of key concepts, most notably recklessness, and 
in the way in which parliamentary ambiguity with regards to whether 
an offence is one of strict liability has granted the courts authority to 
require mens rea if they believe it is necessary.
Perceptions of blame on the part of the judiciary have, therefore, 
shaped the substantive criminal law. The legal definitions discussed in 
this chapter affects pre-trial decision-making as it will inform charging 
and prosecuting decisions. There will also be defendants who will 
be acquitted at trial. The issues which concern this chapter have 
considerable implications on the role of blame in the criminal justice 
process and, therefore, on the analysis throughout this book.
Motive: criminalising the well-intentioned
The previous chapter discussed situations where particular categories 
of individual could be classed as blameless, or at least lacked sufficient 
blame to be dealt with by the criminal justice process in the usual 
manner (although Chapter Two cautions that it can be difficult to 
determine what the ‘usual’ process for dealing with offenders is). Motive 
could potentially have informed some of the discussion in the last 
chapter as motive may have partly explained the extraordinary blame 
in some cases. Here it is discussed in the context of criminal liability. 
According to criminal law theory, motive is generally irrelevant to 
whether or not an individual is criminally liable (see further, Gardner, 
1993; Husak, 1989; 2010, Chapter 2). Glanville Williams, the pre-
eminent criminal lawyer of the twentieth century explains it thus:
If we say that a man shot and killed his aunt with the motive 
of benefitting under her will, the immediate intent, which 
makes the act murder, is the intention or desire to kill, while 
the further intent or motive, which forms no part of the 
definition of the crime of murder, is the intention or desire 
to benefit under the will. Other motives are the desire to 
obtain the satisfaction of revenge, or to get rid of a rival, 
or to promote a political object. Such motives may also be 
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expressed in abstract terms: ‘he killed her from a motive of 
greed/revenge/jealousy’. Motive in this sense is irrelevant 
to responsibility (guilt or innocence), though it may be 
relevant to proof, or to the quantum of punishment. The 
prosecution may prove a motive for the crime if it helps 
them to establish their case, as a matter of circumstantial 
evidence; but they are not legally bound to prove motive, 
because a ‘motiveless’ crime is still a crime. Conversely, 
the defendant may adduce evidence of his good motive in 
order to reduce his punishment, perhaps to vanishing-point. 
(Williams, 1983, 75) 
Kaufman (2003) provides a robust defence of this orthodox position 
arguing that it accords with moral theory. Motive is relevant to criminal 
liability in some situations. A theft does not occur, for example, if an 
individual genuinely believes that a property owner would consent 
to him taking the property (Theft Act 1968, s2; see Ormerod and 
Williams, 2007, 105). There are also a number of situations where 
the individual’s motive is seen, rightly or wrongly, to make the crime 
especially serious and this is reflected in the creation of an aggravated 
offence (see further, Chapter Five) or in an enhanced sentence. 
Whenever motive in English law is raised two controversial, and 
unusual, cases are mentioned which appear to introduce motive as 
a central concern. The first of these cases is Steane [1947] KB 997. 
Summoned by the Nazis in war-time Germany, Steane was asked to 
make a series of propaganda broadcasts which he did as he had been 
told that his wife and children would have been sent to a concentration 
camp had he refused. He was charged after the war with assisting the 
enemy and, despite the fact that he had clearly assisted the enemy when 
making the broadcasts, the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed his 
conviction. It is easy to see why the Court was desperate to allow his 
appeal given Steane’s predicament. On the facts, however, the Court 
had a perfectly justifiable option at their disposal; the defence of duress 
would appear to have been made out. Regrettably, the Court elected 
to quash the conviction on the dubious basis that he did not intend 
to assist the enemy. Surely he was desperate to do so in order to spare 
his family? According to Lord Goddard CJ:
In our opinion it is impossible to say that where an act was 
done by a person in subjection to the power of others, 
especially if that other be a brutal enemy, an inference 
that he intended the natural consequences of his act must 
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be drawn merely from the fact that he did it. The guilty 
intent cannot be presumed and must be proved. The proper 
direction to the jury in this case would have been that it 
was for the prosecution to prove the criminal intent, and 
that while the jury would be entitled to presume that intent 
if they thought that the act was done as the result of the 
free uncontrolled action of the accused, they would not be 
entitled to presume it, if the circumstances showed that the 
act was done in subjection to the power of the enemy, or 
was as consistent with an innocent intent as with a criminal 
intent, for example, the innocent intent of a desire to save 
his wife and children from a concentration camp. (p 1006)
The first part of this statement is undoubtedly correct: intention to 
commit an act cannot be inferred from the commission of an act. 
The requirement that the prosecution must prove intent where this 
is an element of the offence also accords with the rules of criminal 
procedure. Thereafter the reasoning becomes less convincing. Intent, if 
one accepts Lord Goddard’s logic, should not be found ‘if the act was 
done in subjection to the power of the enemy’ or was consistent with 
an ‘innocent’ intent such as seeking to save his family’s lives. Talking 
of the ‘enemy’ does not help (although in a case dating from 1947 is 
understandable) because the argument is more general as it would, 
presumably, apply to other situations where an individual commits an 
act under threat of death or serious injury. The objection to Steane is 
basic: he did intend to make the broadcasts, which would have assisted 
the enemy, even if his desire was driven by external pressure rather than 
commitment to the Nazi cause. There is no denying that his motive 
was relevant, as was his lack of blame, but this should have determined 
whether he had a possible defence rather than whether he intended to 
commit the offence. Following Steane to its logical conclusion, there 
would be no need for a defence of duress as defendants in such cases 
would presumably have an ‘innocent’ intent.
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and Department 
of Health and Social Security [1986] 1 AC 112, the other leading case, 
concerned a challenge to the right of medical professionals to prescribe 
contraceptives to girls under the age of consent without parental 
approval if a clinical judgement was made that this was in the patient’s 
best interests. Among other arguments, it was submitted that a doctor 
who prescribed contraception in the knowledge that the girl would 
engage in sexual intercourse would be guilty of aiding and abetting 
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unlawful sexual intercourse. The House of Lords focused on the 
doctor’s motive:
The bona fide exercise by a doctor of his clinical judgement 
must be a complete negation of the guilty mind which is 
an essential ingredient of the criminal offence of aiding and 
abetting the commission of unlawful sexual intercourse…
If the prescription is the bona fide exercise of his clinical 
judgement as to what is best for his patient’s health, he has 
nothing to fear from the criminal law or from any public 
policy based on the criminality of a man having sexual 
intercourse with her. (p 190)
Public policy can be a useful explanation for judgments which 
ostensibly conflict with legal precedent. Sometimes it is invoked to 
justify radical departure but, more commonly, it is used to qualify or 
limit a law that if applied to a particular case would create obvious 
injustice. No injustice was caused in Steane or in Gillick due to the 
exceptional nature of the first scenario and the policy ramifications had 
the second been decided otherwise. It is, however, legitimate to ask 
whether the means employed to reach these outcomes were proper. It 
has already been argued that duress could have been invoked in Steane. 
A lack of a potential defence meant that the House of Lords in Gillick 
had to introduce motive into an assessment of intent so that clinical 
decisions would not be open to challenge in a criminal court.
There are also situations where public policy has required the 
courts to conclude that someone acting for the best of motives may 
nonetheless commit an offence intentionally. The case of Yip Chin-
Cheung v R [1994] 3 WLR 514 serves as a useful example. An American 
drug enforcement agent acting undercover and, according to the Privy 
Council with courage and good motive, arranged to meet with Yip 
Chin-Cheung in order to take a consignment of heroin from Hong 
Kong to Australia. Conspiracy, the offence with which Yip Chin-
Cheung had been convicted, requires an agreement between two or 
more persons to commit an unlawful act with the intention of carrying 
it out. The Court held that there was an intention on the part of the 
officer to commit the offence, regardless of his motives and despite 
the fact that the Hong Kong authorities authorised the trafficking of 
the heroin to Australia. Public policy in this case, and in others like it 
(for example, R v Latif [1996] 1 All ER 353), favoured a traditional 
interpretation of the relationship between motive and intent. Divorcing 
the two and holding that motive is irrelevant to establishing intention 
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enabled the conviction of a morally culpable individual involved in 
international drug trafficking. Departure from the orthodox rule only 
appears to occur when the individual’s blame demands an exceptional 
outcome.
Recklessness: criminalising the risk-taker
Recklessness, as opposed to intention, satisfies the mens rea of some 
offences. The result is not intended but risk-takers show little regard 
for the safety of others. Public protection and deterrence can legitimise 
the criminalisation of reckless conduct. Nor does the criminalisation 
of reckless behaviour conflict with the requirement that punishment 
is reserved for the blameworthy as it is not unreasonable to expect 
individuals to act in a way which does not cause unnecessary risk to 
others. Recklessness is in many ways the most interesting form of 
criminal liability. A risk may be foreseen by an individual who then 
goes on to take it or the risk may be obvious to most people but was 
not foreseen by the individual in question. Is it fair to say that someone 
has acted recklessly, and is deserving of punishment, if he did not foresee 
the risk even if the risk would be obvious to most? The risk may not 
have been foreseen for a number of reasons. Some reasons why a risk 
was not foreseen may carry blame, such as where the individual is 
intoxicated. In other situations the lack of foresight does not involve 
blame, as, for example, where the individual is mentally impaired. The 
criminal law has struggled to resolve which of these positions should 
be adopted and a brief chronology of the leading cases demonstrates 
how in some situations blameless individuals could be deemed reckless, 
and found guilty of serious offences, due to their inability to see an 
obvious risk. Legal developments are sometimes welcome and there 
are few better examples of this than the way in which the House of 
Lords finally interpreted recklessness. Blameworthiness, and the fact 
that it had not always been present or deemed necessary, underpinned 
their reasoning as will be shown.
There have been two standard interpretations of recklessness 
(Williams, 1988; Norrie, 1992). The first possible interpretation is 
subjective and would require proof that the defendant knowingly 
took the unjustified risk. Even if the risk was manifest and obvious, 
a defendant who did not foresee it would be acquitted. The second 
possibility would involve an objective assessment of the risk and, 
crucially, would not depend on whether the defendant foresaw the 
risk personally. The subjective approach would protect the blameless 
from conviction whereas the latter approach would not, unless it is 
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fair to say that blame attaches to the inability to see an obvious risk as 
well as engaging in conduct knowing it to pose a risk. One might have 
expected the courts to have adopted a uniform interpretation but this 
was not the case. Both tests were employed for some offences. One 
case became synonymous with each variant. R v Cunningham [1957] 
2 QB 396 gave recklessness a subjective meaning while R v Caldwell 
[1982] AC 341 adopted an objective test. The subjective test had been 
in operation for 25 years prior to Caldwell, however as Caldwell, unlike 
Cunningham, was a House of Lords decision its impact was significant.
Caldwell involved damaging property with intent to endanger life or 
being reckless whether life would be endangered (Criminal Damage 
Act 1971, s1(2)) and the claim made by Caldwell was that he was 
drunk at the time and could not have envisaged the threat to life. This 
argument should have been rejected on the simple and accepted basis 
that voluntary intoxication cannot be used as exculpatory evidence 
for this offence in English law (see Chapter 6) but the Court went 
further and redefined recklessness so as to ensure that individuals like 
Caldwell could be found reckless. In criminal damage cases it was held 
that someone would act recklessly if ‘(1) he does an act which in fact 
creates an obvious risk that property will be destroyed or damaged and 
(2) when he does the act he either has not given any thought to the 
possibility of there being any such risk or has recognised that there 
was some risk involved and has none the less gone on to take it’. One 
wonders the extent to which this reformulation was motivated by an 
intrinsic sense that Caldwell was blameworthy because his inability to 
perceive the risk was self-induced, even though his intoxication at the 
time would have meant that he was criminally liable.
The position after Caldwell was indefensible due to its inconsistency 
and complexity. Both forms of recklessness endured and were employed 
according to the offence. A general distinction could be drawn between 
offences against the person which tended to follow Cunningham and 
offences involving criminal damage which used the Caldwell test. The 
obvious and fundamental objection to this approach is why two tests 
survived? If blameworthiness matters to recklessness then why should 
the defendant’s perceptions or awareness remain key in some contexts 
but not in others? A convincing answer is hard to discern. Fires are 
unpredictable and potentially life-threatening so it could be that the 
nature of the harm influenced the House of Lords in Caldwell. Yet, the 
potential harm associated with many violent offences is equally grave 
rendering this reasoning flawed. Ironically the facts of Cunningham 
illustrate this: the offence with which he was charged involved 
unlawfully and maliciously administering to or cause to be administered 
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to or taken by any other person any poison or other destructive or 
noxious thing, so as thereby to endanger the life of such person, or so 
as thereby to inflict on such person any grievous bodily harm (Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861, s23). If public protection or deterrence 
requires an objective approach in some contexts due to the nature of 
the harm, the position post-Caldwell only partially achieved this, not 
least because the subjective test was still used for violent offences.
It was not long before the ramifications of adopting an objective test 
emerged. In a series of criminal damage cases, individuals with limited 
culpability were convicted where the risk would have been ‘obvious’ to 
others (see for example, Elliott v C [1983] 1 WLR 939). The inevitably 
of individual injustice had been foreseen immediately by academics 
(for example, Williams, G, 1981) and was increasingly recognised by 
the judiciary. The facts of the leading case of R v G [2003] UKHL 50 
illustrate the potential for injustice. Extensive damage, valued at about 
£1 million, had been caused by two boys aged 11 and 12 and it was 
accepted that they did not foresee the risk that fire would spread from 
newspapers that they had lit in a yard behind a shop to the shop itself 
and to adjoining buildings. Caldwell had been employed, properly given 
the offence, by the judge and the boys had been convicted. In the 
House of Lords, Lord Steyn listed the objections to Caldwell succinctly:
The surest test of a new legal rule is not whether it satisfies 
a team of logicians but how it performs in the real world. 
With the benefit of hindsight the verdict must be that 
the rule laid down by the majority in Caldwell failed this 
test. It was severely criticized by academic lawyers of 
distinction. It did not command respect among practitioners 
and judges. Jurors found it difficult to understand; it also 
sometimes offended their sense of justice. Experience 
suggests that in Caldwell the law took a wrong turn. 
That brings me to the question whether the subjective 
interpretation of recklessness might allow wrongdoers 
who ought to be convicted of serious crimes to escape 
conviction. Experience before Caldwell did not warrant 
such a conclusion. (para 57)
He found that ‘the case for departing from Caldwell has been shown to 
be irresistible’ (para 59). Lord Bingham gave the leading judgment and 
his first two reasons for abandoning an objective test related specifically 
to blame and culpability:
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[It] is a salutary principle that conviction of serious crime 
should depend on proof not simply that the defendant 
caused (by act or omission) an injurious result to another 
but that his state of mind when so acting was culpable…
The most obviously culpable state of mind is no doubt 
an intention to cause the injurious result, but knowing 
disregard of an appreciated and unacceptable risk of causing 
an injurious result or a deliberate closing of the mind to such 
risk would be readily accepted as culpable also. It is clearly 
blameworthy to take an obvious and significant risk of 
causing injury to another. But it is not clearly blameworthy 
to do something involving a risk of injury to another if [for 
reasons other than voluntary intoxication] one genuinely 
does not perceive the risk. Such a person may fairly be 
accused of stupidity or lack of imagination, but neither of 
those failings should expose him to conviction of serious 
crime or the risk of punishment. (para 32)
At the trial both the judge and the jury thought that convicting the 
boys would be unfair when it was accepted that they had not foreseen 
the risk of the fire spreading. The judge, however, was legally bound to 
follow Caldwell and instructed the jury that the boys’ lack of awareness 
was immaterial provided that the risk was obvious. Lord Bingham 
shared their ‘sense of unease’: ‘It is neither moral nor just to convict 
a defendant (least of all a child) on the strength of what someone 
else would have apprehended if the defendant himself had no such 
apprehension’ (para 33).
These are simple but compelling arguments. Blame is pivotal to the 
approach adopted: knowingly taking an unjustified risk is qualitatively 
and normatively different from taking an ‘obvious’ unjustified risk 
unknowingly. As Lord Bingham recognises, no culpability can fairly 
be attributed to those who do not perceive a risk. The unsatisfactory 
position of having two tests operating in parallel has been resolved in 
that all offences now employ a subjective test (see Attorney-General’s 
Reference (No 3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 868). This test has the 
welcome effect of ensuring that the blameless are acquitted.
Negligence and gross negligence: criminalising the 
incompetent
Negligence is a civil law concept found in the law of tort which 
refers to situations where a defendant has a duty of care which he fails 
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to satisfy objectively causing harm to his victim. If these criteria are 
satisfied, civil remedies can be awarded usually in the form of monetary 
damages. The criminal law sometimes criminalises negligent behaviour, 
most commonly in road traffic offences. Section 3 of the Road Traffic 
Act 1988, for example, makes it an offence to drive a mechanically 
propelled vehicle on a road or other public place ‘without due care and 
attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using 
the road or place’. A definition of ‘without due care and attention’ is 
provided in s3ZA(2):
A person is to be regarded as driving without due care and 
attention if (and only if) the way he drives falls below what 
would be expected of a competent and careful driver.
It can be seen that the test relates to his driving and it is immaterial 
whether the driver is aware that his driving falls short of this standard. 
The more serious offence of dangerous driving is found in s2 of the 
1988 Act. A person is to be regarded as driving dangerously if:
(a) the way he drives falls far below what would be expected of a 
competent and careful driver, and
(b) it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving 
in that way would be dangerous.
This statutory definition of dangerous driving is also objective as it 
relates to the perceptions of competent and careful drivers; there is no 
requirement that the driver was aware that his driving was dangerous. 
The distinction between careless driving and dangerous driving is 
one of degree. Whereas careless driving only requires proof that the 
motorist falls below the expected standard of a competent and careful 
driver, dangerous driving has to fall ‘far below’ that standard. In neither 
case does the driving have to result in an accident. Criminalisation is 
justified presumably on the potential harm that could follow driving 
below the standard of competent and careful drivers. It would be a rare 
driver who never makes a mistake, however, and it would appear likely 
that most motorists would technically be guilty of careless driving on 
a comparatively frequent basis. The offence gives police considerable 
discretion when dealing with incompetent drivers. In many occasions 
an informal warning at the roadside may suffice whereas a formal 
caution or prosecution may be necessary in other cases. Punishing 
dangerous drivers is easier to justify on utilitarian grounds as it may 
deter others from driving in a similar manner. Many of the activities 
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which have been held to constitute dangerous driving, such as racing, 
are blameworthy and can also be justified on retributive grounds even 
though the offence does not require proof that the offender realised 
that his driving was dangerous. 
Separate offences exist if the driving results in death. Death by 
dangerous driving is an established offence but controversy followed the 
passing of the new offence of causing death by careless or inconsiderate 
driving (s20, Road Safety Act 2006). This offence provides that a 
motorist who kills while driving in a way which falls below what 
would be expected of a competent and careful driver can be imprisoned 
for up to five years. As Hirst (2008) notes, this standard is unique to 
the motoring context and there are insufficient policy grounds to 
discriminate between driving and other forms of behaviour. It is a 
point well made. 
How does the criminal law respond to deaths caused by negligence? 
Murder requires an intention to kill or to cause grievous bodily 
harm and so the negligent killer is not a murderer. Manslaughter is 
potentially relevant as this offence can be satisfied in a number of ways. 
It covers, first, offences which would have been murder but for a loss 
of control (which is narrowly defined) or diminished responsibility 
on the offender’s part (see Chapter Three). As these variants would 
otherwise lead to a murder conviction, they are classed as voluntary 
manslaughter. The offence extends to some situations where the 
individual did not intend to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm 
and, because intent was lacking, these variants are termed involuntary 
manslaughter. Constructive or ‘unlawful act’ manslaughter still requires 
an intention on the part of the defendant to commit an offence (Dias 
[2002] Crim LR 490) which is objectively dangerous (Watson [1989] 1 
WLR 684). As the dangerous offence is committed intentionally, there 
is no doubt that the individual is blameworthy and hence deserving of 
punishment, even though death or serious injury was not intended. 
The requirement that the offence is objectively dangerous helps protect 
individuals who kill when the risk of harm is minimal.
Murder and all of the three variants of manslaughter discussed above 
require an intent either to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm or 
to commit an offence which is objectively dangerous. There might 
be debate about whether it is fair that an individual who commits an 
offence which he does not believe to be dangerous can be convicted 
of manslaughter. Nonetheless, as culpability attaches to the decision 
to offend, the blameless are exonerated. In contrast, the final type of 
manslaughter, gross negligence manslaughter, allows for the conviction 
of the highly incompetent which raises significant issues about whether 
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such individuals, who may have been acting to the best of their ability, 
should be held liable for so serious an offence. The courts recognise that 
negligence would be too low a standard for conviction but have argued 
that if recklessness was required, too many culpable individuals would 
escape conviction. In Andrews v DPP [1973] AC 566 Lord Atkins held 
that ‘a very high degree of recklessness’ would have to be established:
I do not myself find the connotations of mens rea helpful 
in distinguishing between degrees of negligence, nor do 
the ideas of crime and punishment in themselves carry a 
jury much further in deciding whether in a particular case 
the degree of negligence shown is a crime and deserves 
punishment. But the substance of the judgment is most 
valuable, and in my opinion is correct…Simple lack of 
care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough: 
for purposes of the criminal law there are degrees of 
negligence: and a very high degree of negligence is required 
to be proved before the felony is established. Probably of 
all the epithets that can be applied ‘reckless’ most nearly 
covers the case. It is difficult to visualise a case of death 
caused by reckless driving in the connotation of that term 
in ordinary speech which would not justify a conviction 
for manslaughter: but it is probably not all-embracing, 
for ‘reckless’ suggests an indifference to risk whereas the 
accused may have appreciated the risk and intended to 
avoid it and yet shown such a high degree of negligence 
in the means adopted to avoid the risk as would justify a 
conviction. (p 583)
The kind of scenario in which this ‘higher’ form of negligence may 
be seen occurred in R v Adomako [1994] 3 WLR 288. A locum 
anaesthetist took over from a colleague during a routine operation. 
During the course of the operation the endotracheal tube supplying 
oxygen to the patient became disconnected. Adomako realised that 
something was wrong when an alarm sounded after 4.5 minutes, but 
he failed to spot the disconnection believing instead that the Dinamap 
machine supplying the oxygen had developed a fault. He proceeded to 
examine the machine and supplied the patient with atropine to raise 
his pulse. The patient died following a cardiac arrest nine minutes 
after the endotracheal tube became disconnected; it was only then 
that Adomako realised what had occurred. In the period between the 
disconnection and the cardiac arrest Adomako had allegedly missed a 
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series of indications which should have led him to discover the problem: 
the patient’s chest was not moving; the dials on the ventilating machine 
were not operating; and the patient was becoming progressively blue. 
It was also alleged that, despite noticing that the patient’s pulse and 
blood pressure had dropped, he had failed to understand why. One 
expert witness described Adomako’s standard of care as ‘abysmal’ while 
another said that a competent anaesthetist would have recognised the 
signs of a disconnection within 15 seconds and that his failure to do 
so amounted to a ‘gross dereliction of care’.
His conduct was not reckless. In evidence he admitted that ‘after 
things went wrong I think I did panic a bit’. One expert witness also 
testified that, once Adomako had wrongly concluded that the Dinamap 
machine was faulty, his actions thereafter were not unreasonable. 
Another expert gave evidence that it was possible that another problem 
may have arisen at the same time as the disconnection and that may 
have distracted Adomako from the fact that the tube was no longer 
connected. Other factors may have contributed to the accident. 
Gardner (1995, 26) reports that Adomako’s career had consisted of a 
series of six-month contracts and that, at the time of the incident, he 
was working in one hospital during the week and another at weekends. 
The night before the accident he had only had 3.5 hours sleep. Finally, 
Adomako did not have an assistant during the operation despite this 
being normal practice. 
Lord Mackay of Clashfern LC held that it was not necessary to prove 
that Adomako had been reckless and that gross negligence would 
suffice. What amounts to gross negligence?
On this basis in my opinion the ordinary principles of the 
law of negligence apply to ascertain whether or not the 
defendant has been in breach of a duty of care towards the 
victim who has died. If such breach of duty is established 
the next question is whether that breach of duty caused the 
death of the victim. If so, the jury must go on to consider 
whether that breach of duty should be characterised as gross 
negligence and therefore as a crime. This will depend on 
the seriousness of the breach of duty committed by the 
defendant in all the circumstances in which the defendant 
was placed when it occurred. The jury will have to consider 
whether the extent to which the defendant’s conduct 
departed from the proper standard of care incumbent on 
him, involving as it must have done a risk of death to the 
patient, was such that it should be judged criminal. (p 295)
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If the jury are being asked to determine whether the defendant had 
been ‘grossly negligent’ it would appear that they are assessing his 
conduct rather than his state of mind. Adomako’s admittance that he 
panicked may have given credence to his claim that he was not acting 
recklessly and might have helped to explain his failure to spot the 
disconnected tube. Potentially it may have also informed the jury’s 
assessment of his conduct as a competent anaesthetist would not panic 
in such circumstances. This raises the question of whether it is necessary 
to have evidence of the individual’s state of mind before it can be 
concluded that their conduct was grossly negligent. According to Rose 
LJ in Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1999) [2000] 3 All ER 182:
Although there may be cases where the defendant’s state of 
mind is relevant to the jury’s consideration when assessing 
the grossness and criminality of his conduct, evidence of 
his state of mind is not a prerequisite to a conviction for 
manslaughter by gross negligence. The Adomako test is 
objective, but a defendant who is reckless…may well be 
the more readily found to be grossly negligent to a criminal 
degree. (p 186)
Evidently this offence is very fact-specific and much rests on how the 
jury in any case determines when negligent conduct becomes grossly 
negligent conduct. Whether or not the defendant’s state of mind should 
inform their decision is left vague: it is not a prerequisite but there may 
be cases ‘where the defendant’s state of mind is relevant’.
Manslaughter can, therefore, be committed by the grossly incompetent 
and, as this depends on their conduct rather than their state of mind, 
the blameless can be convicted. Admittedly, the jury may consider the 
defendant’s state of mind and whether he is blameworthy, but this is 
not mandatory. This is correct as a matter of law. Negligence relates 
to conduct rather than a state of mind. Why should gross negligence 
suffice for one of the most serious criminal offences? The harm would 
appear to be the sole rationale. Adomako would have been guilty of 
no offence if his patient had survived but had suffered brain damage. 
Elsewhere we have argued that the seriousness of an offence depends 
on both the offender’s culpability and the harm caused (see Chapter 
Two). This would appear to be a classic case where there is significant 
disjuncture between harm and culpability. Not all individuals who kill, 
though, are guilty of a criminal offence, so culpability would appear 
to play some part. An accident caused by gross negligence is judged 
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differently from other types of accident. The question then is whether 
any benefit accrues from this approach?
One might argue that the possibility of a criminal conviction would 
lead people to take greater care – an argument based on general 
deterrence. This may appear persuasive but the existence of an offence 
would have no impact in a case like Adomako where the individual 
panicked and misdiagnosed the situation. It is also difficult to see 
why this offence is necessary to protect society from the dangerously 
incompetent. Conviction follows a death and other measures could 
be taken, it is hoped, before their actions prove fatal, to prevent the 
individual from engaging in such conduct (for example professional 
accreditation could be removed). If recompense is paramount, civil law 
remedies would appear to be more appropriate. The public no doubt 
believe that those who cause death through gross negligence deserve 
punishment and we shall return to the attribution of blame and the 
dangers of scapegoating later in this book. For now it is sufficient to 
note that an individual’s state of mind can have no bearing in a homicide 
offence with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. 
Strict liability: criminalising the blameless
There are many offences where no mental requirement or mens rea 
is specified in the relevant Act of Parliament (see, generally, Simester, 
2005a). The legislature is at liberty to frame an offence as they see fit 
and so there is no constitutional objection to strict liability offences 
and, where parliamentary intent is clear, the courts have a duty to apply 
the Act. There are normative objections to strict liability offences, 
which will be addressed later, but the constitutional principle outlined 
above disguises a more complex and dynamic tension. The courts 
have sometimes faced enormous problems determining whether an 
offence is a strict liability offence due to parliament’s failure either to 
specify mens rea explicitly or to state categorically that the offence 
is one of strict liability. This has forced the courts to decide the issue 
on an offence-specific basis and has meant that the appellate courts 
have had to provide more generic guidance as to how the task should 
be approached. It is necessary to consider the case law in some detail 
because the guidance provided relies on issues of blame and stigma and 
also because a broader assessment of the utility and efficacy of strict 
liability can only be undertaken meaningfully if the determinants for 
classification are outlined first.
Strict liability offences have a lengthy pedigree. Wilson (2011, 158) 
identifies two reasons for their rapid growth in the nineteenth century. 
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The initial impetus was industrialisation and the need for measures to 
protect factory workers. These offences were followed by a multitude 
of others concerning public safety more generally. Many of these 
laws were narrowly defined, carried minimal penalties and had no 
stated mens rea requirements. There were some early challenges. In 
Cundy v Le Cocq (1884) 13 QBD 207, a licensee had sold liquor to a 
drunken patron and had been convicted of unlawfully selling liquor to 
a drunken person (Licensing Act 1872, s13). The Act was silent as to 
whether the licensee had to be aware that the customer was drunk and 
Cundy appealed on the basis that he did not know the customer was 
intoxicated. Affirming his conviction, the Divisional Court justified 
imposing strict liability as they thought it right to put the onus on a 
licensee to determine whether a customer is sober.
The most significant challenge was brought in Sweet v Parsley [1970] 
AC 132, a case involving a teacher who had rented rooms to members 
of the ‘beatnik fraternity’ who proceeded to smoke cannabis on the 
premises. It was accepted that she had no knowledge of this even though 
she kept a room in the house for her own use. She was convicted of 
being concerned in the management of premises which were being 
used for the purpose of smoking cannabis (Dangerous Drugs Act 1965, 
s5(b)). The Act failed to specify whether awareness was a prerequisite 
for conviction. According to Lord Reid:
Sometimes the words of the section which creates a 
particular offence make it clear that mens rea is required in 
one form or another. Such cases are quite frequent. But in a 
very large number of cases there is no clear indication either 
way. In such cases there has for centuries been a presumption 
that Parliament did not intend to make criminals of persons 
who were in no way blameworthy in what they did. That 
means that whenever a section is silent as to mens rea there 
is a presumption that, in order to give effect to the will of 
Parliament, we must read in words appropriate to require 
mens rea. (p 148)
The last sentence would suggest a clear and principled position: in the 
absence of a specific reference to strict liability, the offence should be 
read in such a way as to require mens rea as Parliament cannot have 
intended the blameless to be held criminally liable. However, this 
was not the case: ‘It has long been the practice to recognise absolute 
offences in this class of quasi-criminal acts, and one can safely assume 
that, when Parliament is passing new legislation dealing with this class 
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of offences, its silence as to mens rea means that the old practice is to 
apply’ (p 149).
Creating a distinction between quasi-criminal and criminal 
offences raises concerns, the most pressing of which is whether 
offences can be categorised neatly along such lines. Lord Reid defined 
acts of a ‘truly criminal character’ as those which carried a stigma on 
conviction, a concept closely related to blame, and which would lead 
to public indignation if a conviction was manifestly unjust. Neither 
of these criteria are especially objectionable and it is obvious that an 
injustice is particularly acute if the consequences (whether reputational 
or punitive) are serious. Whether stigma attaches to those who commit 
a given offence is, though, subjective (what about drug possession 
offences?) and may change (consider public perceptions to drink 
driving). Perhaps a more straightforward and objective determinant was 
articulated by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in B (A Minor) v Director 
of Public Prosecutions [2000] 2 WLR 452 when he held that the greater 
the seriousness of the offence, the greater the weight that is to be given 
to the presumption because both the punishment and the stigma are 
more severe. This recognises that offences attract varying degrees of 
stigma which is reflected more convincingly as a continuum rather 
than as an absolute.
A useful summary of the present position is provided by Lord 
Scarman in Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v AG of Hong Kong [1985] 1 AC 1:
 (1) there is a presumption of law that mens rea is required 
before a person can be held guilty of a criminal 
offence;
 (2) the presumption is particularly strong where the 
offence is ‘truly criminal’ in character;
 (3) the presumption applies to statutory offences, and 
can be displaced only if this is clearly or by necessary 
implication the effect of the statute;
 (4) the only situation in which the presumption can be 
displaced is where the statute is concerned with an 
issue of social concern, and public safety is such an 
issue;
 (5) even where a statute is concerned with such an 
issue, the presumption of mens rea stands unless it 
can also be shown that the creation of strict liability 
will be effective to promote the objects of the statute 
by encouraging greater vigilance to prevent the 
commission of the prohibited act. (p 14)
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Arguably the most important of these criteria is the fourth. Unless 
an Act of Parliament states so explicitly, the presumption can only be 
displaced if the statute is concerned with an ‘issue of social concern’ 
and the specific example of public safety is provided. It is easy to be 
glib but most criminal offences deal with issues of ‘social concern’ and 
many with ‘public safety’; all violent offences could feasibly fall within 
this broad category, although this reading is avoided when account is 
taken of the second criterion as there would be little disagreement 
that such offences are ‘truly criminal’. The utilitarian basis for the 
fifth criterion is also important. Even where the offence is concerned 
with public safety and is not ‘truly criminal’, strict liability will only 
be found where it can be shown that this is necessary to promote the 
aims of the statute. These would appear to be significant restrictions 
but many strict liability offences remain. Some are explicitly so but 
many are interpreted in this way by the courts. The judiciary maintain 
that they are engaged in an exercise which protects the blameless from 
social stigma and punishment by imposing mens rea requirements to 
‘truly criminal’ acts. Yet the blameless are routinely being convicted of 
‘quasi-criminal’ acts, and punished for them, on the assumption that 
little stigma attaches to such a conviction (Simons, 1997). 
Conclusion
Inevitably the focus of this chapter has been on the way in which 
blame has informed the substantive criminal law. Yet alternative and 
sometimes compelling objectives exist. It is worth stepping back and 
starting this concluding section by considering what these alternative 
grounds may be and to see whether their merits are sufficient to warrant 
criminalisation of the blameless, at least in some instances.
One could start from the premise that the criminal law is designed 
to protect society from harm, whether perpetrated by individuals 
or corporations, and punishment is necessary to achieve this aim. 
If the focus is on harm, culpability is of little relevance. Objective 
standards of recklessness or negligence or strict liability would ease 
the prosecutor’s burden as proving that the law has been flouted 
intentionally can be difficult and can lengthen trials. Recognising the 
task facing prosecutors is valid and, in some situations, strict liability 
is sensible and proportionate (Simester, 2005b), but the cost has to be 
recognised. Strict liability legitimates the criminalisation of conduct 
and the punishment of individuals whose conduct is blameless.
It is in recognition of these conflicting aims that courts have remained 
mindful of individual culpability. ‘Quasi-crimes’ and ‘real crimes’ are 
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distinguished on grounds of their relative stigma and punishment. 
Crime control (see Chapter Two) and the need for deterrence justifies 
strict liability for more minor crimes. The judiciary, however, are 
reticent to convict the blameless of more serious offences. If deterrence 
is key, this position seems paradoxical as one would expect the law to 
prioritise those minded to commit the gravest offences. It is though a 
balancing act and the case law suggests that the courts value individual 
culpability more highly once the threshold between ‘quasi-crime’ 
and ‘real crime’ has been crossed. There is no reason why one aim 
should predominate for all offences and the probable stigma and 
punishment are sensible factors to take into account when deciding 
on prioritisation. Little sleep will be lost if a small fine is imposed on 
a blameless individual for an offence which carries no opprobrium 
whereas an obvious injustice occurs if someone is imprisoned for a 
serious offence when they have no personal culpability.
One theme that has proved constant throughout this chapter has 
been the importance of judicial interpretation. The issues discussed 
(motive, recklessness, negligence and strict liability) go to the heart 
of criminal law and yet Parliament has often left it to the courts to 
define these key concepts. This is not always a dereliction of duty. 
Parliament cannot be expected to envisage every issue that will arise 
once an Act is passed and some legal issues are better suited to judicial 
interpretation. Nonetheless, it is unsatisfactory that the courts have 
to guess Parliament’s intent when deciding whether an offence is one 
of strict liability. Legislation could make this explicit and, while the 
classification may be objectionable as a matter of principle, at least the 
process would accord with democratic principles and constitutional 
convention. The fact that the judiciary have intervened in some 
cases and have imposed mens rea requirements has not influenced 
parliamentary practice. By implication, politicians accept the practice of 
the courts: interventionism has not resulted in explicitness. Could there 
be a tacit agreement that the balance struck by the courts is correct? 
The default position has been established: mens rea will be read into 
‘real crimes’ unless parliamentary intent is clear. Parliament has accepted 
this which has ensured that the blameless cannot be convicted of ‘real’ 
offences unless an Act of Parliament states otherwise.
Parliament also failed to define recklessness, a term that is central to 
many common offences. Essentially the courts were faced with two 
options: imposing a subjective or an objective test. The tension is 
obvious. A subjective test focuses on individualistic perceptions of risk 
and culpability stems from a perception which is subsequently ignored. 
Assuming that the risk is unjustifiable, and this is largely determined 
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on policy grounds, it is easy to construct a normative argument that 
deliberate risk-taking is culpable and, where the harm is sufficiently 
grave, criminal liability is appropriate. Conversely, recognising that 
individual perception is vital protects the blameless from conviction. 
It is indefensible to punish someone for a risk that they did not and 
perhaps were incapable of seeing. This argument was, according to the 
courts, rooted in notions of blame and helps explain the trajectory of 
the case law over the past 30 years.
Why did the objective test surface during this period? Perhaps 
the court was unduly swayed by the fact that Caldwell’s lack of 
comprehension was caused by voluntary intoxication, which could 
legitimately be seen as culpable. It does not follow, however, that 
all failures of perception are culpable as the cases involving young 
offenders demonstrate. Another possibility is that the danger posed by 
fire influenced their reasoning, although given the multitude of dangers 
from which the criminal law seeks to protect society, what makes arson 
unique? An argument that an objective test would deter potential 
risk-takers is implausible. If someone could not perceive a risk they 
would not modify their behaviour to avoid it. The objective test both 
extends an argument based on culpability and introduces implicitly an 
additional justification. If culpability was to extend only to subjective 
awareness, there would be a conflict between public protection and 
blame. The conflict is avoided if a wider interpretation of culpability 
is employed. The eventual return to subjectivity demonstrates not 
only an awareness that deeming a failure to see a risk as culpable was 
unjust but suggests that an objective test was unnecessary in order to 
protect the public. Utilitarian aims such as public protection require an 
empirical basis and, when that does not materialise, its appeal becomes 
merely rhetorical. 
If objective recklessness offends because it disregards the potential 
for individuals to be unable to meet a certain standard, negligence is 
equally problematic. A failure to satisfy a duty of care may properly 
give rise to civil liability and damages can have significant effects on 
an individual. It is far from certain that a criminal penalty will have a 
more severe impact than civil damages. Civil liability may also result in 
reputational damage, which could be significant, but there is something 
distinct about the stigma of a criminal conviction and the imposition 
of punishment which makes one wonder whether negligence is a 
sufficient basis for criminal liability.
It is helpful to compare negligence with strict liability. Strict liability, 
as we have seen, allows for the conviction of the blameless although 
judicial intervention has limited the possibility of this to ‘quasi-crimes’ 
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unless statute is explicit. Negligence differs in so far as someone who 
has a duty of care only becomes liable if they breach that duty and 
damage ensues. Someone may breach a duty of care for various reasons 
some of which, like incompetence, may or may not be culpable. 
Individuals have diverse competencies as do those with particular duties 
of care. Not all drivers, for example, display the same ability and it 
would seem that those who breach an objective standard should not 
be penalised if their optimum level of ability would be insufficient. 
There are, though, distinctions that can be drawn with strict liability. An 
obvious one is that the individual assumes a duty of care willingly and 
ordinarily benefits from it. Why should it be objectionable to punish 
someone who fails if they have voluntarily taken on a duty of care? In 
the majority of cases one can avoid assuming a duty of care so there 
is a degree of freedom absent from strict liability. Another difference 
is that negligence has to be established whereas strict liability makes 
prosecution very straightforward. Using a civil standard to establish 
criminal liability may seem problematic but it should be viewed on 
its own terms as to whether it is sufficient to merit criminal liability 
in certain situations. In strict liability cases, the courts consider stigma 
and punishment in deciding whether mens rea should be read into the 
offence. These factors could help inform a discussion as to whether 
negligence is appropriate mens rea for a given offence.
The worry that a palpably culpable and incompetent individual would 
evade criminal liability for homicide led the courts to gross negligence 
manslaughter. Recklessness does not have to be proved which could 
be difficult as the inept often fail to foresee risks. Negligence, though, 
would potentially encompass too much behaviour and could deter 
people from assuming duties which are beneficial to society. Gross 
negligence effectively raises the bar by saying that the conduct has to 
be worse than mere negligence but whether that standard has been met 
is a question of fact for the jury. The objections are obvious: the test is 
circular and lends itself to inconsistency. Yet perhaps, by focusing on 
the individual’s blame, juries will reserve punishment for those whose 
conduct can be perceived as blameworthy and acquit those whose 
negligence is not deemed sufficient.
What does this study of the role of blame in the criminal law tell 
us about blame in the criminal justice process? It was argued at the 
beginning of the chapter that the limits of the criminal law were vital 
to understanding the operation of the criminal justice process. The 
seemingly obvious point that the system processes people who break 
the criminal law is sometimes lost. The part that blame plays in the 
system then starts with the way in which offences are defined. If this 
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book had failed to address some of the conceptual debates in substantive 
criminal law, then the picture painted would have been misleading. 
It has been necessary to consider these issues at a general level as the 
volume of offences does not allow analysis at an offence-specific level. 
The centrality of blame to a given offence will obviously differ but 
some clear conclusions can be drawn.
The first is that blame is surprisingly central to the criminal 
law. Objective recklessness has been abandoned. Strict liability 
has been reserved for ‘quasi-crimes’ and rejected for ‘real’ crimes 
unless Parliament has stated its intent clearly. Subjectivity demands 
consideration of the individual’s state of mind and, where a risk is 
unforeseen, the defendant should be acquitted. Similarly, finding mens 
rea ensures that the blameless are not convicted of a strict liability 
offence. Had two young boys who had not been able to foresee a risk 
of fire or a landlady who was wholly unaware that cannabis was being 
smoked by her tenants been convicted, an obvious injustice would have 
been done. The courts have gone to considerable lengths to interpret 
the law in such a way that the blameless are not held criminally liable.
A second observation is that the courts’ willingness to impose mens 
rea or adopt a subjective interpretation of the law is comparatively 
recent and suggests greater willingness to exonerate the blameless. 
It must be stressed that this trend relates to the judiciary, but they 
clearly perceive part of their function to be interpreting the law in a 
way consistent with the ideal that only the blameworthy should be 
liable for a criminal offence. This may be a counterbalance to popular 
demands that someone must be held to account in a criminal court 
whenever harm occurs. Similarly, the courts may be better placed than 
politicians to respond to cases where individual injustice could arise.
Many blameless individuals will, therefore, have been filtered out of 
the criminal justice process prior to conviction. Decisions regarding 
arrest, charge and prosecution hinge on the interpretation of the 
criminal law and there will be some who will be prosecuted but who 
are acquitted at trial as their blame could not be established. This 
does not imply that all those who are convicted should be regarded 
as morally blameworthy. Nor are all those who are acquitted morally 
blameless; some defendants escape justice on a legal technicality. 
Blame, however, plays a crucial role in the criminal law and hence in 





The previous chapters have focused on situations where blame may 
be diminished or absent. Chapter Five is concerned with conduct 
that is deemed especially blameworthy. In sentencing offenders 
reference is regularly made to the seriousness of the offence and the 
degree of culpability of the offender. Under the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 courts are specifically required to give consideration to the 
seriousness of the offence. The clear implication is that some offences 
are more serious than others and that it is possible to rank offences 
according to the degree of blameworthiness. At first sight this may 
appear to be unproblematic. Research which requires participants to 
rank offences according to seriousness generally find a measure of 
agreement. We would probably all agree that murder is more serious, 
and more blameworthy, than petty theft. In most situations we would 
regard violent offences as more serious than non-violent offences. Yet 
expressing the reasons behind our intuition may be more difficult. Is 
someone who murders 500 people deserving of more blame than the 
person who kills 10? Is someone who murders 50 people because they 
belong to a particular ethnic group more deserving of blame than the 
murderer who chooses victims at random? Orthodox criminal law 
jurisprudence distinguishes motive from intent (see Chapter Five) 
yet it is apparent that motive is not only relevant but central to the 
definition of some crimes. Chapter Five considers two particular 
aspects of blameworthiness. First, we will consider the relationship 
between punishment and blame within the national legal system. We 
will then focus discussion on the so-called extraordinary crimes 
such as genocide and crimes against humanity. 
If offence-severity is a measure of harm and culpability, an incident, 
say criminal damage, cannot be aggravated if it is motivated on grounds 
of race unless the offender’s culpability is greater. If it is assumed that 
the damage was intentional, does the specific motive of racism affect 
blameworthiness? When it comes to sentencing, evidence of hate is 
considered aggravating. Why exactly does such a motive make an 
offender more blameworthy and deserving of greater punishment? 
Genocide might be considered a particularly extreme form of hate 
crime. The second part of this chapter will therefore discuss those 
crimes which are said ‘to shock the conscience of mankind’. To what 
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extent is blame relevant when the number killed or tortured is counted 
in thousands?
Offence seriousness
Retributive principles have played an increasing role in the approach 
to sentencing in England and Wales since the late 1980s. The Criminal 
Justice Act 1991 was underpinned by concepts of just desert and 
retribution. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 continued to promote 
retributive principles although s142 acknowledged other, possibly 
contradictory, purposes of sentencing. Von Hirsch et al (2009) indicates 
that criminological interest in retribution and desert dates from the 
mid-1970s. The interest was partly generated by the post Second World 
War boom in the literature of analytical moral philosophy. It was also 
partly a reaction to mounting criticism of the focus on rehabilitation 
in many criminal justice systems during the 1960s. Criticism of 
rehabilitation in turn was partly based on a growing scepticism about 
its effectiveness. It was also connected to a growing interest in Kantian 
ideas and particularly Kant’s view that: ‘Juridical punishment can never 
be administered merely as a means for promoting another good either 
with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all 
cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted 
has committed a crime’ (quoted in von Hirsch, 1992, 60).
Von Hirsch identifies the publication of the American Friend Service 
Committee report, Struggle for Justice in 1971 as being a pivotal 
moment. The report argued in favour of proportionate sentences 
and against sentencing based on rehabilitative grounds. At the heart 
of the AFSC report was the idea that fairness in sentencing required 
punishments to reflect the seriousness of the offence rather than the 
likelihood of the offender re-offending or the ability of the offender 
to reform.
For von Hirsch:
Desert theories for sentencing have had the attraction that 
they purport to be about just outcomes: the emphasis is on 
what the offender should fairly receive for his crime, rather 
than how his punishment might affect his future behaviour 
or that of others. It also seems capable of providing more 
guidance: the sentencer, instead of having to address elusive 
empirical questions of the crime-preventative effect of the 
sentence, can address matters more within his or her ken, 
concerning the seriousness of the criminal offence – how 
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harmful the conduct typically is, how culpable the offender 
was in committing it. (Von Hirsch et al, 2009, 116)
We comment elsewhere in this book on the extent to which assessing 
blame is any less elusive than questions of crime-preventative 
effectiveness. Here we wish to focus on the link between punishment 
and blame. Von Hirsch places blame at the centre of punishment: ‘The 
criminal sanction conveys censure’ (p 116). According to von Hirsch, 
developing ideas first expressed by Kant:
Any human actor…should be treated as a moral agent, 
having the capacity (unless clearly incompetent) of 
evaluating others’ assessment of their conduct. A response 
to criminal wrongdoing that conveys blame gives the 
individual the opportunity to respond in ways that are 
typically those of an agent capable of moral deliberation: 
to recognise the wrongfulness of action; to feel remorse; to 
make efforts to desist in the future – or to give reasons why 
the conduct was not actually wrong. What a purely ‘neutral’ 
sanction not embodying blame would deny, even if no less 
effective in preventing crime, is precisely this recognition 
of a person’s status as a moral agent. (pp 116–17)
Von Hirsch identifies two accounts of retributive justice. The benefits 
and burdens theory associated with Herbert Morris (1968) and Jeffrie 
Murphy (1973) justifies punishment on the basis that it offsets the 
advantage law-breakers gain through their offending. Laws benefit us all 
by restraining predatory conduct: others benefit from my self-restraint 
and I benefit from the restraint of others. The offender continues to 
gain the benefit of others’ restraint without exercising self-restraint. 
The theory may be criticised on the basis that it over-emphasises the 
extent to which we benefit from the law abiding behaviour of others. 
A more fundamental criticism is that the theory provides little assistance 
in deciding the level of punishment. The seriousness of an offence 
does not always depend on the tangible benefit gained. Even if one 
considers benefit in a more abstract sense it is difficult to compare and 
rank different offences. Von Hirsch offers tax evasion as an offence 
which might be explained in terms of unjustified advantage:
[The] tax evader refuses to pay his or her own tax, yet 
benefits from others’ payments through the services he or 
she receives. Tax evasion, however, is scarcely the paradigm 
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criminal offense, and it is straining to try to assess the 
heinousness of common offenses such as robbery in similar 
fashion. (Von Hirsch, 1992, 62)
The alternative account, the ‘expressive’ theory, provides that: 
‘Punishing someone consists of doing something painful or unpleasant 
to him, because he has committed a wrong, under circumstances and 
in a manner that conveys disapprobation of the offender for his wrong’ 
(p 66).
The advantage of this account is that it does not rely on an idealised 
view of society based on mutual benefit. It is also suggested that it 
provides a better basis for deciding on levels of punishment:
If punishment is seen as an expression of blame for 
reprehensible conduct, then the quantum of punishment 
should depend on how reprehensible the conduct is. The 
punishment for typical victimizing crimes would depend 
on how much harm the conduct does, and how culpable 
the actor is for the harm – and no longer on how much 
extra freedom of action the actor has arrogated to himself 
vis-à-vis third parties. (p 67)
To arrive at just and proportionate sentences it is necessary to consider 
both ordinal and cardinal proportionality. Ordinal, or relative, 
proportionality dictates that individuals convicted of crimes of similar 
seriousness should receive comparable punishment; more serious 
offences should attract greater punishment than less serious ones. 
Ordinal proportionality provides no guide to the absolute level of 
punishment: the most serious offence might be punished with the death 
penalty or with a small fine; provided lesser offences are punished less 
severely, principles of ordinal proportionality are satisfied. The overall 
level of punishment is determined by cardinal proportionality which 
sets limits on the overall severity of available sentences.
It seems widely accepted that the seriousness of offence depends 
on a combination of the harm caused or intended and the culpability 
of the offender. This view is reflected in s143 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003. At first glance, grading offence severity may appear to 
be relatively unproblematic. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission, for example, has produced a sentencing guidelines grid 
which ranks offences according to seriousness and it appears there 
was little disagreement on the underlying assessments of seriousness. 
Research into public attitudes to sentencing similarly seems to suggest 
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a broad level of agreement when it comes to ranking the seriousness 
of offences. For example, research commissioned by the Sentencing 
Council on public attitudes to the sentencing of sexual offences revealed 
a broad level of agreement among the public on factors affecting 
seriousness (Sentencing Council, 2012b). The research, however, did 
reveal differing attitudes to offence seriousness when the views of 
victims/survivors were compared to the public. Interestingly, bearing 
in mind the discussions on juvenile offending in Chapter Three, both 
victim/survivors and the public took the view that the age of the 
offender should not affect culpability.
During the research, comparisons were invited between rape and 
other offences. The public saw rape as more serious than grievous 
bodily harm or supplying class A drugs (Sentencing Council, 2012b, 
para 5.2) although selling heroin was seen as ‘almost as serious as 
rape’ as were random, potentially life threatening attacks by strangers. 
Victims/survivors tended to see only homicide as more serious than 
rape and even then suggested that homicide ‘at least meant the victim 
no longer experienced the pain and aftermath of the offence’ (para 
5.2). The aggravating factors identified by the research were: 
• premeditation or planning
• sustained or repeated offences
• multiple offenders
• previous offending
• age and vulnerability of the victim
• use of violence, torture or weapons
• abduction and detention
• transmission of a sexually transmitted infection
• production and distribution of images.
The participants in the research were also asked to consider the 
defendant’s character and what impact, if any, it should have on the 
seriousness of the offence. On balance it was felt that previous good 
character should not be taken into account:
Indeed the participants could report ‘good character’ to be 
an aggravating factor because the offender had essentially 
been in a position of trust and also let down their own family 
and community to a greater extent by committing a sexual 
offence. It was also felt this may indicate greater culpability 
as they were hiding behind a ‘cloak of respectability’ but 
knew the offence was wrong. (para 6.3)
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The views of the public on sentencing sexual offences are broadly in 
line with the guidelines on seriousness produced by the Sentencing 
Council (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2004).
The factors indicating higher culpability include (the order has been 
changed from that in the Guidelines):
• offence committed while on bail for other offences;
• failure to respond to previous sentences;
• previous conviction(s), particularly where a pattern of repeat 
offending is disclosed;
• failure to respond to warnings or concerns expressed by others about 
the offender’s behaviour;
• offence committed while on licence;
• offence was racially or religiously aggravated;
• offence motivated by, or demonstrating, hostility to the victim based 
on his or her sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation);
• offence motivated by, or demonstrating, hostility based on the 
victim’s disability (or presumed disability);
• offence motivated by hostility towards a minority group, or a 
member or members of it;
• deliberate targeting of vulnerable victim(s);
• commission of the offence for financial gain (where this is not 
inherent in the offence itself);
• high level of profit from the offence;
• planning of an offence;
• ‘professional’ offending;
• offenders operating in groups or gangs;
• an intention to commit more serious harm than actually resulted 
from the offence;
• use of a weapon to frighten or injure victim;
• deliberate and gratuitous violence or damage to property, over and 
above what is needed to carry out the offence;
• abuse of power;
• abuse of a position of trust; 
• an attempt to conceal or dispose of evidence;
• commission of an offence while under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs.
These aggravating factors can be seen to fall into a number of separate 
categories. The first five indicate that a failure to respond to earlier 
warnings will result in greater culpability. It seems intuitively right that 
if I have been told before not to do something my level of blame will 
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be higher if I then proceed to do the thing. Release on bail, previous 
convictions and prior warnings all suggest that an offender is aware 
of his or her actions and the possible consequences. Of course, one 
might argue that there should be little difference in culpability between 
the offender who has offended repeatedly in the past without being 
discovered and the persistently unsuccessful criminal. Here again one 
encounters the problem of moral luck. 
The second group of factors relate to the victim: hate crimes and 
targeting of the vulnerable increase the level of culpability. Clearly 
discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation 
or disability is morally reprehensible and therefore blameworthy. 
Interestingly, offences motivated by hostility to the victim’s gender or 
age are not listed, although there seems little reason why it is not as 
morally reprehensible to set out deliberately to target the elderly, or 
women as it is to target homosexuals or Jews. Hostility towards minority 
groups is identified as an aggravating factor but not hostility towards 
majority groups although the degree of culpability would logically 
seem to be the same. Perhaps the identification of the targeting of 
vulnerable victims raises the biggest problem. Arguably, many rational 
offenders may seek to target the vulnerable: it is easier to burgle an 
unlocked than a locked house. In some cases it may be difficult to see 
why the deliberate targeting of the vulnerable should actually increase 
culpability. It may also be difficult to assess levels of vulnerability: is an 
85-year-old person inherently more vulnerable than one who is 65 
years old? There is a problem also with the extent to which motivation 
can be readily identified. The Sentencing Council identify two other 
motivational factors relating to financial gain and profit. It can be 
accepted that stealing £1,000 is likely to be regarded as more serious 
than stealing £10 but this surely has more to do with levels of harm 
than levels of culpability.
The third group of factors are concerned more with the mode 
and method of offending. There seems to be a widespread view that 
premeditation or planning increases culpability and there are parallels 
here with the defence of loss of control discussed in Chapter Three. 
Diminished levels of self-control might also be a factor, mitigating 
sentences imposed on juvenile offenders. Professional offending 
might be considered to be linked to planning and premeditation. 
Identifying group offending as a factor is perhaps more problematic. 
Social psychology might suggest that we are more susceptible to loss 
of self-control when acting within a group. Arguably too, groups are 
more likely to act with hostility to those ‘outside the group’. One 
can understand that it may be more frightening to be attacked by a 
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group than by an individual but this surely goes to the extent of harm 
rather than the level of culpability. Deliberate and gratuitous harm and 
violence or damage to property might be more readily accepted as 
increasing culpability as might the abuse of power or trust. The attitude 
to previous good character in relation to sentencing sexual offences 
is relevant here in the sense that previous good character might itself 
contribute to placing an individual in a position of trust.
The effect of alcohol and drugs on culpability is discussed in 
Chapter Six. In regard to ‘attempts to conceal or dispose of evidence’ 
again it is to be wondered why this might increase culpability. It is 
true that the wrongdoer who, on realising what she or he has done, 
immediately gives themselves up and expresses remorse might be 
regarded as deserving less blame then the wrongdoer who lays low 
and says nothing. Yet if we imagine that Ann uses a kitchen knife to 
stab and kill Ben, is Ann really more culpable if she hides or destroys 
the knife than if she simply returns the bloodied knife to the kitchen 
and continues with her life?
Von Hirsh seems to suggest that assessing culpability is less puzzling 
than assessing harm:
Culpability can be gauged with the aid of clues from 
substantive criminal law. The substantive law already 
distinguishes intentional conduct from reckless and from 
criminally negligent behaviour. It should be possible in 
principle to develop, for sentencing doctrine, more refined 
distinctions concerning the degree of purposefulness, 
indifference to consequences, or carelessness in criminal 
conduct. The doctrines of excuse in the substantive criminal 
law could also be drawn on to develop theories of partial 
excuse – for example, of partial duress and diminished 
capacity. (Von Hirsh et al, 2009, 4–5)
While it may well be possible in principle to develop more 
sophisticated measures to gauge culpability the fact remains that little 
development work has actually been done. 
Robinson and Darley (2007) point out that it is common for us to 
think that our assessments about culpability and judgements about 
punishment are entirely reasoned in the same way we regard most 
judgements we make about our daily lives, but social science evidence 
suggests that judgements about justice, especially for violations that 
might be called the core of criminal wrongdoing, are more the product 
of intuition than reasoning. Their intuitional nature means, among 
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other things, that they are judgements quickly arrived at, even by 
people with little education or life experience, that they frequently 
are held with strong feelings of certainty, and that the reasons we reach 
such judgements with such certainty are generally inaccessible to us.
Robinson and Darley (2007) refer to the research by Tversky 
and Kahneman which suggests that people frequently use intuitive, 
short-cut methods to reach decisions and then go on to act on them. 
Kahneman further suggests that: ‘The evidence, both behavioural…
and neurophysiological…is consistent with the idea that the assessment 
of whether objects are good (and should be approached) or bad (and 
should be avoided) is carried out quickly and efficiently by specialized 
neural circuitry’ (Kahneman, 2003, 701).
Similarly Jonathan Haidt found that people report strong intuitions 
about things that are morally wrong, but are unable to provide a 
principled explanation for their judgements (Haidt, 2001). Having 
reviewed the relevant literature, Robinson and Darley conclude:
In sum, there is at least some degree of consensus that many 
moral judgments are made by a deeply intuitive system. 
If such judgments were the product of a set of principles 
of morality learned from others, it would seem to be a 
straightforward matter to derive the ‘wrongness’ of acts 
from these principles, just as mathematical inferences can 
be made from a set of axioms and subsequently explained 
with reference to them. Moral dumbfounding and related 
effects in the psychological literature suggest that this is not 
how these judgments are made.
To summarize, we are suggesting that the belief that 
serious wrongdoing should be punished and the culturally 
shared judgments of the relative blameworthiness of 
different acts of wrongdoing are commonly intuitive rather 
than reasoned judgments. This being so, these judgments 
come quickly to mind and are accompanied by strong 
feelings of certainty. The fact that these intuitions are the 
product of interpretative habits is obscured to the person 
because the processes that produce them are automatic and 
rapid, and leave no ‘mental traces’. (Robinson and Darley, 
2007, 8)
These findings have important implications for the retributive project. 
As we have seen already, an assessment of the measure of blame is 
central to the proportionality of punishment. The impression might 
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be gained that blameworthiness can be scientifically and objectively 
assessed by weighing in aggravating and mitigating factors. Current 
social science research paints a very different picture.
Shocking and extraordinary crimes
In 1994 the population of Rwanda was approximately 7 million and was 
divided into three ethnic groups: the Hutu (85%), the Tutsi (14%) and 
the Twa (1%). According to the independent report commissioned by 
the Secretary General of the United Nations, during a 100-day period 
between April and July 1994 approximately 800,000 people were killed. 
Most of those killed were Tutsis. An estimated 200,000 women were 
raped and other appalling atrocities were carried out (United Nations, 
1999). In its 2012 report Genocide Watch identified nine countries 
where genocide was taking place and a further 11 countries at the 
‘preparation for genocide’ stage. According to Genocide Watch, at 
the preparation stage:
Victims are identified and separated out because of their 
ethnic or religious identity. Death lists are drawn up. 
Members of victim groups are forced to wear identifying 
symbols. Their property is expropriated. They are often 
segregated into ghettoes, deported into concentration 
camps, or confined to a famine-struck region and starved. 
(Genocide Watch, 2012, 5)
In recent years it seems as if genocide, mass killings, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity have increased to such an extent that they 
may no longer be considered extraordinary crimes. At the same 
time ‘Since 1989, the use of international judicial institutions to hold 
accountable those who are accused of perpetrating atrocities have 
burgeoned’ (Schabas, 2012, 2).
On 29 November 1864 members of the Third Colarado Volunteer 
Cavalry Regiment under the command of Colonel John Milton 
Chivington carried out an attack on an unarmed, Indian settlement at 
Sand Creek. There were about 500 Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho 
living in the settlement, two-thirds of whom were women and children. 
Chivington ordered his men to ‘Kill and scalp all, little and big…Nits 
make lice’. Eye witness accounts reported mutilations, killing of young 
children and final estimates of the number killed number 150 with 
many others seriously wounded. The massacre at Sand Creek was sadly 
not an isolated incident during the nineteenth century expansion of the 
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United States westwards (see Waller, 2007, 26). Neither Chivington 
nor any of the others involved in the massacre were ever prosecuted.
On 13 July 1942 members of Reserve Police Battalion 101 assembled 
outside the Polish village of Jozefow. They were middle-aged men 
considered to be too old to serve in the German army and had only 
arrived in Poland less than three weeks earlier. Their commander was 
Major Wilhelm Trapp, a 53-year-old career policeman. With the men 
assembled Trapp announced that the battalion had been ordered to 
round up the 1,800 Jews that lived in the village. Males of working 
age would be transferred to a work camp; the remaining Jews were 
to be shot on the spot. Trapp indicated that he was not happy about 
the assignment, but that those were his orders. He indicated, however, 
that any of the men who did not wish to participate in the shooting 
could choose not to participate in the massacre. Out of nearly 500 
men only 12 declared themselves unwilling to shoot. The incident is 
explored in detail in Christopher R Browning’s Ordinary men (2001).
It is tempting to believe that atrocities and other evil acts are carried 
out by evil people. We prefer to believe there was something inherently 
evil in Colonel Chivington, even if he had formerly been a Methodist 
minister. We like to think that we would join the 12 police reservists 
who refused to participate in the massacre at Jozefow. Phillip Zimbardo 
suggests that the idea that there is a clear distinction separating good 
people from bad people gives us comfort for at least two reasons:
First, it creates a binary logic, in which Evil is essentialized. 
Most of us perceive Evil as an entity, a quality that is 
inherent in some people and not in others…it also takes 
‘good people’ off the responsibility hook. They are freed 
from even considering their possible role in creating, 
sustaining, perpetuating, or conceding to the conditions 
that contribute to delinquency, crime, vandalism, teasing, 
bullying, rape, torture, terror and violence. ‘It’s the way of 
the world, and there’s not much that can be done to change 
it, certainly not by me.’ (Zimbardo, 2007, 7)
A series of experiments were conducted at Yale University in 1961–62 
by Stanley Milgram. He found that almost two-thirds of participants, 
ordinary Connecticut residents, were willing to give apparently harmful 
electric shocks – up to 450 volts – to a pitifully protesting victim, simply 
because a scientific authority commanded them to, and in spite of the 
fact that the victim did not do anything to deserve such punishment. 
Following the experiment Milgram commented:
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Many people, not knowing much about the experiment 
claim that subjects who go to the end of the board are 
sadistic. Nothing could be more foolish than an overall 
characterization of these persons. It is like saying that a 
person thrown into a swift-flowing stream is necessarily 
a fast swimmer, or that he has great stamina because he 
moves so rapidly relative to the bank. The context of action 
must always be considered. The individual, on entering the 
laboratory, becomes integrated into a situation that carries 
its own momentum. (Milgram, 1977, 118)
Some 10 years later, in August 1971, Phillip Zimbardo began an 
experiment aimed at discovering what went into the making of a prison 
guard. Zimbardo recruited a number of Stanford university students 
and some Palo Alto police officers to participate in the experiment. A 
mock prison was set up and roles as prisoners and guards were randomly 
assigned. The experiment was scheduled to run for two weeks but 
had to be abandoned after only six days because the guards became 
increasingly abusive and the prisoners dangerously stressed:
[All the participants] began the experience as seemingly 
good people. Those who were guards knew that but for 
the random flick of a coin they could have been wearing 
the prisoners’ smocks and been controlled by those they 
were now abusing. They also knew that the prisoners had 
done nothing criminally wrong to deserve their lowly status. 
Yet, some guards have transformed into perpetrators of evil, 
and other guards have become passive contributors to evil 
through their inaction. Still other normal, healthy young 
men as prisoners have broken down under the situational 
pressures, while the remaining prisoners have become 
zombie-like followers. (Zimbardo, 2007, 172)
Over 30 years after the Stanford Prison Experiment reports of the 
abuse of detainees in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq by US Army Reservists 
showed disturbing similarities.
We saw earlier in the chapter that deliberate targeting of particular 
victims is seen as a factor increasing culpability. Genocide might be 
regarded as the most serious of all hate crimes. Yet the evidence from 
social psychology is that genocide does not occur outside a particular 
social context. Colonel Chivington’s reference to the Indians as ‘lice’ 
and ‘nits’ is pertinent here and in most situations where genocide 
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occurs there are sustained attempts to dehumanise the targeted group. 
The members of Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the participants 
in Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s experiments were just ordinary human 
beings like any of us. Yet, in a particular set of circumstances, they 
were capable of acts of which most of us would strongly disapprove. 
The question of the extent to which they should be ‘blamed’ for their 
actions is less easy to answer. It may be a comfort to blame them because 
by blaming them we are saying, in a similar situation, we would have 
acted differently. The disturbing finding of Zimbardo’s, and Milgram’s 
and others’ work is that there is no evidence that we would.
In Chapter Seven there is some discussion of international criminal 
law and the work of the international criminal tribunals. The issue 
of quantifying blame and ranking offence seriousness was raised 
particularly starkly by the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
The tribunal had been established by the United Nations Security 
Council and the maximum punishment the court could impose was 
a sentence of imprisonment. For a period of time while the court was 
hearing cases, the Rwandan courts still had the power to impose the 
death penalty. There was therefore the possibility that an individual 
convicted of murdering a shopkeeper might face the death penalty 
in the Rwandan courts while an individual convicted of murdering 
hundreds of shopkeepers would receive a sentence of imprisonment 
from the ICTR. This point did, to some extent, undermine the 
credibility of the ICTR in Rwanda, but raises a fundamental question: 
to what extent is carrying out multiple murders more blameworthy 
than carrying out a single murder? Is blame something tangible that 
can be quantified exactly: one murder = one unit of ‘murder’ blame, 
10 murders = 10 units of ‘murder’ blame? The links between blame, 
retribution and punishment seem to suggest blame can be so quantified. 




Putting oneself in harm’s way
It is an everyday occurrence: people put themselves into positions 
where it becomes far more likely that they will offend. These actions 
constitute a continuum of conduct which range from putting oneself 
in a situation that makes offending virtually certain, through conduct 
where offending is a probable consequence, to situations where the 
causal link is far weaker. In all cases, the initial decision does not 
remove all later choice, although it may severely restrict the options 
available or may impair the individual’s ability to act rationally. As the 
initial conduct is usually voluntary, it may reasonably be regarded as 
blameworthy but that does not mean that the process of causation and 
attribution is straightforward. The overarching concern is whether the 
precursory conduct aggravates any future offence or merely provides 
the context and whether it should even serve as mitigation. The allied 
question of policy is how the criminal law should rely on blame when 
determining how to respond to these cases when other factors such as 
deterrence appear of relevance. For the purposes of this chapter, the 
discussion concerns deliberate decisions which increase the likelihood 
of offending. Putting oneself in harm’s way encapsulates the 
voluntariness of this behaviour. Other factors, such as socio-economic 
deprivation, may also be criminogenic, but these factors will be 
discussed elsewhere on the basis that the conduct is not (we would 
argue) voluntary and, even if this were the case, it could not sensibly 
be regarded as a decision to engage in behaviour which heightens the 
risk of offending.
Criminologists have largely ignored this phenomenon for 
understandable reasons. Studies into behaviour prior to the offence 
have often focused not on the actions of offenders, but on the actions 
of victims. Attempts to reduce crime victimisation are welcome but 
there is a danger that victims who are seen to have acted ‘imprudently’ 
are judged to be in some way to blame for the crime. Victim-blaming 
is highly context-specific. Despite well-publicised campaigns warning 
of the dangers of leaving valuables unattended in cars, for example, 
victims are not castigated if the contents of a car parked in a vulnerable 
location are stolen. Compare that with victims of sexual violence who 
are routinely subjected to claims that they in some way ‘provoked’ the 
offence by, for example, dressing in a certain way (Walklate, 2009, 231). 
116
Blamestorming, blamemongers and scapegoats
This chapter does not consider the actions of victims but it is important 
to recognise why this wariness exists. This neglect is regrettable as this 
chapter demonstrates the multitude of issues at stake and the practical 
ramifications that arise as a consequence. Not all of these issues have 
previously been identified, let alone analysed, and so this chapter serves 
as an attempt to map new terrain. 
Returning to the continuum above, it would appear that there is 
some inverse correlation between the certainty of the future offence 
and the frequency with which the issue arises. Only rarely are the 
courts faced with situations where someone acted in such a way that 
offending was virtually certain. More commonplace scenarios, where 
the likelihood is more remote, cause particular problems: the frequency 
supports calls for a deterrent response but the weaker causal link suggests 
less blame. In order to consider these issues, the chapter will consider 
four scenarios in turn, each of which exemplify different points on the 
continuum: joining criminal or paramilitary organisations; becoming 
associated with the drug trade; offending to feed an existing drug 
habit; and offending after becoming voluntarily intoxicated. There 
are commonalities but it is equally apparent that significant differences 
exist. Blame helps link these scenarios but equally it helps to expose 
the distinctions. 
Blame, gang membership and paramilitary involvement
Those who join criminal gangs or paramilitary organisations do so 
with the expectation (and quite possibly the hope) of offending. (We 
are ignoring situations where mere membership of the organisation is 
a criminal offence.) Recruits to paramilitary and terrorist organisations 
are aware that members engage in serious, violent criminality. Funding 
is often secured through other illegal activity such as drug dealing, 
prostitution and extortion. Non-compliance is likely to be met with 
violence, a fact of which members will no doubt be acutely aware. 
There is no difficulty establishing a link between the decision to join 
and the offence. The issue in such cases relates to situations where, after 
joining an organisation known to offend, the individual offends but 
claims that he did not want to but did so under duress. Voluntariness 
and blame evidently attach to the original decision to join, causality 
may be obvious, but, assuming the veracity of the individual’s account, 
does blame attach to the offence committed under duress? Duress 
may well have been applied given the nature of the organisation. 
Nevertheless, the certainty of offending and the likelihood of violent 
compulsion would surely have been foreseeable and the essence of 
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duress is that there is a lack of blameworthiness on the individual’s 
part. One could legitimately question whether that is the case here. 
Refusing to recognise the duress, though, is problematic. Excluding 
such an argument would mean that an individual’s initial decision to 
participate would make him liable for all ensuing criminal activity, or 
at least all foreseeable criminal activity, even if he was forced to commit 
it. Young, naive or vulnerable recruits would be offered no protection 
from violent coercion.
Instinct might suggest that the availability of such a defence is most 
pressing for serious crimes. The severity of the crime, however, partly 
determines the availability of the defence. Duress is not available as a 
defence to the very gravest crimes in most domestic legal systems or 
to the most serious crimes in international criminal law. This absolute 
position gives rise to some fundamental, and potentially uncomfortable, 
questions about blame. In the infamous case of Erdemović (IT-96-22-A) 
a young soldier refused to obey an order to execute a group of about 
70 civilians. He was told that if he had sympathy for the victims he 
should join them, at which point he carried out the order. At his trial 
he pleaded guilty, but claimed that he had shot the civilians under 
duress. A majority of the Appeal Chamber held that duress could not 
be used as a defence to war crimes or crimes against humanity. In this 
case the execution of numerous civilians was exceptionally grave, but 
one cannot ignore the abnormally severe pressure he faced. Perhaps 
it is also worth noting that Erdemović had not joined a paramilitary 
or a criminal organisation, but, rather, was a member of an army and 
had not joined with the expectation that he would be a party to the 
massacre of civilians. For present purposes, the dissenting judgment 
of Judge Stephen is of particular relevance. Judge Stephen reviewed 
the principles of the common law and argued that duress existed as a 
defence because the defendant’s actions were not blameworthy and it 
would be unjust to punish him for his actions. He noted that duress was 
not available as a defence to murder in the common law (see below) 
but could find no compelling reason why this was the case. A possible 
answer was provided by Judges McDonald and Vohrah. They also 
accepted that the basis for the defence was a lack of blameworthiness, 
but they held that murder could be distinguished from other offences 
due to the sanctity of innocent life. 
The leading English case, Howe [1987] 1 All ER 771, did establish 
that duress cannot act as a defence to murder, but it is unfair to say 
that the judges failed to articulate a convincing rationale for this rule. 
Recognising that ‘the overriding objects of the criminal law must be to 
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protect innocent lives and to set a standard of conduct which ordinary 
men and women are expected to observe’, Lord Hailsham LC held that:
Other considerations necessarily arise where the choice is 
between the threat of death or a fortiori of serious injury 
and deliberately taking an innocent life. In such a case a 
reasonable man might reflect that one innocent human life 
is at least as valuable as his own or that of his loved one. 
In such a case a man cannot claim that he is choosing the 
lesser of two evils. Instead he is embracing the cognate but 
morally disreputable principle that the end justifies the 
means. (p 780)
At first glance this appears to be an argument based on the sanctity 
of life, but it is in fact an argument about blame. By finding that the 
defendant had embraced ‘the cognate but morally disreputable principle 
that the end justifies the means’, Lord Hailsham is attaching blame to 
the defendant’s actions. The argument does rest on the sanctity of life 
in that someone who commits a lesser harm does not make such a 
calculation and hence lacks blame. How convincing is this argument? 
What if someone was forced to decide whether to kill one person 
when the threat relates to the lives of several? Having an absolute rule 
would mean that he would be guilty of murder even if his actions 
paradoxically saved lives. Lord Hailsham was sensitive to this possibility, 
believing that it could be dealt with appropriately at the prosecutorial 
or sentencing stage.
These cases establish that no-one can rely on duress as a defence 
to murder, so those who join a paramilitary or criminal organisation 
and who kill under duress are treated no differently from a random 
individual placed in this invidious position. Yet the blame appears 
markedly different. A paramilitary or someone who joins a violent 
criminal gang exposes himself to such a risk and the decision to 
join the organisation introduces an element of blame which is not 
present in a case involving a random individual. If Lord Hailsham is 
correct, the blame attaches equally in that both adopted a ‘morally 
disreputable principle’. The fact that both individuals may have acted 
in such a way, though, does not mean that there is equivalence. Surely 
the paramilitary was engaged in disreputable conduct beforehand and 
there was a factual link between this and the subsequent (and ‘morally 
disreputable’) ‘decision’ to offend? The other individual found himself 
in this position by chance. 
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The law does distinguish between the paramilitary or gang member 
and the ‘innocent’ person in cases involving lesser crimes. Duress exists 
as a potential defence to most offences, although the law is complex as 
there are obvious policy reasons favouring a restrictive approach. This 
complexity means that a general account of the law is beyond the scope 
of this work especially as in-depth analyses can be found elsewhere 
(Ashworth, 2009; Ormerod, 2011; Simester et al, 2010). One such 
restriction is that the defence is forfeited if ‘a person has voluntarily, and 
with knowledge of its nature, joined a criminal organisation or gang 
which he knew might bring pressure on him to commit an offence and 
was an active member when he was put under such pressure’ (Sharpe 
[1987] 1 QB 853 at 861). This case involved an armed robber who 
was denied the opportunity to plead duress following the shooting of 
a post office employee, despite a claim that his participation had only 
been secured at gun point.
If policy dictates a generally restrictive approach to duress, removing 
the defence in this situation can be justified on similar grounds:
The policy of the law must be to discourage association 
with known criminals, and it should be slow to excuse the 
criminal conduct of those who do so. If a person voluntarily 
becomes or remains associated with others engaged in 
criminal activity in a situation where he knows or ought 
reasonably to know that he may be subject to compulsion 
by them or their associates, he cannot rely on the defence 
of duress to excuse any act which he is thereafter compelled 
to do by them. (Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 at para 38)
Although this might appear to be an absolute bar to pleading duress 
after becoming involved with paramilitary or criminal enterprises, 
it does not appear that the initial decision to join the organisation 
precludes any later reliance on duress. The bar would appear to demand 
continuing association with the organisation or gang which presumably 
could be terminated.
Despite this, Hasan places a broad restriction on pleading duress in 
two ways. Most notably, the quotation from the judgment shows that 
the test is objective: it is not necessary for the individual to be aware that 
his voluntary association may subject him to compulsion if he ‘ought 
reasonably’ to have known this. A subsequent Court of Appeal decision 
recognised that this ruling could remove the possibility of duress from 
someone who knew that an associate carried a knife and with whom 
others had warned him not to associate (Ali [2008] EWCA Crim 716).
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Imposing an objective test as opposed to a subjective one has 
implications for this study. It is, at least theoretically, possible to envisage 
a scenario where someone ought to have seen the risk of compulsion 
but failed to do so (examples certainly abound in other areas of the 
criminal law when an objective test is adopted). Naive individuals 
may well be vulnerable to approaches from such organisations. 
Should such a person be treated in the same manner as someone who 
knowingly embraced the risk? If blame is relevant to criminal liability 
or punishment, can an objective approach be defended? The distinction 
may be academic (in Hasan it was argued that a jury would be unlikely 
to conclude that a defendant failed to see a reasonable risk) but the 
policy is deliberate. The quote from the judgment shows that the 
policy rests on the idea that individuals should be discouraged from 
associating with criminals. Blame is not the issue but deterrence, and 
that objective does not demand blameworthy conduct on the part of 
the defendant.
The second restriction, which is of greater practical significance, 
relates to the phrase ‘association with known criminals’, a construction 
that would appear to go beyond actively joining criminal enterprises. 
Ali [2008] EWCA Crim 716 provided the example of an individual 
who knew that an associate carried a knife and had been warned by 
others of the dangers of associating with him. Drawing the boundary 
in this manner expands massively the number of people potentially 
affected by this ruling. It has particular ramifications for drug users. 
On the vast number of occasions when drugs are purchased, the buyer 
knowingly associates with dealers who are, by definition, criminals. 
One might have had more sympathy for the restriction in that it would 
have applied to a comparatively small number of people who had made 
the decision to join groups whose mission was to offend if Hasan had 
adopted a narrower formulation. A justification could have been found 
which relied on both blame and deterrence if a subjective test had been 
applied. Other than a crude recourse to deterrence, it is difficult to see 
how one can support this broader interpretation. 
Purchasing drugs, ‘associating with criminals’ and 
expanding the ‘blameworthy’
It is trite but true that every drug deal represents an association with 
a known criminal. It is also well known that the drug trade is brutal 
with debts frequently enforced by violence (Brownstein et al, 2000; 
Curtis and Wendel, 2007; Goldstein, 1985). Debtors may, though, 
be pressurised into offending in lieu of a debt, for example by drug 
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trafficking, raising issues similar to those discussed in the preceding 
section. There is, it is submitted, one key distinction. A gang member 
or a paramilitary can expect to offend and can reasonably foresee that 
refusal will be met with violence. Those in debt to a drug dealer may 
expect violence, however it is unlikely that they would have envisaged 
pressure to offend.
Although the English courts have treated the relationship between 
user and dealer as a criminal association, we would argue that there is 
a difference between those who purchase drugs and those who join 
a criminal or paramilitary organisation: the former involves contact 
with and, in the broadest sense, participation with criminals while 
membership makes one part of the criminal enterprise. Users may be 
said to enable the enterprise but they do not belong to it. The enterprise 
may not exist without users but one should be wary of finding moral 
equivalence between an enabler and a participant via association. 
Statistically, drug users may be more likely to find themselves in a 
situation where they offend under duress than non-users, though that 
risk is obviously less overt and less foreseeable than for someone joining 
a criminal enterprise. The courts have argued that these distinctions 
are meaningless by prescribing so wide a definition of association. The 
leading case of Hasan [2005] UKHL 22, discussed in the preceding 
section, does in fact allow for a situation where duress may be allowed 
more readily in a case involving a drug user. It will be recalled that 
duress will not be available to someone who voluntarily becomes 
or remains associated with others engaged in criminal activity in a 
situation where he knows or ought reasonably to know that he may 
be subject to compulsion. A jury may be more willing to say that a 
drug user could not reasonably envisage being compelled to offend 
compared to someone who joins a criminal organisation. Case law 
suggests that the courts take a hard line. The accused in Heath [2000] 
Crim LR 109 was charged with possessing a Class B drug with intent 
to supply and maintained that he had done so after serious threats were 
made by a dealer to whom he owed money. Heath acknowledged the 
reality of his situation, stating that ‘people collect their debts in one 
way’. His defence of duress was excluded as the risk of duress was 
freely undertaken. It seems odd that reliance was made of Heath’s 
comment when the more obvious and natural interpretation would 
be that violent retaliation was likely.
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Drug misuse and crime
It is well-documented that drug-users commit a disproportionate 
amount of crime. A meta-analysis of 30 studies undertaken by Bennett 
et al (2008) reported that users were three to four times more likely 
to commit a variety of offences than non-users. It has been estimated 
that up to half of all property crime in England is drug-related and 
that the market value of the property stolen could be £2.5 billion a 
year (DrugScope, 2013). Even though the correlation between drug 
use and crime is beyond dispute, this does not prove that there is a 
direct causal link. Those who are both drug-users and offenders are 
not a homogenous group: 
[There] are some individuals for whom the acute, and 
possibly chronic, cognitive effects of some drugs, such as 
alcohol, increase the propensity toward criminal behaviors. 
For others, involvement in deviant behavior weakens 
bonds to conventional norms and increases involvement 
in deviant subcultures (including the illicit drug market) 
that provides opportunities and reinforcement for increased 
deviant behavior, including drug use. Finally, for others, 
probably a majority, biopsychological factors (for example, 
temperament) and early parent–child interactions, in 
combination with socioenvironmental factors increase the 
risk for involvement in all types of deviant behavior. (White 
and Gorman, 2000, 195)
Research suggests that criminal behaviour usually pre-dates drug use, a 
finding which challenges the popular belief that people offend in order 
to fund a pre-existing drug habit (Menard et al, 2001). The authors of 
this study, however, found that once offenders start using drugs, each 
behaviour increases the likelihood of the other, leading the authors 
to conclude that, by this stage, crime affects drug use and drug use 
affects crime. Ford (2005) also found significant indirect connections 
in the relationship between drug use and delinquency. His primary 
contention was that both drug use and delinquency weakened the 
social bond which increased the risk of both behaviours continuing.
How do these findings inform a discussion of blame in the criminal 
process? First, early initial forays into criminality may be wholly 
unrelated to subsequent drug use: the offender might not heighten his 
risk of offending by taking drugs, but may heighten his risk of drug 
taking by offending. In terms, then, of apportioning blame, it would 
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appear appropriate to treat such an offender in the same way as any 
other first-time offender. If, as Menard et al (2001) suggest, crime pre-
dates drug use, the situation thereafter becomes complex. Both the 
early offences and the initial drug use were (probably) voluntary and 
both may well be precursors to later crime. Accordingly, there would 
appear to be two possible departure points and both would support 
a claim that the offender had deliberately increased the likelihood of 
offending. In fact, the attribution of blame appears far less problematic 
than if there was a direct causal link between drug taking and crime. 
In the last scenario, one would have to find that someone using drugs 
did so in the knowledge that there was an increased risk of offending. 
Presumably few individuals start using drugs with this in mind. 
Consequently, the fact that the two activities are commonly entwined 
may be less problematic than supposed. What, however, if drug use 
and criminality are in fact linked to another common factor such as a 
risk-seeking personality?
In such cases it seems reasonable to ask two questions: to what extent 
does that trait explain the offending behaviour and to what extent 
does that trait affect blame? There are many people with risk-seeking 
personalities, and such people may be more likely to offend or use 
drugs, but others channel this by, for example, participating in extreme 
sports. The quantification of blame should then encompass more than 
the fact that the offender was a drug user. Recognition must be given 
to the variety of ways in which drug use can feature in an offender’s 
life at any particular point; research suggests that the relationship is 
fluid and becomes more prominent as criminality becomes entrenched 
(Menard et al, 2001). It may also be appropriate to recognise the fact 
that an offender is trying to address a drug habit and is taking positive 
steps to reduce the risk of recidivism. This could even be regarded as 
an attempt to put oneself out of harm’s way. 
The impact of blame is important for another reason with this type 
of offender. Drug users in treatment frequently report stigmatisation 
or self-stigmatisation and this in turn is likely to undermine the 
effectiveness of treatment (Room, 2005). Blame could then have a 
negative effect when it comes to rehabilitating offenders with substance 
abuse problems. Luoma et al (2007), however, found that substance 
abusers receiving treatment who were also involved in the criminal 
justice system reported less stigma than other service users. This is an 
intriguing finding. Perhaps drug users who are not involved in crime 
feel that they suffer because of the common assumption that users 
offend in order to feed their habit. In this context, the stigma flows from 
an overly-simplistic, but widely-held, view of causality. The divergence 
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between popular assumption and empirical evidence creates problems 
for policy-makers, particularly those dependent on electoral support. 
Responding to the public mood may lead to political success, but it is 
unlikely to have a positive impact on the underlying problem. Indeed, 
it may exacerbate it, as is the case when aggressive enforcement of 
drug laws have been shown to drive up the price of drugs leading to 
increases in crime (Quinn and Sneed, 2008). Evidence-based policy 
may dispel some myths, or, at least, demonstrate that the reality is more 
complex than commonly understood. Attempts to explore crime, and 
even more so to explain it, can be seen by some as an attempt to excuse 
it. By simplifying the causal connection between drug use and crime, 
the popular view is that the offender is to blame for his predicament 
and that this should be reflected in how the criminal justice system 
responds. In certain cases, such a conclusion may be warranted but, 
due to the evidence offered above, it is clear that such a finding should 
not be universal. 
Blame, intoxication and alcohol-related offending
The last scenario to be considered is by far the most common – 
offences committed by those who had been drinking alcohol. There 
would appear to be correlation between intoxication and offending 
(Aldridge et al, 2011, 13–15). According to the British crime statistics, 
44% of those who reported that they had been the victim of violence 
said that the attacker had been ‘under the influence of alcohol at 
the time’ (Home Office, 2011, table 7.10). Research has also found 
a causal association between alcohol abuse/dependence and several 
classifications of offending in a New Zealand birth cohort (Boden et 
al, 2013). The relationship was particularly marked for violent offences 
(Boden et al, 2012). Finding a direct causal link between intoxication 
and violence is notoriously problematic (Dingwall, 2006); evidently 
the majority of those who become intoxicated do not then offend. 
Nonetheless, one cannot sensibly disregard the fact that a very high 
proportion of violent crime is committed by those who are drunk, nor 
can one ignore the reality that most of these individuals put themselves 
in such a state voluntarily.
Alcohol is used in many contexts as an explanation and as a 
justification for atypical behaviour, so it should come as no surprise that 
offenders often blame alcohol use for their criminal conduct. Despite 
this, most studies show that offenders do not see a simple causal link 
and that the explanations offered are complex and nuanced. When 
McMurran and Hollin (1989) asked 100 young offenders, all of whom 
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were moderate or heavy drinkers, whether they saw a link between 
their drinking and their offending, 55.7% said, initially, that they did 
not. Yet, when the offenders were then presented with a sample of 
cue cards, many did identify a link. Some of these links amount to a 
decision to put oneself in harm’s way: most notably, 37.5% stated that 
they did things that they would not do if they had not been drinking. 
Parker (1996) similarly found that his sample identified a variety of links. 
Three of the most common again suggest a decision to put oneself in 
harm’s way: drinking made them impulsive and then they offended; 
drinking caused problems which led them to offend; and the places 
where they drank led them to offend.
More recent research by Newbury and Dingwall (2013) considered 
the perceptions of correlation between drunkenness and offending 
offered by a sample of young females who had offended, sometimes 
seriously, after binge drinking. The sample was drawn from a larger 
research project (Newbury, 2011) concerned with young offenders, the 
majority of whose offences were not related to alcohol. This meant that 
the interviewees were asked no specific questions about alcohol use nor 
were they presented with cue cards as in the studies above. Although 
the sample often expressed extreme remorse, they also stated that 
alcohol was the direct cause of their offending as it had a detrimental 
effect on their personality. Newbury and Dingwall’s study shows that 
attributing blame to their sample is problematic. Many interviewees 
had experience of previous episodes where binge drinking had led to 
harm yet had not modified their drinking behaviour as a result. At 
the same time, one of the study’s key findings was that most of those 
interviewed displayed genuine, and at times frightening, ignorance 
about safe alcohol consumption. 
The situation is, therefore, complex: direct causation between 
intoxication and offending is hard to find; a high proportion of violent 
crime is committed by those who are intoxicated; most of these 
people drank voluntarily; people no doubt believe that there is some 
link and therefore few would be easy with the idea that individuals 
should escape any form of criminal liability on the grounds of being 
voluntarily intoxicated at the time. How should an intoxicated person 
who subsequently offends be treated?
One could start from a position that an individual should gain no 
benefit from getting intoxicated voluntarily. This was the original 
common law stance (McCord, 1992) and still represents the position 
in Scotland (HM Advocate v Savage [1923] JC 49) and in several states 
in the USA (Montana v Egelhoff 518 US 37 (1996)). The effect of this 
is that an intention to become intoxicated is regarded as an alternative 
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to an intention to commit the offence in question. Difficult questions 
of relative blame arise. It would not be implausible to construct a 
normative argument that the blame associated with voluntarily getting 
intoxicated equates to that of committing a crime. The task, though, 
would be daunting; not least as it would entail showing that the 
blame associated with getting intoxicated corresponded to the blame 
associated with committing the actual offence in question. Surely, 
though, the blame in getting intoxicated remains constant, whereas 
the blame associated with offending depends on the seriousness of the 
offence? It cannot be the case, for example, that the blame associated 
with intoxication equates to both the blame associated with criminal 
damage and the blame associated with murder. Perhaps it would be 
more intellectually honest to justify this stance explicitly on the grounds 
of public policy, although one should be wary of accepting that such 
a policy would have any real deterrent effect.
Some Commonwealth countries adopt an opposite position whereby 
evidence of intoxication is seen as a relevant factor in determining 
whether an individual satisfied the requirements of the offence. This 
does not lead to an automatic acquittal although it allows for this 
possibility. This may appear paradoxical in that someone who is so 
intoxicated that he could not have intended to commit the offence 
escapes liability while someone less intoxicated who nevertheless 
intended to do so is convicted, but the position accords with standard 
criminal law doctrine which requires the prosecution to prove all of the 
constituent elements of an offence including intention where relevant. 
Another interpretation of this approach is that it allows a distinction 
to be drawn between the blame associated with intending to become 
intoxicated and the blame associated with intending to commit the 
offence. Society may well believe that an intoxicated person who 
stabs someone is blameworthy, but the better question is whether 
that person is as blameworthy as a sober individual who intentionally 
stabs the victim. This is further complicated when one remembers 
that becoming intoxicated is not of itself criminal and there would 
be debate about whether it should be regarded as blameworthy at all. 
Perceptions of blame help explain the popular reaction to certain 
cases where intoxicated individuals have been acquitted in these 
jurisdictions. Daviault (1994) 93 CCC (3d) 21, a particularly infamous 
Canadian case, involved a chronic alcoholic who sexually assaulted an 
elderly disabled woman after consuming a vast quantity of beer and 
brandy. The Canadian Supreme Court held that it was incumbent on 
the prosecution to prove that Daviault satisfied all of the requirements 
of the offence. His extreme intoxication at the time meant that this 
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was impossible. The media incredulity following his release led to rapid 
legislative changes designed to ensure that those facing trial for violent 
or sexual offences could not escape conviction on similar grounds. The 
outrage is, of course, understandable and no doubt reflected a widely-
held view that considerable blame attached to Daviault’s conduct. It 
was this disjuncture between a judicial outcome and popular belief that 
led Parliament to reform the law. It is worth reflecting further on the 
reaction. First, there is no way of knowing whether the public felt that 
Daviault’s blame was identical to that of a sober offender. There was 
outrage, but that may have been because he was not held to account in 
any way for his conduct; we have no way of gauging whether or not his 
alcoholism would have affected the public’s perceptions of his blame. 
Second, a binary position had to be adopted: Daviault’s intoxication 
was or was not relevant. When faced with a stark choice, the reaction 
would suggest that the public would have arrived at the opposite 
conclusion to the Supreme Court, although it is worth remembering 
that the public’s knowledge of the facts of the case would have been 
partial and that the Supreme Court was determining a point of law 
and not acting as a moral arbiter. 
Alternative approaches exist which allow for greater nuance. One 
could, for example, distinguish between different offences, as in 
England and Wales, where intoxication is potentially relevant for some 
offences but is irrelevant for others. Such an approach may appear to 
have little to commend it: blameworthy individuals will escape liability 
for some crimes while others are convicted despite failing to satisfy the 
requirements of the offence. Yet this approach, confirmed by the House 
of Lords in Majewski [1977] AC 443, is more logical than is sometimes 
supposed. Offences requiring intention are classified as specific intent 
offences and evidence of intoxication can be considered. An acquittal 
can follow, although, if the offence can be committed without intent, 
usually recklessly, evidence of intoxication must be excluded.
Commentators have generally found flaws with this approach (for 
example, Cavender, 1989; Farrier, 1976; Smith, 1976; Virgo, 1993). 
Everything rests on how an offence is classified, yet this is far from 
settled and there are theoretical disputes about whether existing 
classifications are correct (Williams, 1983). Recklessness is also found 
too readily. English law defines recklessness as the conscious taking 
of an unjustified risk (R v G [2004] 1 AC 1034). The risk relates to 
a specified harm. Yet, the sense in which recklessness is used here is 
more generic and appears to relate to consciously getting intoxicated, 
with the attendant risk that one might then offend in an unspecified 
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manner. The blame shifts from an intent or recklessness about causing a 
particular harm to that generally associated with becoming intoxicated.
If blame attaches to intoxication then why not make that a distinct 
offence? Germany, for example, has an offence of total intoxication:
Whoever intentionally or negligently get [sic] intoxicated 
with alcoholic beverages or other intoxicants, shall be 
punished with imprisonment for not more than five years 
or a fine, if he commits an unlawful act while in this 
condition and may not be punished because of it because 
he lacked the capacity to be adjudged guilty due to the 
intoxication, or this cannot be excluded. (Strafgesetzbuch 
StGB, Section 323a)
One of the present authors has advocated this approach before 
(Dingwall, 2006) on the basis that it balances the need to deter 
alcohol-related crime while ensuring that the fundamental principles 
of criminal liability are respected. Central to his argument is that the 
German offence recognises that those who offend while intoxicated 
deserve punishment and that the offence identifies the blameworthy 
conduct, that is, the voluntary intoxication and not the subsequent 
offence. Not everyone accepts that the locus of the blame relates to 
the intoxication. The New South Wales Sentencing Council (2009) 
rejected the creation of an offence of this nature on a number of 
grounds including: 
The creation of a special offence that includes intoxication 
either as an element, or as an aggravating element, risks 
punishing the offender for being intoxicated or for their 
moral irresponsibility, while the true focus of sentencing 
should be on the act committed by the offender while 
intoxicated. (New South Wales Sentencing Council, 2009, 
103)
Two other objections can be raised, one practical and one theoretical. 
Although such an offence might best reflect the offender’s blame, 
would it accord with the public’s sense of justice? If Daviault had been 
convicted of this offence, would the popular reaction have been any 
more muted? If the maximum sentence is five years imprisonment, 
only those threatened with longer terms would want to be convicted of 
this ‘lesser’ offence. Discontent may be fuelled if all of those convicted 
of the offence had committed grave acts. Second, this approach still 
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depends on a criminal harm occurring. In terms of blame, however, can 
a distinction be drawn between an intention to get intoxicated and an 
intention to get intoxicated which leads to a criminal harm occurring? 
Although this offence ostensibly punishes the earlier conduct which 
puts the offender in harm’s way, it remains completely dependent 
on an ensuing harm which, according to the offence definition, was 
neither intentional nor reckless. Here moral luck enters the equation 
(see Chapter Three). If getting intoxicated is the blameworthy activity 
in such cases, it begs the question of whether existing drunkenness 
offences provide the remedy even if these typically attract minor 
penalties and have to be enforced selectively? It is suggested that they 
cannot perform this function. The penalty level would lead to outrage 
if serious harm was caused; and, despite the number of drunkenness 
offences that exist, many scenarios, including that in the Daviault case, 
would not be covered.
Conclusion: voluntarily heightening the risk of offending
It has been pre-supposed that blame attaches to the activities referred 
to above (joining criminal organisations, using illegal drugs, voluntary 
intoxication) and that, if these activities then lead to an offence 
occurring, it is appropriate and just for the law to take account of 
the earlier behaviour. Even if blame links these behaviours, however, 
there is no reason why policy dictates a uniform response. Joining a 
terrorist group, for example, exposes an individual to a far greater risk 
of offending than consuming alcohol. 
Policy may favour a robust response which ignores such variables. 
Society has strong reasons for wanting to deter behaviour which, 
although not necessarily criminal in itself, may act as a precursor to 
crime. The policy of not allowing drug users to plead duress can be 
seen as an obvious example of a failure to distinguish between different 
factual scenarios and a willingness to apply a far-reaching definition 
of blame in order to justify the removal of a potential defence. 
Deterrence cannot, though, fully explain criminal justice policy in 
this area. Were this the case, the obvious response to alcohol-related 
offending would be to say that, provided the drinking was voluntary, 
the use of alcohol would be ignored when determining liability or 
sentence. Most jurisdictions, as has been seen, do not adopt such an 
approach. Instead, other factors are recognised as being important 
determinants of liability and these either override or limit deterrent 
concerns. Intoxication challenges common legal requirements that 
an offender either intended to commit a crime or was reckless about 
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its commission. This, too, is an argument about blame; the offender 
may be blameworthy but to what does that blame attach? This is a 
common thread to all of the scenarios considered in this chapter. In 
each case one has to try and determine whether blame attaches to the 
earlier conduct or to the subsequent offence. Put thus, this seems a 
binary decision, but that has the potential to mislead. Arguably blame 
could attach to neither, one or both of the incidents. Returning to the 
intoxicated offender, one could hold the view that intoxication is not 
blameworthy and that it would be inappropriate to hold an intoxicated 
person liable for an offence that he did not intend to commit. It would 
be equally plausible to argue that intoxication is blameworthy and that 
offences committed in that state should be similarly regarded or that, 
while intoxication is indeed blameworthy, no blame should attach to 
an offence committed in that state.
If the assessment of blame is complicated by the fact that both the 
precursory conduct and the crime could be deemed blameworthy, there 
is also the question of the degree of blame. It is possible to accept that a 
drug addict who offends to feed his or her habit is to blame both for the 
initial habit and for the theft, but does that habit affect the blame that 
attaches to the theft? Determinations of where blame lies may best be a 
question of whether criminalisation is warranted and, just as crucially, 
what conduct should be criminalised. Questions relating to degrees 
of culpability are more commonly relevant at the sentencing stage, 
particularly if proportionality is a relevant determinant. Retributive 
notions of justice depend on the gravity of the offence which is usually 
taken to include both an assessment of the harm caused or intended 
and of the individual’s personal culpability (see, further, Chapter Five). 
Offence-gravity is difficult to quantify objectively and the scenarios in 
this chapter further complicate this assessment. The prior use of alcohol 
and drugs provides a useful example. Australian research (Potas, 1994) 
has shown that sentencers faced with identical factual scenarios treated 
evidence of intoxication very differently with the result that individual 
outcomes varied markedly. This research probably reflects broader 
discrepancies about how society regards intoxication. The traditional 
position in England and Wales was that sentences would not be affected 
by evidence of intoxication (Bradley (1980) 2 Cr App Rep ((S) 12; 
Parkhouse [1999] 2 Cr App Rep ((S) 208); however, examples can be 
found of ‘exceptional’ cases where, presumably, less blame was seen 
to attach. These cases fall into two general categories, both of which 
are revealing: the first concerns men of previous good character who 
committed sexual offences (Spence (1982) 4 Cr App Rep ((S) 175), 
the second, incidents best described as drunken ‘frolics’ (Abrahams 
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(1980) 2 Cr App Rep ((S) 10). Drunken ‘frolics’ may perhaps deserve 
sympathy, but it is far from obvious why a distinction can be drawn 
between sexual offences and other offences. 
The most clearly articulated case law comes from New South Wales. 
As a general principle:
The degree of deliberation shown by an offender is usually 
a matter to be taken into account; such intoxication 
would therefore be relevant in determining the degree 
of deliberation involved in the offender’s breach of the 
law. In some circumstances, it may aggravate the crime 
because of the recklessness with which the offender became 
intoxicated; in other circumstances, it may mitigate the 
crime because the offender has by reason of that intoxication 
acted out of character. (Coleman v The Queen (1990) 47 A 
Crim R 306 at 327)
Further guidance was provided about when mitigation was appropriate:
The fact that an offender was intoxicated at the time of 
committing an offence is not of itself a reason for mitigating 
the sentence which should be imposed on the offender. 
However, the fact that an offender was intoxicated at the 
time of committing the offence may be taken into account 
as mitigating the objective criminality of the offence, insofar 
as it indicates that the offence was impulsive and unplanned 
and that the offender’s capacity to exercise judgement was 
impaired. (Walters v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 219 at 
[38])
Sentencing remains under-researched and this restricts the discussion 
here in two ways. First, there is a lack of a meaningful evidence base 
from which to determine policy. Second, contentious policy decisions 
can go unchallenged leading to an erroneous belief that the policy 
commands universal support. The Sentencing Guidelines Council 
(2004, para 1.22) determined in a guideline on offence-severity that 
intoxication by alcohol or drugs should aggravate a sentence. This 
does not provide empirical proof that sentences are being increased 
in such cases despite statutory requirements that guidelines must be 
followed unless it is contrary to the interests of justice (Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009, s125). Nonetheless, the guideline deserves comment 
as the descriptive nature and practical utility of a sentencing guideline 
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means that a considered normative analysis is lacking. For example, it is 
unclear whether the decision is based on blame or whether deterrence 
was the determining factor.
Guidelines are designed to ensure greater uniformity of approach 
which, when one considers Potas’ findings, appears laudable. A standard 
approach to such cases, however, presupposes that all offenders who 
were intoxicated at the time of the offence deserve identical treatment. 
Padfield (2011), an academic who also sits as a judge, disputes this, 
arguing that sentencers need to retain discretion in such cases, as 
intoxication can have an impact on culpability in different ways. This 
stance was also taken by the New South Wales Sentencing Council 
(2009, 113) Padfield’s argument was in part a response to an article 
by Dingwall and Koffman (2008) who suggested a uniform approach, 
but one that differed significantly from the sentencing guideline. The 
authors contended that sentencing disparity resulted from the absence 
of an agreed policy for sentencing intoxicated offenders and that this 
disparity led to individual injustice. They rejected the argument, 
however, that sentences should be increased on the basis of intoxication 
and suggested instead an approach allowing mitigation if it was a 
first offence, thereafter intoxication would not influence sentence. 
Dingwall and Koffman’s model was situated in a retributive sentencing 
framework so it excluded other policy objectives such as deterrence 
or public protection, both of which may favour treating intoxication 
as an aggravating factor. By adopting a retributive approach, however, 
blame featured large in their analysis and led to the distinction being 
drawn between first time offenders and recidivists. An offender of 
previous good character who offended while intoxicated was seen 
as less blameworthy than a sober offender. An individual who had 
previously offended while intoxicated, though, deserved no credit 
as he had failed to alter his behaviour. This conclusion raises another 
question of relative blame which the authors do not address: can one 
infer that a decision to become intoxicated having previously offended 
in that condition equates to a decision to offend while sober? Are they 
not qualitatively different?
What is important here is that all of these approaches are directly 
concerned with blame. What differs is how assessments of blame are 
best calculated. Recognising variety in circumstance and using this as 
a justification for discretion, Padfield’s (2011) argument implies that 
blame is not uniform in such cases. Dingwall and Koffman (2008) also 
reject such a notion by distinguishing between first time offenders and 
repeat offenders but, within these categories, there is less room for 
manoeuvre as intoxication is irrelevant for all but first time offenders. 
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Their approach does not wholly disregard discretion in that judges 
dealing with first time offenders would still have to decide how much 
mitigation is appropriate and this decision depends, at least in part, on 
blame. Meanwhile the Sentencing Guidelines Council (2004) deems 
intoxication to be an aggravating factor, a conclusion that clearly 
relates to blame.
This chapter represents the first attempt to tie together four diverse 
areas of criminal justice policy. All raise both practical and theoretical 
issues of concern. Frequently, legal intervention relies on claims that 
the earlier conduct was blameworthy and that this justifies departure 
from standard requirements of the criminal law (as is the case with 
intoxication) or the removal of a potential defence (as is the case with 
those who ‘associate’ with criminals). The methods employed to allow 
these outcomes are often tortuous and contestable, even where the 
policy objective is sound. Perhaps it would be better to focus on the 
initial blameworthy conduct and seek an appropriate way of responding 
to it. This may well involve creating specific offences (such as those 
prohibiting membership of prescribed organisations) or of reviewing 
the enforcement of existing offences (such as drunkenness offences). 
One must be wary of presupposing that criminalisation provides the 
remedy (see Chapter Seven); there is a clear danger of ‘net-widening’ 
when one is attempting to curb behaviour which may well lead to 
significant harm. Where the potential harm is grave and the earlier 
conduct blameworthy, however, recourse to the criminal law may be 
appropriate. The dangers of ‘net-widening’ should make one wary 
of extending the reach of the criminal law but it should not exclude 
intervention where necessary.
Blame may provide a valuable mechanism for considering these 
types of case, but it is important to remember that other policy drivers 
operate. Deterrence may lack the empirical support that is commonly 
supposed (Von Hirsch et al, 1999), yet combating earlier decisions 
which heighten the risk of offending might feasibly reduce their 
occurrence. The offences in question are also often comparatively 
serious and the public rightly expect protection from the criminal 
justice system. These concerns validate an approach which treats 
behaviour which increases the risk of offending as aggravation. 
Compelling as this may sound, blame is more complex and may 
support an alternative conclusion, at least in some instances. While 
the preliminary conduct may properly be regarded as blameworthy, the 
impact that it had on subsequent events may have reduced the blame 
that can fairly be attached to the offence. In all cases, should the offender 
be judged as harshly as an individual committing the offence without 
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that background? To reverse the proposition, if someone commits an 
act of violence while they are sober are they really less blameworthy 
that an intoxicated assailant? Fairness might demand sympathising with 
individuals who have made poor earlier choices which can rightly be 
considered blameworthy. 
What is apparent from the survey provided in this chapter is that 
the way in which the criminal justice system responds to those who 
put themselves in harm’s way is inconsistent, though there is perhaps 
an increasing readiness to treat such individuals unsympathetically. 
Inconsistency can perhaps be explained on two grounds. The first is 
that there can be legitimate disagreement about whether prior conduct 
mitigates or aggravates a subsequent offence. Uniformity of approach 
avoids inconsistent outcomes (theoretically) but it masks the debate 
by categorising crudely. Retaining discretion also tends to mask the 
debate as judges are free within reason to apply the law in what they 
see as a fair manner. The second explanation for inconsistency is that 
policy is driven not just with reference to blame. Our review is limited 
as a result as we cannot know the extent to which blame is central, 
marginal or irrelevant to policy in practice. This is true even where it 
is a stated justification. 
The final claim made in this chapter is that, whatever the motive, 
there is evidence to suggest that there is an increasing trend among 
legislators and judges to treat decisions to put oneself in harm’s way as 
an aggravating factor. Obvious examples include the way in which the 
courts in England and Wales have extended the concept of associating 
with criminals to encompass drug users and the decision taken by the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council to treat intoxication as an aggravating 
factor. Indeed, none of the scenarios that were considered in this 
chapter showed any signs, in any jurisdiction, of greater leniency. This 
conclusion supports one of the book’s broader conclusions, namely 
that blame is increasingly being used to justify reactive criminal justice 
interventions. The next chapter addresses this theme.
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criminalisation
The growth of blame culture and the need for scapegoats
We live in a world that is said to be full of risk, danger 
and threat. Every day, a new social issue emerges to assail 
our sensibilities, often accompanied by the cry: What’s to 
be done? Who’s to blame? On each occasion, there is an 
assumption that things are getting worse: that our society, 
communities and very lives are becoming more risky and 
more dangerous. In the 1980s and 1990s, panics focused 
on issues such as dangerous dogs, mugging, video games, 
satanic abuse and child sexual abuse. More recently, they 
have centred on elder abuse, people trafficking, the internet 
and welfare scroungers. In the midst of this, claims of 
historical sexual and physical abuse have taken centre-stage. 
(Cree et al, 2014)
In September 2013 the findings of two Serious Case Reviews were 
published. Serious Case Reviews are undertaken by Local Safeguarding 
Children Boards in cases where a child has died or suffered serious 
harm as a result of suspected abuse or neglect. They are governed by 
the Local Safeguarding Children Boards Regulations 2006 made by 
the Secretary of State under the provisions of the Children Act 2004. 
The stated purpose of such reviews is to ascertain what lessons can be 
learned to inform future practice of all those with responsibility for 
safeguarding children. Inevitably, however, the reports, and others like 
them, are often seen more as an official attempt to find scapegoats and 
allocate blame. On 9 January 2011 two-year-old Keanu Williams died 
in Birmingham as a result of multiple injuries arising from separate 
incidents. In June 2013 Keanu’s mother was convicted of his murder 
and her partner was convicted on charges of child cruelty (Birmingham 
Safeguarding Children Board, 2013). On 3 March 2012 four-year-old 
Daniel Pelka died in Coventry as a result of persistent abuse and neglect. 
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On 31 July 2013 Daniel’s mother and stepfather were convicted of his 
murder (Coventry Safeguarding Children Board, 2013).
The Birmingham Safeguarding Children Board review was reported 
by the Daily Mail with the headline: ‘The four missed chances to save 
Keanu: How social services failed two-year-old boy beaten to death 
by his mother as it’s revealed even SHE was surprised he wasn’t taken 
into care’ (Daily Mail, 3 October 2013). The Guardian’s headline was 
slightly more measured: ‘Professionals failed to prevent toddler Keanu 
Williams’ death, report finds’ (Guardian, 3 October 2013). Similarly, 
the headlines announcing the Coventry review read: ‘Everyone to 
blame but no one punished: Teachers, doctors, the police and social 
workers escape justice after missing 27 chances to save tragic Daniel 
Pelka’ (Daily Mail, 17 September 2013). Although the review into 
child protection commissioned by the Department for Education and 
undertaken by Professor Munro (DfE, 2011) stressed the need to value 
professional expertise and hinted at learning more and blaming less, 
the focus continues to be on blame and scapegoating.
It is clearly vitally important that we do learn from tragedies and 
disasters to try to prevent them occurring in the future. Professor Munro 
was right to stress the need to create and develop a learning system, 
although, in practice, inquiries such as the Serious Case Reviews often 
do little more than feed a blame culture. According to the Guardian 
(8 October 2013) there are about four such reviews published each 
week. With the length of the average review being in the region of 
500 pages, reading the full report becomes a practical impossibility and 
it becomes inevitable that the focus is on the headlines. The current 
situation is neatly summed up by Ray Jones in the Guardian:
Of course it is crucial to review locally what happened 
when something awful occurs and to take necessary actions. 
But I cannot imagine what new general learning will 
come from more and more serious case reviews. Instead 
they have become a tool for apportioning and allocating 
accountability. This is now explicit in the government’s 
description of them. They feed the blame culture. They are 
also costly and a major distraction from focusing on current 
practice as resources and management attention are heavily 
deployed. (Guardian, 8 October 2013)
Between July 1963 and October 1965 five children between the ages 
of 10 and 17 were murdered. At least four of them had been sexually 
assaulted before they were killed. In 1966 Ian Brady and Myra Hindley 
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were convicted of their murders and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
There were no public inquiries, no investigations into why the police 
had taken so long to discover and investigate the earlier murders, there 
was no effort to spread the blame wider than the two individuals who 
had carried out the killings. It is difficult to imagine the same reaction 
today. The desire to minimise risk, to prevent such things happening 
again seems to lead inexorably to a search for scapegoats. 
The reaction to the publication of allegations against Jimmy Savile in 
October 2012 is indicative of the modern preoccupation with blame. 
Following the broadcast of a television documentary, Exposure: the 
other side of Jimmy Savile, by ITV on 3 October 2012 the Association 
of Chief Police Officers requested that the Metropolitan Police Service 
(MPS) assess the claims made in the programme. On 9 October 2012 
the MPS announced that the investigation would be entitled Operation 
Yewtree and would be carried out in association with the NSPCC and 
the National Association for People Abused in Childhood. In January 
2013 ‘Giving Victims a Voice’, a joint MPS and NSPCC report into 
allegations of sexual abuse made against Jimmy Savile under Operation 
Yewtree was published (NSPCC, 2013). Jimmy Savile had died in 
October 2011 so there was no possibility of criminal proceedings against 
him. This lack of criminal proceedings was part of the justification for 
the publication of the report. Operation Yewtree had a wider remit 
than simply investigating allegation made against Jimmy Savile. It 
consisted of three strands:
The first strand is offences believed to have been committed 
by Jimmy Savile on his own; the second is where victims 
have said there were other people around Savile who they 
believe were involved in offending; the third strand involves 
accounts from people who have come forward as a result 
of the publicity about Jimmy Savile but who have said they 
were sexually assaulted by people unconnected to him. 
(NSPCC, 2013, para 2.2)
As with Serious Case Reviews, Operation Yewtree was keen to learn 
lessons for the future: ‘By drawing on the experiences of victims we 
can begin to explore how police and other bodies can learn to be more 
effective in the resolution and prevention of serious crime relating to 
predatory abusive behaviour’ (para 3.5).
Yet blame remains central to the investigations and publicity 
surrounding the allegations: 
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Central to the many questions being posed by both his 
victims and others are why did it happen and why was it 
not noticed and stopped by police, health, education or 
social services professionals, people at the BBC or other 
media, parents or carers, politicians or even ‘society in 
general’? (para 3.6)
As was discussed in Chapter One, modern society increasingly seems 
perturbed by seemingly uncontrolled events and this apparent lack of 
control leads to a desire for blame: we couldn’t prevent it – it must be 
somebody’s fault! As a result of Operation Yewtree more than 10 public 
figures have been investigated by the police in relation to allegations 
of sexual abuse. Of course it is right that allegations of abuse are 
properly investigated and that criminal proceedings are taken against 
those directly responsible. Yet the search for scapegoats goes beyond 
those who are directly responsible to include the BBC, a number of 
care homes, schools and NHS institutions. 
From civil liability to criminal liability
An allied trend is that, when a supposedly blameworthy party is 
identified, justice is seen increasingly to demand punishment in the 
criminal courts rather than recompense in the civil courts. It is difficult 
to establish whether this is a gradual on-going process where less 
tolerance is shown over a lengthy timeframe, possibly due to a realisation 
that the existing process fails to deliver on expectations, or whether 
this exasperation with civil remedies is a more recent development. If 
there is a perception that civil remedies are inadequate, one needs to 
question why as well as attempt to explain why punishment is seen 
as necessary. One concern may be that a reliance on the civil law has 
failed to prevent harm from occurring as its focus is on remedying 
damage that has already been caused. The threat of punishment by 
way of contrast might deter people from engaging in conduct which 
could be harmful. The public have an enduring faith that deterrence 
does lead to a modification of behaviour, a conclusion that is not borne 
out by the extensive empirical literature in this area (Von Hirsch et al, 
1999). The disjuncture between the intuitive logic of deterrence and 
the reality can probably be explained on the basis that individuals have 
limited knowledge of the likely consequences of breaking the law and 
fail to act with the rationality that is often supposed.
Another justification for adopting the criminal justice system 
would be that punishment is necessary to reflect the individual’s 
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blameworthiness. Unlike the recourse to deterrence, this is not an 
argument based on the avoidance of future harm but is essentially 
a retributive claim. Proportionality is usually used by penologists to 
quantify the punishment that an offender deserves. It could also be used 
more widely to gauge which forms of blameworthy conduct should 
result in criminal rather than civil liability. Evidently, there are recent 
examples of very serious conduct which escapes criminal censure while 
other obviously more trivial varieties do not. Some of the behaviours 
which have become criminalised are serious, most notably corporate 
manslaughter; in these cases using criminal rather than civil processes 
could perhaps be viewed as a welcome redressing of the balance. There 
is, however, no overall coherence to the behaviours that have been 
criminalised in recent years. Some conduct, in particular anti-social 
behaviour, appears comparatively minor. The trend then has been 
general and has encompassed areas that probably should have been 
criminalised in the past as well as behaviour previously seen as too 
trivial or otherwise undeserving of criminal liability.
The political background is crucial to understanding this trend as 
it reached its zenith during the period of office of the last Labour 
government (1997–2010). Tony Blair, who held the Shadow Home 
Affairs brief prior to becoming party leader, recognised that the party’s 
previous criminal justice policies had been perceived as unduly lenient 
and had become an electoral liability. He also saw that those living 
in disadvantaged communities were disproportionately affected by 
crime and that Labour had failed to grasp the significance of this to its 
traditional core support. A radical change occurred in the mid-1990s 
when Labour started to challenge the Conservative government’s record 
and proposals on the basis that they were insufficiently severe rather than 
overtly punitive and regressive. Despite vocal debate, there was in fact 
a tacit agreement that greater use of the criminal law in combination 
with increased penalties was necessary. This stance was intriguing as it 
came at a time when crime rates were falling, but it can be understood 
when one considers the respective positions of the two major parties: 
Labour, in essence, were trying to plug a perceived weakness while the 
Conservatives, conscious that electoral support was fast evaporating, 
sought to cling on to their advantage in a vital area of policy. After 
Labour won the 1997 election they were true to their mantra that they 
would be ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’. It is well 
known that sentences increased and the prison population expanded 
massively during Labour’s period in office. Less attention has been 
given to the way in which the government created a vast number of 
new offences, helped in part by the size of their parliamentary majority. 
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For a supposedly progressive party, Labour presided over a period of 
sustained and substantial expansion to the criminal law. 
Labour’s agenda, though, was more ambitious as it sought to tackle 
not only crime but anti-social behaviour which also tends to affect the 
disadvantaged disproportionately. There is no doubt that to those on 
the receiving end of such conduct the distinction between criminal 
and lawful behaviour is academic. Yet there was no evidence to suggest 
that there had been a surge in anti-social behaviour nor was there an 
obvious popular outcry for new legal powers. (Although there may 
well have been support for greater enforcement of minor offences that 
affect quality of life.) Conceptually, however, anti-social behaviour 
encompasses a broad range of activity, much of which is lawful. The 
challenge for policy makers was how to regulate lawful conduct which 
had an adverse impact on others.
A novel legal structure was devised which created a hybrid of 
civil and criminal law: a civil order would be issued prohibiting the 
individual from engaging in specified behaviours and an offence 
would be committed if the recipient breached the terms of the order. 
Research has shown that the vast majority of applications for Anti-
Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) are granted, but there is marked 
geographical disparity in their use. The fact that the bulk of applications 
are successful might suggest that only worthy cases, supported by 
compelling evidence, are pursued, but an alternative possibility is that 
the courts are lax in challenging the cases brought. If applications tend 
to succeed, the longer-term benefit appears marginal as the majority 
of ASBOs are breached with the consequence that the individual is 
liable for punishment and possibly imprisonment. The rate of non-
compliance shows that ASBOs fail to deter those minded to act in 
an anti-social manner, indeed there are anecdotal claims that some 
view an ASBO as a badge of honour. In March 2014 the Anti-Social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act received the Royal Assent. The Act 
abolishes ASBOs, the coalition government partly justifying abolition 
on the grounds of the rate of non-compliance, but replaces them with 
‘injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance’. 
For once, the media criticism did not contend that ASBOs were 
insufficiently severe, instead they were portrayed as faintly ludicrous; 
stories about pensioners receiving ASBOs for swearing and neighbours 
being issued with ASBOs for failing to prevent livestock entering 
adjoining gardens were reported. Cases of this sort did arise very 
infrequently but the missed story related not to the atypical but to 
the typical. Research by Koffman (2006b) found that ASBOs were 
most commonly issued for behaviour that was criminal suggesting that 
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ASBOs were being used as an alternative to prosecution, a strategy 
which carried an attraction for the authorities as the standard of proof 
for an ASBO is lower than that for a criminal conviction. Given the 
fact that the conduct which usually attracts an ASBO is criminal, there 
is an argument that the process could usefully be viewed as a form of 
pre-trial diversion (see, further, Chapter Two) and many of the concerns 
about the lack of due process safeguards commonly associated with 
diversionary strategies apply here.
The criminalisation of anti-social behaviour is unusual for a number 
of reasons. First, although many suffer from this conduct the problem 
was not getting appreciably worse. Second, neither the public nor the 
media demanded criminalisation; if anything, the media ridiculed the 
response by publicising absurd cases. Third, the impetus came from 
a supposedly progressive government who wanted to demonstrate a 
resolute and punitive response to minor deviancy. The government 
cannot be faulted for recognising the plight of those faced with anti-
social behaviour but failed to appreciate that there was no popular 
appetite for ASBOs. Finally, the legal structure was novel in that it 
combined elements of civil and criminal law. The offence, speaking 
strictly, related not to the anti-social behaviour but to the breach of the 
civil order. Yet what emerged was that this system was often employed 
as an alternative not only to the civil procedure (as intended) but, 
more frequently, as an alternative to the criminal procedure. Reducing 
the standard of proof meant that ASBOs were easier to secure than 
convictions, so the net widened to capture not only those originally 
envisaged (the serially anti-social), but those whose allegedly criminal 
conduct would not ordinarily have resulted in conviction.
Death caused by corporations may appear to represent a very different 
harm to anti-social behaviour, but there are surprising similarities. The 
first is that this was far from a novel problem and, while there were 
a number of high-profile incidents which cost lives, earlier tragedies 
were often ‘resolved’ successfully in the civil courts. Litigation was 
often pursued in tandem with an official enquiry which sought to 
identify blame so that lessons could be learnt which would improve 
safety in the future. A second similarity is that, with the exception of 
some immediate victims, the public did not demand that company 
directors or employees should be punished when a death occurred. 
Media support was also limited. Finally, experience had demonstrated 
that there were both conceptual and practical problems associated 
with criminalising corporate (mis)conduct. The most fundamental 
of which was who should be held criminally liable if a death arose? 
Often this would be far from obvious given the size and complexity 
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of many companies: an individual employee, for example, may have 
failed to maintain a section of railway line, but if he was inadequately 
supervised and over-stretched it would appear harsh to hold him wholly 
or possibly even partially to blame in a criminal court. There is also 
the question of how a corporation should be punished. Would it be 
appropriate to imprison those who are identified as having been at fault? 
In the example above, should that include the individual who failed 
to provide adequate resources and supervision? Problems remain if a 
financial penalty is seen as more acceptable. Consumers, employees and 
shareholders could suffer if a company is forced to raise the necessary 
funds even though they bear no responsibility for the death. Moreover, 
once a decision has been taken to criminalise corporate manslaughter, 
the imposition of a fine seems an inadequate response given the harm 
caused and leads to an impression that homicide in this context is far 
less serious than is ordinarily the case. If the punishment is perceived as 
unduly lenient, there is a danger that criminalisation will paradoxically 
trivialise the harm in the eyes of victims, although there is the real 
possibility of scapegoating if lengthy prison terms are imposed.
Prior to the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
2007 coming into force on 6 April 2008, corporate entities could be 
prosecuted for a range of criminal offences including gross negligence 
manslaughter (see Chapter Four). Yet it was difficult to convict 
corporations as it had to be proved that a senior individual who could 
be seen as a ‘controlling mind’ or embodying the company was guilty 
of the offence. The new Act allows conviction if it can be shown that 
there was a gross breach of a duty of care by ‘senior management’ 
rather than by one individual. Although the offence refers to ‘senior 
management’, it is important to stress that the offence is concerned 
with corporate liability and does not apply to senior personnel within 
the organisation. Individuals, though, can still be charged with gross 
negligence manslaughter in appropriate cases. The penalties that can be 
imposed include unlimited fines, remedial orders and publicity orders.
This Act supplements gross negligence manslaughter, an offence 
discussed in Chapter Four. It may be recalled that this offence may be 
difficult to reconcile with the notion that only the blameworthy should 
be punished. A distinction was drawn between those acting in such 
a fashion and those who engage in harmful behaviour intentionally 
or recklessly (in the subjective sense). The objection raised was 
that although the individual may have been factually to blame for 
the victim’s death it is debatable whether he was morally to blame 
if incompetence – even if extreme – led to the death. Corporate 
manslaughter also requires a gross breach of a duty of care, but here 
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it is suggested that this is less objectionable. Corporate liability is 
distinctive from individual criminal liability in terms of the impact of 
a conviction. Both a company and an individual may face stigma (and 
anyone associated with the company may do so vicariously) but the 
punishment is far more significant for an individual who will likely 
face a lengthy custodial term rather than a financial penalty.
Despite this, is criminalisation warranted? If the hope was that 
corporations would take greater steps to maintain safety the deterrent 
effect of the offence is impossible to measure. There have only been 
a limited number of successful prosecutions which suggests that the 
impact will be marginal. That said, there is an argument that could 
be made that organisations may behave in a more rational way than 
individuals and so the threat of prosecution may lead to operational 
change. Victims may feel that justice would be better served if 
individuals were prosecuted, and, if convicted, punished, rather than 
corporations fined. Criminalisation in itself may not satiate demands 
for justice. It may intensify calls for greater punitiveness.
Criminalising behaviours that cause society harm is attractive 
politically due to its symbolic effect. In both the cases above the 
government were effectively seen to side with the law-abiding and 
powerless against the anti-social and dangerous corporations. There 
is also little political mileage in challenging such legislation as that 
could be seen as showing sympathy to the perpetrators. By pitting 
the responsible against the irresponsible in this way the government 
glossed over the fact that such a binary distinction is too simplistic. 
People view certain types of behaviour differently, so classifying some 
people as anti-social is arbitrary. So too is a determination that there 
was a gross breach of a duty of care by senior management. Yet the 
drive to criminalise was symptomatic of Labour’s desire to control what 
it saw as deviant behaviour. The creation of a myriad of diverse new 
offences, measured in the thousands, has to be viewed alongside more 
invasive methods of responding to crime, particularly with regards to 
juvenile justice.
The approach was also crude. Whereas there should have been 
meaningful debate about whether it was appropriate to create an 
offence in any particular context it appears that criminalisation was 
practically the default position. The first explanation for this is political. 
Labour, particularly during its initial term, enjoyed a substantial 
parliamentary majority which limited the constraints on the executive. 
Opposition from the Conservatives was also muted as the party did 
not want to be seen as being on the wrong side of the debate. It was 
crucial to the Conservative’s attempt to rebuild support that they did 
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not cede ground on Law and Order which meant that the government 
could legislate in the knowledge that the Opposition would be unlikely 
to challenge the need for new offences. The effect of the unedifying 
appeal to popular punitiveness was that both parties became embroiled 
in a futile race that neither would win as it is always possible to devise 
a solution more draconian than your opponent’s. Given their sizeable 
parliamentary advantage, Labour did not need to get drawn into this 
battle, but clearly they did not want to squander their majority by 
failing in their pledge to be tough on crime. There was also conviction 
behind Labour’s position. According to Blair’s memoirs:
[Fighting] crime was a personal cause, it completely fitted a 
new politics beyond old right and left, and since no Labour 
person had ever made anything of it…the field was mine to 
play on. For once I was very confident of what I could do. 
And I was correct…I took a traditional Labour position, 
modernised it, made it popular and upended the Tories 
with it. (2010, 55)
Modesty aside, Blair’s quote is telling as is displays a naive belief about 
the potency of the criminal law. It should not be forgotten that Labour 
also promised to be ‘tough on the causes of crime’, and valuable work 
was done to this end, but it would appear that the party’s policy was 
a mixture of the opportunist and the simplistic. Of course, there is 
no reason why a democratically elected government should require 
an evidence base to determine social policy but the lack of debate 
and reflection on the expansion of the criminal law has significant 
implications. 
The first is that any expansion of the criminal law increases the 
demands made on the criminal justice system unless there is a 
simultaneous process of decriminalising existing offences. Although 
some activities have been decriminalised in the past 20 years, 
these represent a fraction of the offences which have been created. 
Enforcement will suffer unless considerably more resources are made 
available to the relevant agencies; in fact budgets have been cut due to 
the coalition government’s deficit reduction policy. This means that 
a criminal justice system which is already highly selective in the cases 
that are investigated and prosecuted will become more so. The threat 
that selectivity will lead to discrimination against marginalised groups 
therefore increases. 
Second, previously law abiding citizens could experience the 
criminal justice system as offenders. There are obvious normative 
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questions which we have addressed throughout this book about 
whether those who engage in particular activities are sufficiently 
blameworthy to deserve punishment. This is assumed too readily but 
needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis. There are, however, 
other implications for those convicted of a criminal offence. In some 
situations disclosure of a conviction may result in loss of employment 
or employment opportunities. More generally, however, it could be 
argued that the stigma associated with having been found guilty of an 
offence labels an individual in a way which may increase rather than 
decrease the likelihood of future criminality. This argument rests on 
the idea that the process of labelling reaffirms the individual’s status as 
a deviant which makes it more difficult to reintegrate him or her back 
into society. Support for this thesis can be found in statistics which 
show routinely that the majority of those convicted of an offence re-
offend within a short space of time. The effects of labelling may also 
explain why deterrence is hard to achieve.
A linked point is that if individuals suddenly find themselves being 
viewed with a different status by law enforcement agencies their 
overall perceptions of the criminal justice system may become more 
antagonistic. Speeding, unlike most forms of criminal activity, has the 
potential to kill, but, because of motorists complaining that ‘they were 
being treated like a criminal’, policing strategies have changed. The 
point here is that the resentment is unlikely to be channelled towards 
politicians but to those charged with enforcing the law. One could 
hardly blame the police for treading carefully if they know that the 
public will perceive their actions as heavy-handed but this could have 
the unfortunate effect of targeting police resources to crimes that are 
committed disproportionately by the disadvantaged in society.
Third, it is difficult to see how the rapid expansion of the criminal 
law facilitates progressive responses to criminal behaviour because it 
fosters a punitive environment. Conduct is criminalised so that it can 
be punished, despite the likely consequences outlined above. There are 
those, however, who argue that, although it is sensible to criminalise 
some behaviours, punishment is a brutal, degrading and inefficient 
response. Restorative justice in various guises has been offered as one 
possible alternative by penal theorists but, as this seeks to reintegrate 
the offender back into society in a way which respects his or her 
identity, it would be impossible to implement when a programme 
of rapid criminalisation was justified on the basis of a perceived need 
for punishment. It would appear illogical to increase the number of 
offences while at the same time raising concerns about the limitations 
of punishment. This might explain why the Green Party is the only 
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British political party which openly advances a policy of restorative 
justice and decarceration (Green Party, 2010, 24).
Finally, those who would have traditionally pursued a civil action 
may have been better served in that forum. It is an easy claim to make 
that victims want someone to be punished for their actions but what 
is sought is likely to be highly individualistic. Victims can easily be 
appropriated by those advocating criminalisation whether that is a lobby 
group or a political party. There is an associated danger that the state 
takes ownership of the dispute, leading victims to feel marginalised 
by the process. Although reparation is possible in the context of the 
criminal justice process, prosecution is brought in the name of the 
Crown and punishment is seen as a mechanism for repaying a debt to 
society. It is a matter of luck whether victims feel that the punishment 
imposed adequately reflects the harm that they suffered. Testifying at 
a criminal trial can also be a bruising experience for victims as the 
veracity of their testimony is subjected to searching cross-examination. 
A civil case may still entail confrontation but settlement out of court 
is common and, if the case does go to court, success is more likely 
because the standard of proof is lower in civil than in criminal cases. 
From human rights to the International Criminal Court
In May 1915, following reports that Ottoman forces were engaged in 
the massacre of the Armenian population, the governments of Britain, 
France and Russia communicated the following message to the Grand 
Vizier in Istanbul: 
In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and 
civilization, the allied Governments announce publicly to 
the Sublime Porte that they will hold personally responsible 
[for] these crimes all members of the Ottoman Government 
and those of their agents who are implicated in such 
massacres. (Cited in Schabas, 2012, 6)
The allied announcement represents the first attempt in the modern era 
to impose criminal responsibility for crimes against international law. 
At the end of the First World War the Treaty of Sevres was signed by 
the allies and Turkey. Under article 230 Turkey agreed to hand over to 
the allied powers those responsible for the massacres committed during 
the war. Furthermore, Turkey undertook to recognise an international 
tribunal established by the League of Nations (should it prove possible 
to do so) established for the purpose of trying such offences. No such 
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tribunal was established and the government of the new Republic of 
Turkey never ratified the Treaty of Sevres. The vast majority of those 
responsible for the Armenian massacres went unpunished.
The Paris Peace Conference at the end of the First World War had 
been particularly concerned about how to deal with alleged breaches 
of the law and customs of war. In January 1919 a Commission on the 
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement 
of Penalties was established. One of the matters it was required to 
investigate was the establishment of an appropriate tribunal to hear 
allegations of war crimes. The Commission recognised the fact that 
states individually could legitimately try individuals for war crimes 
but that an international tribunal was essential for the trial of certain 
offences: for example, atrocities in prison camps containing prisoners of 
war of more than one nationality; charges against persons of authority 
whose orders affected more than one nationality or operations against 
the armies of more than one of the Allies, and charges against the major 
enemy authorities and against any other persons whom it might not 
be desirable to try in any national court.
Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles, concluded between the allied 
powers and Germany, proposed the establishment of a special tribunal 
for the trial of the former German Emperor. Again, no tribunal 
was established and Kaiser Wilhelm was able to gain asylum in the 
Netherlands. 
The lack of successful prosecution of those accused of atrocities 
during the First World War led to a number of calls for the establishment 
of an international criminal tribunal. There was some concern that 
ad hoc tribunals established after the event were susceptible to claims 
that they were merely carrying out ‘victor’s justice’. A permanently 
established court would have greater legitimacy by appearing to 
be more genuinely independent. An international criminal court 
would also complement the newly established Permanent Court 
of International Justice (forerunner of the International Court of 
Justice) which had jurisdiction over disputes arising between states. 
During the 1920s and 1930s a number of organisations, including the 
Advisory Committee of Jurists established by the League of Nations 
and the International Law Association, called for the establishment of 
an international criminal court. Efforts to make such a court a reality 
were increased as the international situation became more unstable 
during the 1930s.
In October 1934 King Alexander I of Yugoslavia was assassinated 
in France. The suspects fled to Italy and attempts at extradition were 
unsuccessful. Three months earlier the Austrian Chancellor had been 
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assassinated and an attempt had been made on the life of the Romanian 
prime minister. In response to growing concerns the League of Nations 
established an expert Committee for the International Repression of 
Terrorism (CIRT). The resolution which established the Committee 
noted that ‘the rules of international law concerning the repression 
of terrorist activity are not at present sufficiently precise to guarantee 
efficiently international co-operation’ (League of Nations, 1934, 
1760). The Committee was charged with producing an international 
treaty to repress ‘conspiracies or crimes committed with a political 
and terrorist purpose’ (League of Nations, 1934, 1760), although 
the League provided no definition of terrorism. An International 
Conference on the Repression of Terrorism was held in Geneva in 
November 1937. Two treaties were signed at the end of the conference: 
the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 1937 
and the Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal 
Court 1937. Terrorism was defined as ‘acts directed against a State 
and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of 
particular persons, or groups of persons or the general public’. In the 
event neither proposed treaty gained sufficiently widespread support. 
Twenty states signed the Terrorism Convention and out of those, 10 
signed the Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal 
Court. Neither convention received sufficient ratifications to enter 
into force. 
Within 10 years an international tribunal was established. The 
establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
represented the first genuine attempt to hold the perpetrators of 
crimes against international law individually responsible. In 1950 the 
International Law Commission adopted the Principles of International 
Law Recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the 
Judgment of the Tribunal. Principle I provides that:
Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime 
under international law is responsible therefor and liable 
to punishment.
Principle VI identifies the crimes as crimes against peace, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. In January 1951 the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 (Genocide 
Convention) entered into force. The Genocide Convention confirms 
genocide as a crime under international law and requires states party 
to the treaty to undertake to punish the offence within their national 
jurisdictions. In 1948 the United Nations General Assembly voted 
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in favour of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 
represented:
[A] common standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations, to the end that every individual and every organ 
of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, 
shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect 
for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, 
national and international, to secure their universal and 
effective recognition and observance, both among the 
peoples of Member States themselves and among the 
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. (Preamble)
Following the adoption of the UDHRm work started to convert the 
Declaration into legally binding treaty law. The result of the work 
was the two International Covenants: the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1976 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1976. 
The period between 1945 and 1990 saw considerable development 
of international human rights law but little if any enforcement of 
international criminal law. The collapse of the Soviet Union and events 
in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda at the beginning of the 1990s 
saw a renewed focus on international criminal law and individual 
responsibility. In Yugoslavia a series of political and economic crises led 
to the formal dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
in 1992. Hostilities in Slovenia were followed by outbreaks of far more 
serious violence in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Increasing reports 
of massacres, rapes and torture led the United Nations to appoint a 
Commission of Experts to investigate the situation. The Commission’s 
Report detailed grave breaches of international humanitarian law and 
led the United Nations Security Council on 25 May 1993 to pass 
resolution 827 which formally established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Since that time 161 
individuals have been indicted for serious breaches of international 
humanitarian law. Out of 141 cases concluded, 74 resulted in conviction 
and sentence. 
In response to reports of atrocities occurring in Rwanda, the UN 
Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) by resolution 955 of 8 November 1994. The 
ICTR was established for the prosecution of persons responsible for 
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of Rwanda between 1 January 1994 and 31 
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December 1994. It also has jurisdiction to deal with the prosecution of 
Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations 
of international law committed in the territory of neighbouring States 
during the same period. The ICTR has dealt with 75 cases, 63 of which 
resulted in conviction although 16 of those are still pending appeal.
The establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
appeared to give renewed impetus to attempts to create a permanent 
international criminal court. In 1998 the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) was signed in Rome and the ICC came into 
effect in 2002 after the Statute had received the necessary number 
of ratifications. The ICC has jurisdiction to hear cases involving 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of 
aggression. Under the terms of the Rome Statute the ICC prosecutor 
can initiate an investigation on the basis of a referral from any state 
party to the Statute or from the United Nations Security Council. The 
ICC is currently investigating situations in Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and Mali (all 
parties to the Statute) and Darfur, and Libya – both non-States Parties. 
After a thorough analysis of available information, the Prosecutor has 
opened and is conducting investigations in all of the above-mentioned 
situations.
Although it is rarely specifically mentioned, we would suggest that an 
understanding of blame is key to the relationship between international 
human rights law and international criminal law. Arguably both are 
underpinned by a desire to make the world a better, more secure place. 
The preamble to the United Nations Charter provides:
We the peoples of the United Nations determined
• to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which 
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
• to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women 
and of nations large and small, and
• to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the 
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international 
law can be maintained, and
• to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom.
Protecting human rights and the dignity and worth of the human 
person is an underlying purpose of criminal law as much as it is the 
focus of human rights law. Yet the focus of the two systems of law 
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is different. Criminal law tends to be directed towards individuals by 
imposing individual criminal responsibility. That is reflected in the 
often quoted statement from the Nuremberg Tribunal:
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not 
by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 
be enforced. (International Military Tribunal, 1947, 223)
International criminal law is about allocating criminal responsibility, 
blame, to individuals. Human rights law focuses on the wider society 
and the state. As we have seen elsewhere in the book, allocating blame 
can be comforting, as by blaming the few we can exonerate the many 
(including ourselves). As we saw in Chapter Five, atrocities occur in a 
particular context. Putting those directly responsible for them on trial 
may satisfy an immediate desire for ‘justice’, yet it does little to prevent 
similar events happening elsewhere in future. The focus on blame leads, 
we argue, to an increasing criminalisation at the international, as much 
as the national, level. The danger is that the emphasis on criminalisation 





Using blame as a means for evaluating the criminal justice system has 
proved fruitful, even if the picture that emerges defies easy summary. 
Blamestorming reminds us that the allocation of blame is a process, 
as is the criminal justice system. In both processes it would be hoped 
that the attribution of liability is subject to careful reflection in the 
knowledge that a finding of culpability is profound in terms of stigma 
and often in other material respects. The reality, though, can be 
very different. Blamestorming can be haphazard, instinctive and can 
lead to scapegoating. At the same time, the supposed due process 
safeguards embedded in the criminal justice system which are designed 
deliberately to protect the innocent have often been marginalised by 
crime control priorities. The crime control model does not set out 
to convict the innocent, but it should be obvious that, by relaxing 
the impediments to convicting the guilty, one heightens the risk of 
convicting the innocent. Viewing the criminal justice process as an 
exercise in blamestorming removes much of the legal mystique and 
exposes what is in essence a system designed to attribute responsibility. 
There may be rules which specify how the exercise is to take place 
(and these depend in part on time, place and culture) but discretion 
and subjective assessments are rife. 
Blamestorming operates throughout the process. Law makers 
responding to perceived harms may consider culpability, perhaps 
drawing on media and popular assessments. If an offence is created, 
law enforcement officers become engaged in a blamestorming 
exercise every time they are faced with an incident. Many policing 
decisions such as who to stop, who to search, who to arrest and who 
to charge, are influenced by this type of calculation. Prosecutorial 
agencies facing decisions about bringing charges will also review the 
evidence to see whether the individual could be held blameworthy. It 
is at trial that blamestorming becomes most overt as the prosecution 
and defence present alternative accounts which test the defendant’s 
culpability. Finally, sentencing involves a further exercise in quantifying 
the seriousness of the offence which requires a consideration of the 
offender’s culpability. In sum, determinations of blame dictate all key 
stages of the criminal process.
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There is, though, a surreptitious danger with blamestorming: the 
process starts from an assumption that someone is to blame for an 
incident and then seeks to find out who that person is, but often 
no one is directly responsible and so the search for an individual to 
hold to account is no more than an exercise in scapegoating. There 
is a difference between blamestorming in the knowledge that no 
one is personally culpable and blamestorming in the knowledge that 
identifying the culprit will be difficult. The former represents a cynical 
abuse of power and is a clear case of scapegoating while the latter carries 
the possibility, however remote, of finding a blameworthy person. Many 
police investigations carry little chance of success but that does not 
mean that they should be abandoned. In the criminal justice sphere, 
with the threat of punishment, proceeding with the knowledge that no 
one is to blame is morally repugnant even though the authorities can 
face horrendous pressure to act when a major incident occurs. Acting 
when identification will be difficult is perfectly justifiable provided 
adequate safeguards exist to stop wrongful convictions. As society 
seems ever more willing to criminalise behaviour and demonstrates a 
greater readiness to assign blame, it is concerning that the government 
continues to reduce the protection afforded to those who have been 
arrested or who face trial.
In this final chapter, we expand on some of the most important themes 
that emerged from the work, drawing together some central themes 
about how blame can inform a criminological analysis of the criminal 
justice system. It is our belief that our focus on blame has exposed 
some novel issues worthy of further criminological consideration 
and has provided some original insights on more enduring concerns. 
Blamestorming is a process but it is not, nor can it be, a value-neutral 
process. The chapter concludes with some thoughts about how blame 
may not only inform an understanding of contemporary criminal 
justice but can be used as a basis for creating a more progressive and 
humane response to harmful behaviour.
Defining blame
Mary Douglas (1992), suggested a society without blame is not 
possible. She associates blame with a human need to seek explanations 
for situations. If someone dies, we need to know why they died. In 
earlier societies it was sufficient to explain the death in terms of the 
supernatural: ‘she died because she has offended the ancestors, she 
had broken a taboo, she had sinned’ (p 4). The belief that we have 
ever increasing control over our own lives and destinies has led to a 
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rejection of such explanations and a focus on causes and explanations 
closer to home. This search for explanations has led to the emergence 
of blamestorming. Increasingly, society wants to know why harm 
occurred; why more was not done to prevent the harm occurring; 
what assurances can be provided that the harm will not occur in 
the future. Ultimately, death cannot be prevented yet the increasing 
desire to apportion blame could sometimes be seen as a denial of this 
fundamental fact.
In this book we have taken a broad view of blame. We have suggested 
that there is no practical difference between blame and culpability and 
have demonstrated the close links both have with responsibility and 
accountability. Blame is an evaluative response but it is not simply an 
objective evaluation, it is connected to desire, emotion, expectation 
and disposition. We accept the view that the blamer is doing more 
than simply making an objective entry on some form of moral ledger. 
Blame is linked to resentment but it is a distinctive emotional response. 
We would support Sher’s view that ‘[Blame] is a stance or attitude that 
a person takes toward himself or another on the basis of a judgment 
that that person has in some way failed to conform to some moral 
standard’ (Sher, 2006, 7) and further ‘To blame someone…is to have 
certain affective and behavioural dispositions, each of which can be 
traced to the combination of a belief that that person has acted badly 
or has a bad character and a desire that this not be the case’ (p 115). It 
is clear that to blame someone is to think less of them.
Typically, blame is seen as backward looking and responsive: blame 
relates to events that have already occurred. Yet there is also a future 
dimension to blame. Kathleen McGraw’s study (McGraw, 1991) of 
the blame management strategies of elected public officials focuses 
on how officials seek to maximise praise and minimise blame through 
the use of accounts or explanations. McGraw argues that officials 
manage public perceptions through the use of accounts or explanations. 
McGraw found that while accounts which conveyed positive character 
information about events could minimise blame, poor accounts could 
actually increase the amount of blame. For McGraw, ‘It is clear that 
blame entails much more than attribution of responsibility for a past 
event but also future liability for censure or punishment’ (p 1149). 
This future dimension to blame suggests that far from being a single 
objective evaluation, blaming is an ongoing process. We have seen in 
the reactions to incidents of child abuse that allocating blame to those 
directly responsible is often insufficient to halt the blaming process 
and, through inquiries and reviews, others become sucked into the 
blamestorm. Our appetite for blame demands not only the conviction 
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of the abusers, but the resignation of the Director of Social Services 
and the dismissal of social workers.
Legal determinations about blame
Although this book offers a criminological critique, this cannot be 
divorced from earlier decisions about what amounts to criminal 
behaviour. It is not simply a question, as some criminologists appear 
to think, about what conduct is defined as criminal but also a matter 
of how offences are then structured. Deciding, for example, whether 
an offence can be committed recklessly is important, but determining 
what constitutes reckless behaviour is also vital. This determination 
serves as a useful example. Unjustified risk-taking can lead to significant 
harm, so there is a moral basis for criminalising such conduct. Is it fair, 
however, to conclude that someone who did not see an obvious risk 
was acting in a reckless manner?
Where the risk appears obvious and the harm is significant, factual 
blame may be easy to find. In the leading English case of R v G [2003] 
UKHL 50 (see Chapter Four) burning paper led to damage valued at 
£1 million. Despite that, it is the case that some vulnerable people 
cannot foresee a risk for various reasons. The case in question involved 
two young boys and it was accepted that they failed to see the possibility 
that the fire would spread. The issue that faced the House of Lords 
was whether recklessness encompassed conduct which would pose an 
obvious risk to the reasonable man even though the defendant had not 
personally foreseen this. Although the House of Lords had due regard 
to earlier authorities, they were effectively engaged in a blamestorming 
exercise: would it be proper to hold the boys to account for causing 
this damage? Recognising the importance of individual culpability, the 
court held that the test for recklessness should be subjective: someone 
who did not perceive a risk should not be viewed as blameworthy 
and should not be seen to be acting recklessly as a result. What this 
demonstrates is that blamestorming can be considered and careful.
Notions of blameworthiness may help explain some decisions which 
appear to be at odds with standard notions of criminal liability. Motive 
should be irrelevant when considering whether a defendant intended 
a particular result. (The prosecution and defence may, however, 
consider motive at trial as evidence to support or disprove a claim that 
the conduct was intentional.) Yet, when highly atypical cases present 
themselves, motive is not discounted but is used to justify a conclusion 
that there was no intention. Here blamestorming may function in a 
benign fashion – it would have been outrageous if the defendants in 
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the cases discussed further in Chapter Four were held criminally liable 
– but we should not be blind to the fact that a broader perception 
of justice is taking precedence over the standard rules for establishing 
liability in these, admittedly rare, cases.
There are, however, many instances when questions of blame 
should be irrelevant to the criminal law; with strict liability offences 
the individual is liable if he or she engages in the prohibited conduct 
or fails to fulfil a duty regardless of the reason. Many strict liability 
offences are minor and of a regulatory nature so the consequences 
of conviction may not be significant. Yet the courts are prepared 
on occasion to require that an element of mens rea is read into the 
offence. Again this interpretation serves as a mechanism to protect 
those who are perceived to be blameless in situations where the law 
is unclear and where the effect of a conviction would be more than 
minimal. A somewhat artificial distinction is drawn between ‘real’ 
offences and regulatory offences. According to the courts, attention is 
given to whether stigma would follow conviction as well as the likely 
penalty. These factors recognise that society should be slow to convict 
blameless individuals of offences where the outcome, both reputational 
and punitive, is potentially profound. In this context, the courts are 
again interpreting the law in a way that protects the blameless in more 
serious offences when there is ambiguity about how an offence should 
be interpreted.
The debate surrounding strict liability offences centres on the extent 
to which it is just to punish those who lack culpability and whether 
other aims, such as the need to regulate some forms of behaviour for 
the common good, should override this concern. An allied matter is 
whether it is right to criminalise incompetence. Many offences are 
satisfied when negligent conduct occurs, however these offences are 
often comparatively trivial so can potentially be justified on similar 
grounds to most strict liability offences. Whereas the courts have 
generally interpreted statute in a restrictive fashion so as to guard 
against convicting the blameless (at least of more serious offences), 
it is the House of Lords in England and Wales which provided for 
manslaughter by gross negligence. It goes without saying that this is a 
serious offence; the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. It is also 
important to stress that there is a distinction between negligence and 
gross negligence, though the fact that this is left to be determined by 
the jury on a case by case basis hardly inspires confidence. The extent 
to which someone’s conduct departed from what was reasonable to 
expect is in one sense irrelevant: an individual may be blameless even 
if his conduct was outrageous when measured objectively.
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When an individual dies as a consequence of someone breaching 
a duty of care, it is often easy to apportion factual blame and it may 
be appropriate for that person to be held liable in the civil courts. Is 
factual blame sufficient to warrant criminal liability even in extreme 
cases, however? Factual blame and moral blame would appear to be in 
danger of becoming conflated. It is also difficult to see an alternative 
basis for the offence as competence is unlikely to be achieved through 
deterrence and the public can be protected from those unable to 
perform at an acceptable standard in other ways. When responding to 
strict liability offences, the courts deserve credit for recognising the 
impact of a conviction and using that to ensure that the blameless are 
not held liable for serious criminal offences unless that is the stated 
intention of parliament. The blamestorming exercise here is far cruder 
and prioritises the harm caused at the expense of moral blame. The 
gravity of the harm is used to justify manslaughter by gross negligence 
whereas the severity of the stigma and punishment acts as a restraint 
in strict liability cases.
There are two interconnected processes at work: the way in which 
the criminal law allocates blame; and the way in which the criminal 
justice system allocates blame. For too long this has not been fully 
recognised in part because legal academics concentrated on the first 
and criminologists on the second. Academic criminal lawyers often 
fail to recognise that, even where the elements of an offence are made 
out, the arbitrary nature of the criminal justice process has a significant 
impact on who is subsequently convicted. Criminologists, on the other 
hand, frequently downplay the complexity of the criminal law thereby 
missing subtle but important processes which also determine who enters 
the criminal justice process. Neither process is value-neutral but this is 
not necessarily a problem, provided that the aims can be justified. Nor 
does the system have to espouse the same values at every stage; as well 
as being impractical there may be reasons why, for example, greater due 
process is required at points where individuals are especially vulnerable.
Describing the processes as interconnected was deliberate as it is 
too simplistic to view them as linear. Many procedural stages (arrest, 
prosecution and so on) are determined with regard to the law. 
Blamestorming in the context of the criminal law is a process which 
decides what conduct is criminal and, equally, what conduct escapes 
censure. Individual culpability influences the criminal law in diverse 
ways even leading to apparent conflicts with standard principles on 
occasion. These decisions have implications for the criminal justice 
system and it is to this that this chapter now turns.
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Blame and procedural decision-making
One of the perceptions that was challenged in Chapter Two is that the 
standard response to criminal activity involves a prosecution and trial 
and, if a conviction follows, the imposition of punishment. In reality the 
trial process is reserved for only a small proportion of individuals and 
many law-breakers are diverted from prosecution at an early stage. If a 
meaningful assessment of the importance of blame in society’s response 
to harmful behaviour is to be conducted, diversionary processes need 
to be considered alongside the trial process. It remains a moot point 
whether it is best to view diversionary measures as distinct processes in 
their own right or as part of a broader process for responding to crime.
An obvious starting point is whether the grounds for diverting some 
forms of activity while prosecuting others are sound. From a normative 
perspective, it would surely be offensive if more serious forms of 
delinquency were diverted and more trivial offences prosecuted yet 
there are instances where this seems to be the case. Objectively, tax 
evasion and the breach of health and safety regulations cause significant 
harm and, at least in the case of tax evasion, often entail deliberate, 
sophisticated planning. Prosecution, however, is reserved for a minority 
of serious cases. A more general policy of diverting minor crimes on 
grounds of proportionality and expediency is more defensible. Limited 
resources forces selectivity which means that prioritisation becomes a 
necessity. Proportionality is an appropriate guiding principle. Decisions 
about who should be diverted, whether at a macro or a micro level, 
could be classified as an exercise in blamestorming. It can be difficult 
to discern what guides these decisions though guidelines often suggest 
that individual culpability is a relevant concern alongside the gravity 
of the harm.
Blame is also of critical importance when one considers the cases 
that are dealt with in the orthodox fashion. It first has an impact on 
the decision as to whether prosecution is in the public interest. If 
prosecution is not seen as appropriate, the individual may be diverted 
but there is also the possibility that no further action will be taken. 
Deciding which court should hear the case depends broadly on offence-
severity, but this is not only a question of quantifying the harm that 
was caused. Individual culpability is also a relevant variable.
Determining sentence shows that blamestorming can arise 
post-conviction. The statutory framework and the guidelines that 
sentencers should follow in England and Wales delineate a system 
where the seriousness of the offence is of primary concern. Parliament 
recognised that offence-severity could not be measured if the offender’s 
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culpability was ignored (Criminal Justice Act 2003, s143(1)). The 
sentencing statistics provide evidence that there remains a high degree 
of subjectivity in quantifying the seriousness of any given offence and 
then determining what would constitute a proportionate sentence. 
Various factors may explain disparity such as court culture or the 
frequency with which sentencers are faced with a particular offence. 
The difficulty of measuring severity has, however, to be admitted. 
Blame, luck and diminished responsibility
We began this book with a discussion of the case of Mrs Inglis. The 
case raises important questions about the nature of blame and has a 
particular relevance to the issues discussed in Chapter Three. Blame 
is often presented as unproblematic and objectively identifiable. The 
increasing centrality of retribution to sentencing policy has led to the 
increasing importance of blame to criminal justice. Yet, as we have 
pointed out, it remains a topic which has been subject to limited 
analysis. In Chapter Three we saw that cognitive ability, self-control 
and resistance to peer pressure are key factors in the decision to commit 
wrongful acts. Since the commission of wrongful acts may lead to 
blame, levels of cognitive ability, self-control and resistance to peer 
pressure should logically be taken into account when assessing blame. 
We may not blame a three-year-old for taking a toy that belongs to 
another because we do not believe that a three-year-old necessarily has 
the ability to understand concepts of property rights and ownership. We 
expect adults to demonstrate higher levels of self-control than children 
and we are less surprised when a group of teenagers succumb to peer 
pressure than when a group of adults behave similarly. 
What is surprising perhaps is the fact that research that has been 
undertaken into developmental and cognitive psychology appears not to 
have informed decisions about blame and its place in the criminal justice 
system. While the setting of a minimum age of criminal responsibility 
may be influenced by perceptions of childhood and adolescence and 
the conflict between the child-as-victim and the child-as-threat, 
attitudes to mental illness might be expected to be more scientifically 
informed. Yet here, too, we saw how desire for retribution and the 
attribution of blame may outweigh objective assessments of criminal 
responsibility. The partial defences of diminished responsibility, loss 
of control and the offence of infanticide may have their origins in a 
desire to provide courts with the possibility of mitigating sentence 
where the normal imposition of a mandatory sentence was required. 
Yet a serious investigation of the extent to which ‘abnormal mental 
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function’ should reduce blame, and therefore affect sentence, is surely 
long overdue. Given the fact that the prison population as a whole has 
considerably lower levels of educational attainment and higher levels 
of mental illness than the population as a whole, one might question 
the extent to which current sentencing policy truly reflects levels of 
culpability.
The extent to which factors such as age and mental function may 
influence assessments of blame can sometimes appear something of 
a lottery. The concept of moral luck indicates that attribution of 
blame may be much more extensively a matter of chance. Often the 
consequences of any particular act or omission may be a matter of 
luck. The consequences of criminal activity are usually dependent 
on a combination of linked occurrences. We saw in the case of Mrs 
Inglis how a tragic combination of factors contributed to the death 
of Thomas Inglis. Had Edward Drummond been treated by different 
medical practitioners it is possible that he would have survived being 
shot by Daniel M’Naghten and students of criminal law would have 
no M’Naghten Rules to consider. The Kantian solution would be to 
blame only the intention and take no account of the act, yet ascertaining 
intention is no easy task. We often surmise intention from the act. 
The driver who intentionally breaks the speed limit may intend to 
arrive more quickly at the destination. The level of blame attaching 
to a speeding driver who hits and kills a child will be considerably 
more than that attaching to the speeding driver who hits and kills a 
rabbit. Both drivers will be blamed more than the speeding driver who 
arrives safely without incident at the destination. Even if we consider 
self-blame here it seems likely that the speeding driver who kills the 
child will feel the greatest self-blame.
Precursory conduct and the attribution of blame
Chapter Six presented a number of scenarios (involvement in 
paramilitary activity or gang membership, purchasing illegal drugs 
and the use of intoxicants) as a continuum based on the likelihood 
that crime would ensue. While joining a criminal enterprise may or 
may not be intrinsically unlawful, it demonstrates clear intention to 
offend. At the other extreme, despite considerable evidence showing 
a correlation between intoxication and crime, few drinkers set out 
to offend and the causal link between intoxication and offending is 
weak and elusive. Another observation was made, however: those 
scenarios where the causal link appears weakest arise most frequently. 
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This means that ignoring the earlier behaviour would have a greater 
aggregate effect. 
Blame can easily be imputed in an uncritical manner. The best 
example in this context is the way in which the concept of involvement 
in a criminal enterprise has been expanded from situations where 
someone is a willing participant in the enterprise to include those 
indebted to a drug dealer. Drug deals are illegal activities, but is it 
accurate and fair to categorise the purchaser as someone involved in a 
criminal enterprise? It is not difficult to provide an alternative account 
of a desperate individual fearing violent retaliation who commits an 
offence in which he would otherwise have played no part. In any event, 
surely there is a normative difference between an eager recruit to a 
criminal gang and someone who only offends under duress?
This example also shows how blame is often ascribed broadly. There 
are virtues in having a uniform approach to particular situations: a 
lack of uniformity exacerbates diverse outcomes which can lead to 
significant individual injustice. Certainty also allows for a considered 
debate about the approach adopted, although it becomes obvious that 
devising a uniform position can involve crude categorisation which 
often masks considerable variety. Returning to the drug user coerced 
into offending by a dealer, would justice be better served if courts 
recognised that factual situations may differ to the extent that sympathy 
is warranted in some cases but not in all? If the availability of a defence 
depends on the individual’s blame, over-broad categorisation would 
threaten a meaningful assessment of this key determinant in individual 
cases. Categorisation may then be crude and over-inclusive. It may 
also unravel when subjected to detailed analysis as is the case with the 
arbitrary distinction drawn between strict and basic liability offences 
in English law. But what of the central question? What blame should 
attach to behaviour, sometimes lawful, sometimes unlawful, which 
heightens one’s risk of committing an offence?
If there is a sufficient causal link between the precursory conduct and 
the crime – and this should be established rather than assumed – and if 
there is subjective awareness of the link, it would appear reasonable to 
attribute blame. This may legitimate an offence of, for example, joining 
a paramilitary organisation. Mere association does not cause harm in 
such a case, the mischief is the harm that would subsequently be caused. 
Other offences may perhaps reflect both the present condition and the 
increased potential for harm; the offence of being drunk and disorderly 
provides an example. More controversially, there is the German offence 
of ‘total intoxication’. This offence identifies the culpable behaviour 
(that is, the act of getting intoxicated) and, arguably, responds to that 
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in a proportionate manner. In so doing, it recognises the difficulty of 
establishing a causal link between intoxication and offending, although, 
as the offence definition requires a criminal harm to occur, an element 
of moral luck survives. Harm which can factually but not legally be 
attributed to the individual determines liability. Equating factual blame 
with moral blame in this manner is problematic.
Perceptions of justice remain important. The Daviault case in Canada 
demonstrates that genuine incredulity can follow the acquittal of a 
‘blameworthy’ individual. It is far from an isolated example. The law 
should not be driven solely by public perceptions which are often 
ill-informed and partial. One cannot sensibly gauge opinion on 
many issues and there is a danger that the most vocal are seen to be 
speaking on behalf of the majority. It is also a truism that bad cases 
do not make good law, and it is bad cases that generally excite the 
public. Nonetheless, popular sentiment can provide a useful barometer 
of whether the law is seen to operate in a just manner. Where the 
offender had engaged in conduct prior to the offence which appeared 
to have led to the offence, it would come as no surprise if the public 
viewed this behaviour as aggravating and demanded a more severe 
response. This is speculation. No studies that we are aware of have 
tested this hypothesis. One dated study into Australian sentencers’ 
perceptions (Potas, 1994) found a marked divergence of opinion about 
whether intoxication should aggravate or mitigate a sentence. If this 
finding is of more general applicability, government, the judiciary and 
commentators need to exercise caution before justifying policy on the 
basis of a perceived popular perception of blame.
Quantifying blame
Blame is an elusive concept, and its ubiquity in common 
language makes its measurement quite difficult. (McGraw, 
1991, 1149)
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 indicates that when deciding on 
sentence the sentencer much begin by considering the seriousness of 
the offence. S143(1) of the Act provides:
In considering the seriousness of any offence, the court must 
consider the offender’s culpability in committing the offence 
and any harm which the offence caused, was intended to 
cause or might foreseeably have caused.
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According to the Sentencing Guidelines Council (2004) four levels of 
culpability can be identified:
Where the offender:
 i) has the intention to cause harm, with the highest 
culpability when an offence is planned. The worse 
the harm intended, the greater the seriousness.
 ii) is reckless as to whether harm is caused, that is, 
where the offender appreciates at least some harm 
would be caused but proceeds giving no thought to 
the consequences even though the extent of the risk 
would be obvious to most people.
 iii) has knowledge of the specific risks entailed by his 
actions even though he does not intend to cause the 
harm that results.
 iv) is guilty of negligence.
Even in cases of strict liability and where no culpability needs to be 
proved it will still be relevant in determining the seriousness of the 
offence. Few would argue with the view that greater blame attaches to 
those who act intentionally than to those who are merely negligent. 
The Sentencing Council has provided more detail as to how culpability 
might be assessed although it accepts that assessing the seriousness of 
an offence (harm + culpability) is ‘a difficult task’ particularly where 
there is an imbalance between culpability and harm. As we saw in 
Chapter Three, moral luck may result in more or less harm being 
caused than was intended. In Chapter Five we discussed the factors 
that may increase or decrease seriousness. The impression here is that 
sentencing can be the scientific application of objective tests in which 
the sentencer quantifies the seriousness of the offence and determines 
the sentence. It may be ‘a difficult task’ but it is not an impossible 
one. Having accomplished the task the determined sentence will be 
proportionate and will reflect the level of blame the offender deserves.
Yet as we have argued throughout this book, blame is far more 
complex than the impression given in the Sentencing Council’s 
guidelines. It is:
as common as water and as transparent to the gaze. We all 
know what it is but we cannot explain what we know by 
describing the experience. Often there is no experience 
to describe. We also cannot explain what we know by 
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specifying blame’s purpose, since genuine blame is always 
impotent because always after the effect. Given its ubiquity, 
its elusiveness, and its evident moral importance, we might 
expect philosophers to have scrutinised blame carefully. But 
strikingly, they have not. (Sher, 2006, vii)
Social psychologists may argue that it is almost impossible to separate 
harm from culpability. Studies investigating the attribution of blame 
consistently find it linked to perceived harm caused (Ohbuchi et al, 
1989; Frederickson, 2010). There is evidence, too, that blame may 
be linked to perceived characteristics of the offender and the victim 
and the relationship between the two. Much of the research has been 
done in relation to attitudes to rapists (see, for example, Pollard, 1992; 
Whatley and Riggio, 1993). Less blame seems to attach to offenders 
when the victim is perceived as less respectable or is known to the 
offender. The maximum amount of blame is reserved for those who 
rape ‘respectable’ strangers. Yet as Birkbeck and Gabaldon (2001) point 
out: ‘Much interesting research remains to be done on the situational 
referents affecting the attribution of blame to offenders’ (p 100).
A far greater understanding of blame attribution and blame 
quantification is required if sentencing is to become a truly scientific 
and objective process. A greater understanding would also contribute 
to an understanding of offending behaviour since offenders also carry 
a conception of blame. Birkbeck and Gabaldon (2001) considered 
the research on offender morality to investigate whether offenders 
constructed blame differently from non-offenders. They identified a 
number of different types, but found that offenders often do engage 
in moral calculation before engaging in offending behaviour. It seems 
clear that the truly spontaneous, thoughtless act is rare (although more 
common among adolescents – see Chapter Three). The classic plea of 
the arrested criminal is ‘Why are you wasting your time with me? You 
should be out catching the real criminals.’ Many reduce self-blame by 
applying excuses and justifications to their actions or by comparing 
their actions to similar actions of others: ‘I may be bad but I am not 
as bad as them.’ 
This ability to recalibrate one’s moral compass and thus affect blame 
attribution is seen most starkly in relation to those who commit 
genocide or crimes against humanity. Chapter Five discussed how many 
of those engaged in the most horrendous activities during the Second 
World War led perfectly respectable, mostly law-abiding lives before and 
after the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Most 
of those who worked in the concentration camps were not deranged 
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sociopaths. For the most part they were ordinary citizens. They were 
able to commit the most atrocious acts because they did not believe 
that what they were doing was immoral or blameworthy: many felt 
they were acting for a greater good, others viewed their victims as less 
than human. The purpose of much propaganda during times of armed 
conflict is to demonise and dehumanise the enemy: if the Hutus/Jews/
Gays/and so on are less than human then little or no blame can be 
attributed if we do them harm. The Sentencing Guidelines Council 
(2004) recognises that the qualities of the victim affect culpability. We 
would argue that without a clear understanding of blame and how to 
quantify it, this presents a potential danger. If it is more blameworthy to 
target certain victims it must surely be less blameworthy to target other 
victims. This clearly has important implications for society as a whole.
Swiss cheese
In Chapter One we referred to an apparent growth in blame culture 
which in turn has led to an increasing focus on litigation and, in some 
areas, criminalisation. ‘Where there’s blame, there’s a claim’ captured 
the public imagination precisely because it appeared to chime with 
the growth in blame. Increasingly when bad things happen we seek 
out bad people to blame. Yet identifying the bad people does not seem 
to stop the bad things happening. Some suggest that this focus on the 
individual might be part of the problem. Often it can be easier, and 
more comforting, to allocate blame than to investigate the true causes 
of a bad event. The act of blaming allows us to separate the good from 
the bad, leaving us on the side of the good. Studies of human error 
identify two main approaches: the person approach, which generally 
involves blaming, and the system approach. The tradition within the 
medical domain has been to adopt the person approach. This was the 
approach adopted in respect of Beverly Allitt referred to in Chapter 
One. It has also tended to be the approach adopted in respect of 
many of the inquiries into child abuse. The person approach ‘views…
unsafe acts as arising primarily from aberrant mental processes such as 
forgetfulness, inattention, poor motivation, carelessness, negligence, 
and recklessness’ (Reason, 2000, 768): 
If something goes wrong, it seems obvious that an individual 
(or group of individuals) must have been responsible. 
Seeking as far as possible to uncouple a person’s unsafe 
acts from any institutional responsibility is clearly in the 
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interests of managers. It is also legally more convenient, at 
least in Britain. (p 768)
The system approach, by contrast, sees human error as normal, 
expected behaviour and focuses instead on changing the conditions 
under which humans operate. It is credited with having led to major 
improvements in aviation safety. This approach focuses on a layered 
series of defensive barriers and safeguards:
In an ideal world each defensive layer would be intact. In 
reality, however, they are more like slices of Swiss cheese, 
having many holes – though unlike in the cheese, these 
holes are continually opening, shutting, and shifting their 
location. The presence of holes in any one ‘slice’ does not 
normally cause a bad outcome. Usually, this can happen 
only when the holes in many layers momentarily line up 
to permit a trajectory of accident opportunity – bringing 
hazards into damaging contact with victims. The holes in 
the defences arise for two reasons: active failures and latent 
conditions. Nearly all adverse events involve a combination 
of these two sets of factors. (Reason, 2000, 769)
Active failures do usually arise from conduct of individuals with direct 
contact with the system and this may involve rule violation. Latent 
conditions are:
[The] inevitable ‘resident pathogens’ within the system. 
They arise from decisions made by designers, builders, 
procedure writers, and top level management. Such 
decisions may be mistaken, but they need not be. All 
such strategic decisions have the potential for introducing 
pathogens into the system. Latent conditions have two kinds 
of adverse effect: they can translate into error provoking 
conditions within the local workplace (for example, time 
pressure, understaffing, inadequate equipment, fatigue, 
and inexperience) and they can create longlasting holes 
or weaknesses in the defences (untrustworthy alarms and 
indicators, unworkable procedures, design and construction 
deficiencies, etc). Latent conditions – as the term suggests 
– may lie dormant within the system for many years before 
they combine with active failures and local triggers to create 
an accident opportunity. Unlike active failures, whose 
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specific forms are often hard to foresee, latent conditions 
can be identified and remedied before an adverse event 
occurs. Understanding this leads to proactive rather than 
reactive risk management. (Reason, 2000, 769)
The Swiss cheese model does not deny that active failures may arise 
from malice on the part of individuals but that an overemphasis on 
blame can lead to a failure to consider latent conditions and system 
flaws. Being ‘tough on crime and the causes of crime’ does have the 
potential of considering both active failures and latent conditions. Yet, 
as we argued in Chapter Seven, the emphasis has been crime rather 
than its causes. It is more comforting to prosecute and blame individuals 
for genocide than to look for the underlying causes. 
The blamemongers: from process to value
This book set out to provide a criminological account of the role blame 
plays in the operation of criminal justice at a national and supra-national 
level. Our justification for taking this approach was broadly two-fold. 
First, while aspects of criminal justice had been explored in this way, 
there was a strong case for a more sustained analysis that included some 
hitherto unexplored and under-explored areas of criminal justice. 
Second, criminology draws on a number of disciplines, some of which 
have much to contribute to a study of blame. A criminological approach 
not only enabled us to draw on this literature, but compelled us to do 
so, even when this challenged our disciplinary comfort zones. Inevitably 
we drew more heavily from some areas than from others – in many 
cases not those that were originally anticipated. Issues emerged which 
demanded incorporation or expansion and, inevitably, this came at the 
cost of other arguments which we deemed less valuable. 
Philosophy and criminal law theory provided especially rich 
literatures and it is therefore apt that the book ends not with comment 
about the process of attributing blame but rather with a plea: given that 
the process of blamestorming appears inevitable, and that the process 
often has a disproportionate impact on the already disadvantaged, 
continual vigilance is required if the process of criminalisation can be 
morally justified.
Attributing blame is not a value-neutral process. Decisions have to 
be made which can have far-reaching consequences, not only to the 
person whose conduct is or is not adjudged to be culpable. Other 
stakeholders are affected, perhaps most notably those directly harmed 
by the incident: the attribution of blame may change the sense in which 
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they are seen to be victims. More broadly, society is affected by our 
readiness to apportion blame and by the consequences which follow 
such a finding. A central claim made in this work is that there is an 
increasing demand for an individual (or other legal actor) to be held 
to account for a harmful event and that this trend has been amplified 
by a similar demand that the blameworthy are then punished. As a 
consequence, the reach of the criminal law has extended which should 
be a matter of concern to all those who respect individual liberty.
This is not to say that criminalisation is never warranted. Conduct 
which results in significant harm has sometimes been neglected 
shamefully. Recent attempts to address human trafficking provides an 
example. Other offences may be necessary as a response to emerging 
threats such as cyber crime. If examples can be found of new offences 
which can be justified the book documents numerous insidious 
developments. Intervention is often based on perceived harm. Some 
forms of harm which have been recognised, for example, violence in 
a domestic setting, do indeed justify either criminalisation or more 
rigorous enforcement. Not all harms should result in criminalisation, 
however. In some cases a de minimis rule should apply: criminal justice 
involvement is unnecessary on grounds of proportionality. In other 
cases, the harm lacks the specificity that should determine criminal 
liability. Anti-social behaviour, to take the most infamous example, 
can have an extremely adverse effect on quality of life, but deeming 
ostensibly lawful conduct anti-social represents a significant curtailment 
of liberty. Most significantly, over-reliance on harm as a determinant 
of criminal liability masks the potentially uncomfortable truth that 
people are not always to blame for harmful events. Blame is a concept 
of significant rhetorical value and one with profound consequences 
for those whose conduct satisfies the blamemongers. A concept of 
such subjectivity lends itself to distortion and over-simplification. 
Sometimes this manipulation would appear cynical and deliberate, 
but it would be wrong to deny that this is always the case. Blame is 
complex and contestable.
At a time when recourse to the criminal law continues apace, blame 
can fulfil another function. It can act as a restraint. The Criminal Justice 
Act 2003, the most important statute on sentencing in England and 
Wales, states correctly that the seriousness of an offence should be 
measured with reference both to harm and to individual culpability. 
This recognises that someone who causes serious harm may nonetheless 
have limited culpability. Neither harm nor blameworthiness can 
determine the seriousness of an offence in isolation. This insight is also 
relevant when decisions are made about criminalisation. Both harm 
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and blameworthiness should be considered before a new offence is 
created. Other factors are relevant; most notably, would another strategy 
yield greater benefits? These should not be absolute requirements – 
social regulation may justify the existence of strict liability offences 
in some instances, for example. Ultimately, however, there should be 
a significant onus on policy makers to explain why conduct which 
causes no harm or which can be committed by the blameless should 
be criminalised. 
A critique of the process by which blame is assigned is vital in 
understanding how criminal justice operates. Claims, some of which 
are fair but others baseless, that individuals are blameworthy, are central 
to the enterprise. Used thoughtfully, though, blame provides more than 
an analytical tool. It has the potential to provide a normative basis for 
challenging the boundaries of the criminal law and the operation of 
the criminal justice system. These are vital tasks.
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Glossary
ACTUS REUS Every criminal offence specifies the conduct that is 
prohibited. All aspects of the definition must be satisfied in order to 
secure a conviction. A distinction is drawn between actus reus and mens 
rea requirements. The actus reus relates to the prohibited conduct. 
Taking the example of theft in English law, s1 Theft Act 1968 states that 
theft is the dishonest appropriation of property belonging to another 
with the intention to permanently deprive the other of it. The actus 
reus requires the appropriation of property belonging to another.
BASIC INTENT Criminal offences in England and Wales are classified 
as offences of basic or specific intent. In cases involving basic intent 
offences, evidence of voluntary intoxication is irrelevant and must be 
ignored when determining whether the defendant satisfied the mens 
rea of the offence. There is debate about how offences should be 
classified but generally offences that can be committed recklessly are 
basic intent offences.
BENEFITS AND BURDENS THEORY An account of retributive 
justice associated with Herbert Morris and Jeffrie Murphy. It relies on 
the assumption that law-breakers can an unfair advantage through their 
offending whilst we can all benefit from the law abiding behaviour of 
others. The task of the criminal justice system is therefore to provide 
a balance between the benefits and burdens of conformity with the 
law so we all benefit.
BLAME REQUIREMENT Not all offences require the defendant 
to be blameworthy (see Strict Liability). However, courts have felt 
uneasy convicting the blameless of more serious offences, particularly 
where it is felt that conviction carries stigma and / or the likely 
punishment is significant. In such cases the courts have introduced a 
blame requirement unless it is clear that parliament intended otherwise.
BLAMELESS CRIME Most criminal liability (and blame) is dependent 
upon some element of intention on the part of the offender. Blameless 
crime refers to those situations where the action alone can give rise 
to liability irrespective of intention. The most common example is 
provided by strict liability offences. Arguably too, imposing liability 
for reckless behaviour also involves an element of blameless crime.
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BLAMEMONGERS The issue of who is allocating blame, and their 
right to do so, can often be significant. Blamemongers refers to those 
who apportion and allocate blame.
BLAMESTORMING Identified by the Oxford English Dictionary for 
the first time in 2003, Blamestorming refers to the increased tendency 
today to seek to apportion and allocate blame following any perceived 
failure.
BUSINESS CONDITION We use the term Blamemonger to refer to 
those who engage in allocating blame. The Business Condition is one 
of four conditions identified by Bell as a necessary requirement for the 
legitimate claim to blamemonger status. According to Bell, we can only 
legitimately blame another when it is our business to do so: we need 
to have some interest in the action/inaction attracting blame. Privacy 
also dictates that we have no ‘business’ in certain private acts of others.
CAUSAL LUCK  One of four types of moral luck identified by 
Thomas Nagel. Causal luck has similarities with Circumstantial Luck 
and Constitutive Luck. The question arises as to the extent one can be 
blamed for actions that are the result of causes outside one’s control.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL LUCK One of the four types of moral luck 
identified by Thomas Nagel. Circumstantial luck refers to the fact that 
the circumstances one finds oneself in can be a matter of chance and 
outside one’s control. Individuals are blamed for actions they take or 
fail to take and little account is taken of what might have happened 
had circumstances been different.
COMMON SENSE Like Blame, Common Sense is a concept which 
superficially appears to be intuitive and unproblematic. Common sense 
is often used as a substitute for real, cogent evidence. This, for example, 
in debates about the minimum age of criminal responsibility the idea 
that children cannot distinguish between right and wrong is dismissed 
as ‘flying in the face of common sense’. The appeal to common sense 
is used to justify the lack of more scientific inquiry.
CONSTITUTIVE LUCK One of four types of moral luck identified 
by Thomas Nagel (and others). Constitutive luck refers to qualities 
we possess over which we have no control. To a large extent our 
personality is dependent on luck. Given that our personality has an 
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influence on how we behave and how we act, to some extent our 
actions are therefore dependent on Constitutive Luck.
CONTEMPORARY CONDITION A necessary condition identified 
by Bell to be satisfied by those seeking to allocate blame. The legitimacy 
of one’s blame diminishes the further one is in terms of time and space 
from the target of that blame.
CRIME CONTROL In a seminal article about the criminal justice 
process, Howard Packer distinguished between crime control and due 
process values. The crime control model prized systemic efficiency 
and was designed to facilitate the conviction of the guilty. Packer’s 
models originate in the late 1960s and have attracted criticism in the 
intervening period but it is agreed that they represent a valuable means 
of exploring the tensions inherent in the criminal justice process.
CRIMINAL CULPABILITY In order to establish criminal culpability 
all of the requirements of an offence have to be proved. Moreover, 
criminal culpability is avoided if a valid defence exists. In England and 
Wales, for example, a nine-year-old cannot be criminally culpable 
even if he satisfied all of the requirements of a given offence. Criminal 
culpability therefore depends wholly on legal determinations about the 
scope of offences and defences; if the nine-year-old satisfied all of the 
requirements of an offence in Scotland he would be criminally liable.
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE For the purposes of this book, a criminal 
enterprise is taken to mean a group or organisation set up to engage 
in criminal activity. This term is deliberately broad and would include 
both a gang of shoplifters and Mafia organisations.
CRIMINAL OFFENCES Conduct defined by the law as illegal, the 
breach of which can result in conviction and punishment. A vast range 
of conduct is criminalised; no-one knows how many offences exist 
but there are many thousand. Although many offences have a long 
pedigree, the criminal law evolves. New offences are created whilst 
other conduct is decriminalised. Countries also criminalise different 
types of behaviour. There is legitimate debate about what forms of 
behaviour should be criminal. Not all offences require blameworthy 
conduct on the part of the offender and this is a key theme in this 
book. Another contention made is that the growth in the number of 
offences can be explained by a greater readiness to attribute individual 
blame to harmful events.
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CRIMINOGENIC  This term denotes factors which heighten the 
risk of offending.
DISHONESTY Many property offences (e.g. fraud and theft) require 
the defendant to have acted dishonestly. It is a mens rea requirement 
of these offences. There has been debate about whether dishonesty 
should be assessed objectively or subjectively. Both of these approaches 
are problematic and, in England and Wales, a hybrid position has been 
adopted whereby an initial determination is made about whether the 
conduct was dishonest by the standards of reasonable and honest people. 
If it was, dishonesty is found if the defendant would have realised that 
reasonable and honest people would have regarded it thus.
DUE PROCESS  The second of Howard Packer’s models of the 
criminal justice process. Due process was taken to mean that procedural 
safeguards were put in place at crucial junctures to ensure that the 
innocent were not convicted. These protections could impede crime 
control values as the factually guilty could also benefit. Although 
recent criminal justice legislation often appears driven by crime 
control concerns, due process rights are often embedded in human 
rights conventions.
EXTRAORDINARY CRIMES  Mass killings, crimes against 
humanity, genocide and grave breaches of human rights have frequently 
been referred to as Extraordinary Crimes; the level and scale of violence 
seemingly taking such activities beyond the sphere of the normal or 
ordinary. The instances of such violence perhaps suggests that such 
crimes are sadly less extraordinary than is claimed. In any event, such 
crimes are committed by ‘ordinary’ people. It does appear, however, 
that extraordinary crimes attract a higher level of blame.
GUIDELINE JUDGMENTS  Prior to a more formal system of 
sentencing guidelines, the Court of Appeal issued a series of guidelines 
on sentencing particular offences or on generic sentencing issues 
such as determining whether an offence is sufficiently serious to 
warrant a custodial sentence. The coverage of offences was patchy and 
concentrated on the most serious offences which would ordinarily 
attract lengthy terms of imprisonment. Guideline judgments were 
particularly ineffective when giving advice on more generic issues such 
as determining the seriousness of an offence for sentencing purposes.
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INTENTION Some offences specify that the defendant must have 
intended a particular result. In England and Wales, for example, murder 
requires an intention to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm. Intention 
is conceptually problematic and this has generated considerable case law 
on the topic. Intention covers situations where it is someone’s purpose 
or aim to achieve a particular end. The problematic cases have centred 
on situations where the result was virtually inevitable. Can intention 
be inferred? The current law in England and Wales allows the jury to 
infer intention if they conclude that the defendant realised that the 
outcome was a virtual certainty of his actions.
JUST DESERTS The level of blame may be reflected in the amount 
of punishment imposed. Retributivist accounts of punishment require 
that any sanction is proportionate to the seriousness of the offence so 
that the offender receives what he or she justly deserves. 
MENS REA Most, though not all, offences specify a state of mind 
which must have been present at the time of the offence. Intention, 
recklessness and dishonesty are common examples. The exception 
are strict liability offences which specify no mens rea requirements. 
How mens rea terms are defined in statute or by the courts is of 
central importance to this study as the tests employed may or may not 
encompass blameless behaviour.
MORAL LUCK A concept particularly associated with Thomas Nagel 
and Bernard Williams, moral luck refers to the situation where blame 
may be allocated or withheld for reasons outside the control of the 
moral actor.
NON-COMPLICITY CONDITION Bell argues that this needs to 
be met before one can legitimately allocate blame. If one has been 
complicit in the wrongdoing complained of, one loses the right to 
allocate blame.
NON-HYPOCRISY CONDITION Identified by Bell, this refers to 
the argument that one has no standing to blame another for conduct 
one is guilty of oneself.
OBJECTIVITY A central dilemma for the criminal law is whether 
certain mens rea requirements, particularly dishonesty and recklessness, 
should be determined using an objective or a subjective test. An 
objective test relies upon the perceptions of a hypothetical reasonable 
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person as distinct from the particular defendant. Potential injustice 
occurs when the defendant’s competency departs from that of the 
reasonable person. Adopting an objective test raises questions about 
the acceptability of convicting those who are, for whatever reason, 
unable to reach the objective standard required.
PROFESSIONAL OFFENDING The Sentencing Council identifies 
professional offending as a category of offending that attracts higher 
levels of blame. The increased levels of premeditation and planning 
are associated with higher levels of culpability.
PUTTING ONESELF IN HARM’S WAY In this book the authors 
use the term to denote a variety of circumstances whereby individuals 
embark on conduct which heightens the risk that they will subsequently 
offend. Examples include becoming intoxicated and joining a criminal 
gang. Other commentators have considered these behaviours in 
isolation but our contention is that issues of blame link them and that 
a wider assessment is warranted.
QUASI-CRIMINAL This is a term of art used to describe conduct 
prohibited by the criminal law which is not perceived as properly 
criminal in character. The distinction between quasi-criminal and 
criminal behaviour would appear to depend more on questions of 
blame than on the harm or potential harm associated with the offence 
as many regulatory offences which would be classed as quasi-criminal 
nonetheless carry the risk of serious harm occurring.
REASONABLE PERSON The reasonable person is an important legal 
construct, particularly in the civil law. However, the reasonable person 
is also relevant to the criminal law most notably when an objective 
test is employed to determine liability. Generally the reasonable person 
has no specific characteristics but in certain situations gender and age 
may be taken into account. The specific defendant may then share 
few characteristics with the reasonable person, sometimes through no 
fault of his own.
RECKLESSNESS  Risk-taking can be both blameworthy and 
dangerous depending on the context. Some forms of risky conduct may 
be highly dangerous but cannot be regarded as morally blameworthy; 
emergency surgery may serve as an example. Many offences can be 
committed recklessly which recognises the blame that attaches to such 
behaviour. An enduring concern is whether recklessness demands 
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subjective appreciation of risk or whether an objective recognition 
should suffice. English law has vacillated between the two approaches 
but, after a series of cases where blameless individuals were convicted, 
it is now incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the defendant 
foresaw the risk.
RESULTANT LUCK One of four types of moral luck identified by 
Thomas Nagel. Resultant luck refers to a situation where two people 
may act in the same way with identical intent yet their action has very 
different results. Resultant luck raises important questions as far as the 
allocation of blame is concerned since whether or not harm is done 
becomes a matter of chance.
SCAPEGOATS  Historically, scapegoats were those who took the 
blame for the wrongdoing of others. Increasingly its meaning has been 
widened to include those who may carry some element of blame. 
Sometimes the search for scapegoats following criminal activity will 
go beyond the direct perpetrators.
SENTENCING COUNCIL The Sentencing Council is a body charged 
with providing guidance on sentencing particular offences or on more 
general sentencing issues. Most members of the Council are judges 
though there are members representing criminal justice agencies, victim 
organisations and academia. Sentencers are bound to follow guidelines 
unless it is contrary to the interests of justice to do so. It is difficult to 
assess whether this occurs from the sentencing statistics.
SPECIFIC INTENT In English criminal law offences are classified as 
either basic intent or specific intent offences. The distinction becomes 
relevant in cases involving voluntary intoxication as the relevance of 
evidence of intoxication differs depending upon classification. With 
regards to specific intent offences, evidence of voluntary intoxication 
can be considered when determining whether the defendant satisfied 
the mens rea of the offence. Diverse, and potentially incompatible, 
means of classification exist but specific intent offences generally require 
proof that the defendant intended a particular result.
STRICT LIABILITY Certain offences, often comparatively minor in 
nature, require no fault on the part of the defendant. These offences are 
classified as strict liability offences. The courts recognise that blameless 
individuals can (indeed should) be convicted of these offence if the 
other requirements are met. In certain situations, however, the courts 
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have imposed a blame requirement due to the impact of a conviction 
in terms of reputation and punishment.
SUBJECTIVITY Whilst an objective test relies upon the hypothetical 
reasonable person, a subjective test assesses whether the individual 
defendant foresaw risk or realised that his actions were dishonest. This 
removes the objection that an objective test can impose unrealistic 
standards and lead to the conviction of the blameless. In the leading 
cases on dishonesty and recklessness the courts considered in depth 
the importance of blameworthiness in the criminal law.
TOTAL INCAPACITATION The German Criminal Code contains 
an offence of Total Incapacitation which is an alternative verdict when 
the requirements of another offence are not satisfied as the defendant’s 
intoxication at the time compromised his ability to form an intention to 
cause a particular harm or foresee the harm as a possible consequence 
of his actions. The offence carries a maximum penalty of five years’ 
imprisonment.
UNIT FINES Unless financial penalties take account of an offender’s 
financial means the punishment will impact disproportionately on 
those on modest incomes. The Criminal Justice Act 1991 introduced 
a system of unit fines to accommodate disparity. Sentencers would 
determine the gravity of an offence and allocate it a unit value. The 
amount of the fine would be calculated with regard to the number 
of units and the offender’s disposable income. After sustained (and 
sometimes misleading) media criticism, unit fines were abolished in 
the Criminal Justice Act 1993. The general principle that fines should 
reflect an offender’s means remains.
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“Blame and its relation to criminalisation have been neglected in criminal 
justice studies. Drawing on legal philosophy, this book puts them firmly 
under the spotlight of a thorough multi-disciplinary interrogation.” 
Professor Colin Sumner, University College Cork, Ireland
“A much-needed critical review of the role and parameters of ‘blame’ 
within criminal regulation. Accessibly written and insightful in its analyses 
throughout, this book compels a re-evaluation of our attributions and 
tactics of blaming in 21st-century criminal justice policy.”  
Professor Vanessa Munro, University of Nottingham, UK
We live in a society that is increasingly preoccupied with allocating blame: when 
something goes wrong someone must be to blame. Bringing together philosophical, 
psychological and sociological accounts of blame, this is the first detailed criminological 
account of the role of blame. The authors present a novel study of the legal process of 
blame attribution, set in the context of criminalisation as a social and political process. 
This timely and topical book will be essential reading for anyone working or researching 
in the criminal justice field. It will also be of wider interest to anyone wishing to discover 
the role of blame in modern society.
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